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ABSTRACT 
 
Robert Olen McDonald: The Prophets of Incentives: The Metastasis of Economic Tropes in 
Policy and Culture 
(Under the direction of Christian O. Lundberg) 
 
This dissertation critically evaluates the discourses of “incentive-driven behavior” that 
have arisen in culture, politics and in economic theory. I use the framework of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis to develop a critical typology of “the incentive,” and deploy rhetorical theory to 
account for the metastasis thereof. Fundamentally, I argue that “incentives” retroactively fills in 
a gap in our explanations of a chaotic social reality, and presumes that market structures (prices, 
preferences) organize all of human behavior. The result is that a fairly narrow set of assumptions 
about human behavior and social phenomena—borrowed from neoclassical economic theory—
are smuggled into cultural analysis and politics. “Incentives” then work proactively to diagnose 
and solve social problems using market mechanisms, and retroactively to account for inequalities 
by presuming incentive structures operative below the phenomenal level. 
This vocabulary explicitly dismisses alternative explanations including psychology, 
history, and sociology, and as such, threatens the ability of rhetoric, critical theory and cultural 
studies to resist this flattening of reality into markets, especially given how prevalent economists 
have become in social policy and what Lawrence Grossberg calls “economic culture.” The term 
has its roots in ancient Greek and Latin, but was adopted by neoclassical economics as an object 
that could stand for both desire and fulfillment in equilibrium analysis. Its later metastasis comes 
through the work of Bank of Sweden-prizewinning economist Gary Becker, who applied the 
 iv 
incentive driven approach to all cultural, political, social and personal phenomena, and more 
recently through the cultural artifacts of Freakonomics and Nudge. 
Through an analysis of testimony in favor of, and against equal pay legislation, I 
diagnose how “incentive-based” vocabularies have seeped into public policy debates and the 
consequences once this has occurred. I conclude with a set of questions about the shape of the 
modern liberal state after incentive-based approaches are implemented by the current presidential 
administration.  
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Chapter 1: The Metastatic Logic of the Incentive 
 
“Economists, the prophets of incentives, quite logically respond to their own incentives to 
service their various constituencies, and as they never cease to insist, life is nothing but a 
sequence of trade-offs. Whenever they make reference to the ‘public good’ or ‘general welfare’ 
in the course of their endeavors, they frequently mean nothing more than the brute fact of caveat 
emptor.”—Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste1 
 
This is a story about a seemingly innocuous concept—the “incentive”—that has become 
nearly ubiquitous in contemporary discourse. Journalists, politicians, economists, and people 
from virtually every walk of life use it as a synonym for motive, desire, and reward—it has 
become the modern world’s organizing metaphor for our subjective causes of action, and the 
name for the primary inducements in human behavior. The prophets of incentives have won 
Bank of Sweden prizes in economic sciences2, been appointed to presidential administrations, 
become widely cited federal district court judges, and have not only testified in front of, but have 
been elected to the United States Congress. The liberals of all parties, both Democratic and 
Republican, deploy such language to explain why the present looks the way it does. According to 
its proponents, the logic of “incentives” explains how judges rule, how businesses motivate 
workers, and even when people turn off the light at night to sleep. The logic of the incentive has 
metastasized over whole new regions of culture, politics and society—and, as I will argue in 
what follows, this metastasis has severe consequences for public life.  
To see the implications of the expansion of incentive thinking, one has to understand the 
assumptions built into the rhetorical logic of the incentive. Embedded within this term is a 
                                                
1 Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste: How Neoliberalism Survived the Financial Meltdown 
 
2 Otherwise known as the “Nobel Prize in Economics.” 
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discrete history and politics, both of which entail a set of commitments to market-based 
approaches to solving social problems, via the engineering of incentive structures. The rhetoric 
and logic of engineering incentives announces a presumably pragmatic way of engaging social 
problems, but it only gains the purchase it does by normalizing assumptions about the texture of 
social reality and the character of the social bond, including a commitment a specific definition 
of the rationality of social action, and to the consensual character of the social bond. Thus, the 
use of the term “incentive” harbors a struggle over the appropriate organizing metaphors for 
social life. As a result, the decision to approach social reality through the logics and rhetoric of 
the incentive is neither neutral, nor devoid of commitments to an economically determined vision 
of social life. Far from it: its implementation narrows our explanatory faculties, limits our 
capacity to speak meaningfully about difference, and precludes questions about the non-
economic determinants of social change. It is, in other words, nowhere near as innocuous as it 
seems, and, as I will show, “buying” into the incentive as a means of interpreting social reality 
requires the assumption of a whole range of doctrines about the character of the subject, its 
choices, and its means of relating to the world. 
The social logic of the incentive aims to explain some fairly philosophically heavy issues 
that plague human existence: Mainly, it purports to address why it is we do the things that we do. 
Our behaviors could be the result of our existential angst, our habitation in language, our 
repressed childhood sexual trauma, our being-with-others, or the complex articulation of 
multiple temporalities and logics, each of which deserve our careful attention. Not so for the 
prophets of incentives. As authors Steven Levitt and Stephen Dubner put it, “Incentives are the 
cornerstone of modern life.”3 For these authors, and for other consequential thinkers, to be 
                                                
3 Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, Freakonomics: A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of 
Everything (New York: William Morrow & Co., 2005), 13. 
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“incentive-driven” is the human condition: We act through a system of external rewards or 
penalties, and we act in accordance with our own unique desires. This slim, seemingly harmless 
conceptual edifice authorizes a host of presumptions and prescriptions that can have calamitous 
consequences for human life. Crucially, the point of incentive language is not that it founds an 
account, but rather, it retroactively presumes an account that supplants alternatives. When people 
perform any action—marry a partner, run a stop sign, join a protest movement—and the causes 
are unclear, it is an easy shortcut to say one was “incentivized” by it. As I demonstrate, 
attributing the conditions that produced the behavior to “incentives” does not solve the problem 
of causality—instead, it hides it via a post hoc explanation, adherent to the precepts of 
neoclassical economic thought. 
Like all discursive formations, the discourse of economics functions at the level of 
attribution: No theoretical apparatus fully covers the social field. Rather, any such apparatus is a 
compromise formation that retroactively accounts for, and proactively contours, our 
comportment to an inconsistent social field. There are better and worse ways to tell this story, 
and the story that “incentive-based” forms of knowledge production give us is pernicious. The 
expanding domain of academic economics into public policy, into matters of public import, and 
onto cultural formations, should concern us as critical scholars because those at its forefront aim 
to supplant and replace alternative and resistant vocabularies under the “one social science” that 
is economics. Such an approach promotes a form without content, but in so doing, proscribes 
alternatives by rendering all content the result of a narrow neoclassical form. This inquiry is a 
first step in documenting the rhetorical movement of “incentives” in various sites of social 
importance, explicating its consequences (namely, the endorsement of private property and 
market structures at an ontological level), and pointing to what it foreclosed as a result. This 
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logic, along with its theoretical and political fellow-travelers, presents a serious challenge: Its 
prevalence, its utterances, its metastasis signals the serious work that must be done to overcome 
and overturn market-based thinking in the multiple sites where it occurs. 
From its original poetic usage as a “fire” or a “tune” that sets people in motion, and 
through movements within the field of economic thought that reduce it strictly to financial 
motivation, today “incentives” have been raised to an all-encompassing account of human 
behavior. The “incentive-driven” approach posits an explanatory matrix that smuggles in a fairly 
narrow set of commitments from neoclassical economic theory onto analyses of social 
phenomena. The scope of “incentive” metastasizes a neoclassical style of analysis far beyond its 
uptake in orthodox economic thought. For instance, Federal Circuit Court Judge Richard Posner 
relies upon “incentives” as part of his judicial philosophy, informed by the precepts of orthodox 
neoclassical economics. As Jeanne Lorraine Schroeder writes of Posner, “the ‘economist’s basic 
analytical tool for studying markets’ can be used to study other behavior.”4 Its avowed universal 
applicability ends up reducing the complexity of any given situation to fit standard assumptions 
from neoclassical economic thought. Its ubiquity becomes its limitation; as I demonstrate, the 
“incentive-driven” approach frequently ends up affirming tautologies and reaffirming the 
rectitude of any given status quo. 
The presence of the term “incentives” clues us into a gap in the intelligibility of social 
reality that is filled in symbolically: As a result, alternative possibilities outside of market-based 
approaches are foreclosed. Used by some economists, they retroactively account for all 
inequalities and irrationalities, and narrate them as freely chosen rational behaviors; used by 
policymakers, incentives are used to proactively assume in advance individual preferences and 
                                                
4 Jeanne Lorraine Schroeder, The Triumph of Venus: The Erotics of the Market (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2004), 17. 
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socially (and economically) beneficial behaviors in order to contour social reality. Incentives are 
a point of investment in a particular(ly) economic interpretation of sociality itself, and the 
repetition and circulation of this trope signals to me how enjoyment (jouissance) is attributed and 
distributed across the social field. The result is a non-falsifiable, and hermetically sealed 
discourse. It is non-falsifiable because any new information or outcome can be narrated as the 
result of a “hidden” incentive, or a “shadow price” that we have not discovered yet; it is 
hermetically sealed because only new information (as data) can be entered, not new or different 
analytics or problems. 
Careful attention to a rhetoric of trope is vital for interrogating the consequences of how 
“incentive-based” vocabularies work to explain social phenomena. “Incentive-based” logics 
produce a coherent narrative of society by retroactively ascribing a neoclassical economic 
“meaning” to any and all activity. This retroactive sense-making is then propelled forward, and 
used as data (and a moral entreaty) to proactively organize the social field through the production 
of new “incentive structures.” The end result is that the term “incentive” joins together past, 
present and future ways of acting and being in the world, all profoundly circumscribed by the 
discourses of neoclassical economics. Thus I invoke a rhetoric of trope to explain how the social 
logic of the “incentive” is defined by three tropological movements—first as metonymy, next as 
metaphor, and finally as metastasis. Incentive logics work by knotting these three discursive 
moments as a comprehensive explanation for human life. First, “incentive” is placed alongside a 
series of terms—reward, desire, motive, etc.—and rendered as their functional equivalent, or 
metonym. Next, it supplants these alternatives by rendering financial motivation a metaphor for 
motivation writ large: It condenses neoclassical commitments into “financial motivation” as the 
paradigm for all of human behavior. Only then can “incentive” return to the complexities of 
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social life as a metastatic vocabulary, but not as a general synonym for human behavior. Instead, 
financial motivation becomes the model for all of human reality, not the end in and of itself. The 
condensed meaning of “incentive” can metastasize over any available social context because it 
strictly presumes that at root, markets provide the ontological structure of reality. As I argue 
below, the step of “metastasis” epitomizes both condensation and figural displacement, which 
produces a rhetorical “perpetual motion machine” that integrates economic vocabularies onto 
social formations. The sentence “every action acquires an economic meaning” sums up my 
threefold analysis of the incentive-based approach: Metastasis is the “every,” metaphor is the 
“economic meaning,” and metonymy represents the “acquires.” 
First, incentives exist as a metonym, or a trope of displacement, in which other terms are 
set up as functional equivalents for “incentive”: Rewards, desires, motives, reasons, penalties, 
etc., are lined up in a signifying chain that could make any one of them equivalent to substitute 
one another. In any given context, “incentive” can name a set of incidental connections to the 
other terms, the result is that we do not blink an eye when we name each of these fairly distinct 
concepts as equivalent to it. For instance, journalist Zaid Jilani of The Intercept asked on Twitter 
what “incentive” presidential candidate Hillary Clinton has to act differently when her interest 
group supporters in organized labor do not challenge her positions on trade. He writes, “If they 
are just going to pretend Clinton is good in the area when she isnt [sic] what is her incentive to 
do anything differently?”5 And elsewhere, a colleague of mine in Political Science described to 
me the difficulties of teaching online through the University of North Carolina. Because 
instructors do not own the intellectual property of the course, he told me that “there’s no 
incentive for grad students” to improve their existing courses. In these cases, “reason,” “benefit,” 
or “reward” could be easily substituted for “incentive” without much alteration to the meaning of 
                                                
5 Zaid Jilani, https://twitter.com/ZaidJilani/status/748323554568003586, June 29, 2016. Accessed June 29, 2016. 
 7 
the sentences. Yet my gamble is that these terms do not remain “functional equivalents”—there 
is a (non-subjective) libidinal surplus within the deployment of the term, which brings the 
movement from metonymy to metaphor. 
Next, the term does not just stand as equivalent to these other terms—it condenses them 
into itself; “incentive” becomes a metaphor for all goal-directed behavior. Within the domain of 
early 20th century neoclassical economics, the term becomes a metaphor, or a trope of 
condensation, for commitments to a strictly neo-classically “economic” vision of society. That is, 
the term “sums up” investments in the story that neoclassical economics has about itself, 
predicated on the axioms of utility maximization, selfish behavior, and market equilibrium. 
“Incentive” comes to simultaneously describe the external laws of capitalism and the financial 
motivations that individuals have therein. (In a following chapter, I further explicate the “double 
duty” that incentive accomplishes within the discourse of economics by metaphorically suturing 
together “desire” and “reward,” which ultimately grounds Alfred Marshall’s theory of general 
equilibrium.) Here, the metaphor of the “incentive” reduces (condenses) available sets of 
discursive resources into a single one, analogous to financial motivation and reward in the 
capitalist mode of production. For instance, when governments offer “tax incentives” for 
businesses to relocate, or when people say that television studios “have an incentive” to renew 
popular shows, this exemplifies the condensed meaning of “incentive” at work. 
Finally, once these two tropic movements of displacement and condensation have 
occurred, there is one final, vital twist: The metastasis of “incentives” over the social field as a 
whole, wherein neoclassical economics becomes the model for analyzing all behavior. The 
colloquial usage of the term “metastasis” typically refers to the unfortunate effects of a cancer, 
such as when the disease metastasizes into another area of the body. But I invoke metastasis as a 
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useful trope from rhetoric’s history. In his classic treatise The Garden of Eloquence, Henry 
Peachem defines metastasis as “a forme of speech by which we turne backe those thinges that are 
objected against us, to them which laid them to us… The use of this figure serveth both to repell 
objections, and also to reply by accusations, and all at one time.”6 In the context of an argument, 
metastasis is invoked to respond not through refutation, but through a counter-accusation. The 
original argument is displaced into a different order, or into a new place. Such an insight lines up 
with the Greek etymology of the term “metastasis” as another form of rhetorical “displacement,” 
in that something is placed (stasis) outside (meta-) of its normal context. Incentives move beyond 
their original stasis—that of financial motivation—and literally metastasize into new domains 
which were not previously governed by the trope. 
What does this mean in practice? When we view the invocation of “incentive” as an 
exemplar of metastasis, we see how it is first metonymically linked to particular stases, so 
“incentives” are applied to strictly economic and financial problem-spaces. Boswell et al. write 
that in workplace settings, “Locke, Feren, McCaleb, Shaw, and Denny (1980) concluded, 
following the first meta-analytic review of the literature, that no other incentive or motivational 
technique compares to money in terms of its instrumental value…. Incentive compensation 
systems attempt to align employee interests with those of the organization by making 
compensation contingent on particular outcomes or behaviors.”7 But beyond that, and more 
importantly, “incentive” becomes an all-encompassing metaphor for human behavior writ large, 
so markets are not just introduced into social phenomena, but are presumed to have structured 
                                                
6 Henry Peachem, The Garden of Eloquence 1577, 181-182. Accessed February 1, 2016. 
http://gateway.proquest.com.www2.lib.ku.edu/openurl?ctx_ver=Z39.88-
2003&xri:pqil:res_ver=0.2&res_id=xri:lion&rft_id=xri:lion:ft:pr:Z200728358:. 
 
7  Wendy R. Boswell, Alexander J. S. Colvin, and Todd C. Darnold, “Organizational Systems and Employee 
Motivation,” in Work Motivation: Past, Present, and Future eds. Ruth Kanfer, Gilad Chen, Robert D. Pritchard 
(New York: Routledge, 2008), 368. 
 9 
human reality all along—the style of neoclassical analysis is placed outside of its original 
economic context and into new ones altogether. What was previously a narrow explanation for 
financially motivated activity then retroactively becomes the model for human behavior as a 
whole. 
 The mode of argument for “incentive-driven” vocabularies is functionally metastatic—
not only does it spread, it moves. Wherever “incentive” stands in for non-monetary social 
relations, it can never catch up to them. Something fundamental about human reality is displaced 
when the trope of the “incentive” is invoked. One could think of the movement metonymy—
metaphor—metastasis as a rhetorical form of sublation, in which the previous moment is both 
canceled and elevated. One does not metastasize “incentives” as a solution for all social 
problems without being committed to market-based approaches to reality, and seeing all rewards, 
motives and desires as functionally equivalent thereto. The M—M—M circuit is a “perpetual 
motion machine,” since each meta-stasis involves a dis-placement of alternative interpretations 
of a given cultural formation. The raw material of sociality is placed elsewhere: into economic 
logics of supply, demand and innate preferences, the result of which is a suppression of 
alternative explanatory mechanisms. Metastasis erases the rhetorical labor of the market 
metaphor by locating each example of an incentive in a determinate identity. We shall see how 
the “godfather of incentives,” Gary Becker, accomplishes this task, wherein he contends that 
literally all behaviors obey market principles. For Becker, there is no symbolic distance or 
artifice in this claim. He does not claim that families are “like” firms, or that marriages are “like” 
markets—he joins them at the level of identity. The metastasis shifts any of our considerations 
away from culture, history, and context, and places them into a new stasis altogether: 
neoclassical market axioms. 
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As a result, incentives instantiate a trans-contextual mode of social analysis. Incentives 
are presumed to govern social reality and render it calculable in the face of a generalized 
anxiety—call it risk society, or call it uncertainty about the future. Faced with a chaotic and 
unstable future, incentive-based vocabularies render the world calculable, predictable, and 
manipulable. We need no longer infer why people act as they do; instead, we deliver answers 
according to the rubric “By what were they incentivized?” The incentive here functions to 
discipline our chaotic contexts through a terminological reduction to techniques and retroactive 
explanations. Becker metastasizes the style of neoclassical economic analysis onto every 
conceivable cultural formation, so any synonym or differential articulation of desire, reward or 
motive is re-described as an “incentive.” He writes: “Indeed, I have come to the position that the 
economic approach is a comprehensive one that is applicable to all human behavior, be it 
behavior involving money prices or imputed shadow prices, repeated or infrequent decisions, 
large or minor decisions, emotional or mechanical ends, rich or poor persons, men or women, 
adults or children, brilliant or stupid persons, patients or therapists, businessmen or politicians, 
teachers or students.”8 The result is that all contexts, contingencies, and contradictions of human 
life become factors in a utility function, calculable as an advanced version of Jeremy Bentham’s 
pleasure/pain calculus.9 Becker explicitly dismisses sociology, psychology, history, and religion 
as useful for explaining human behavior—not because they do not matter, but because they can 
be calculated by the “one social science” he advocates. 
To be clear, his position is not unique strictly to “incentive” logics, but comes part and 
parcel from neoclassical economics writ large. Maurice Allais, in his lecture after winning the 
                                                
8 Gary Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 7-8. 
 
9 These are: stable preferences, utility maximizing actors, and the presumption that market mechanisms structure 
behavior. I discuss these in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
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Bank of Sweden prize in economic sciences in 1990 stated, “I have been gradually led to a 
twofold conviction: human psychology remains fundamentally the same at all times and in all 
places; and the present is determined by the past according to invariant laws. It seems to me that, 
to a very large extent, the social sciences must, like the physical sciences, be based on the search 
for relationships and quantities invariant in time and in space.”10 Not only is the neoclassical 
approach trans-contextual, it is also assiduously anti-contextual. Allais’ comments unconsciously 
harken back to Jacques Derrida’s critique of structuralism: Structuralism must account for its 
inauguration outside of its own inner logic, thus any structure is the result of contingency. The 
only possible rejoinder is that contemporary economic relations are merely the expression of the 
underlying ontological structure of the universe, and the domain of contemporary academic 
economics is to explicate how such relationships exemplify it. Witness, too, economist Ernest 
Fehr’s claims: “I don’t like the argument that everything is context dependent. That view lacks 
any grounding. In this regard, I really like the strong theoretical emphasis of economics and our 
desire for unifying explanations. It distinguishes us from biologists and psychologists, and 
provides us with a normative anchor.”11 In Fehr’s and Allais’ views, trans-contexuality is a 
strength rather than a weakness of the discourse, because every single conceivable question can 
be answered logically through a reduction to a single one: What were the relevant incentives at 
play, and how can we better engineer them for the next decision? 
Finally, Becker makes the argument that because we have a retroactive account for all 
human behavior, economists can manipulate certain social, political and economic levers to 
                                                
10 Maurice Allais, “Nobel Lecture,” in Nobel Lectures, Economics 1981-1990 ed. Karl-Göran Mäler (Singapore: 
World Scientific Publishing Co., 1990): 243. 
 
11 Ernest Fehr, interview in European Economics at a Crossroads, eds. J. Barkley Rosser, Jr., Richard P.F. Holt, and 
David Colander (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2010), 72-73. Quoted in Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to 
Waste, 262. 
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produce new equilibria to their liking. In his weekly column for BusinessWeek magazine, he 
deployed his “economic approach to human behavior” onto dozens of subjects, from 
immigration, to trade policy, public schools, divorce law, environmental protections, and college 
athletics. He argues, “in this approach, behavior crucially depends on incentives… The fact that 
behavior responds to incentives in this way is consistent, in most situations, with common 
sense.”12 By applying the presumption of incentivization to social questions, Becker argued for 
the introduction of market relations into these matters. For instance, he advocated for a severe 
and violent crackdown on illegal immigration into the United States from Mexico alongside an 
auction system by which wealthy immigrants could purchase their way into the country legally—
such a system would indicate, through the money commodity, the desire (or incentive) that 
migrants had, and indicates further what kinds of contributions they would be able to make as 
workers within this country.13 By introducing formal market relations where there previously 
were none, human beings’ activities become calculable, predictable, and especially manipulable 
toward the preferred political ends of its advocates. 
In sum, metastasis as a concept incorporates the displacement of alternative explanations 
and the condensation of commitments to a neoclassical explanation of society. The metastasis of 
“incentives” covers over sets of concrete particularities with axioms of neoclassical economics: 
actors behave selfishly, and markets organize such behaviors. Economists, authors and 
politicians then advance a unitary solution—social problems arise because markets are 
inadequately produced or maintained, or we are simply inattentive to the deep underlying market 
logics at work in our chaotic reality. The logic of the incentive then displaces all potential 
                                                
12 Gary Becker and Guity Nashat Becker, The Economics of Life: From Baseball to Affirmative Action to 
Immigration, How Real-World Issues Affect our Everyday Life. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997), 4. 
 
13 Becker and Becker, The Economics of Life, 50. 
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alternative explanations—historical, cultural, rhetorical, theoretical—as deficient without the 
discourse of economics translating these explanations into utility maximization models. In the 
above example of immigration, witness what must be suppressed in order for such an “incentive 
scheme” to function. Becker’s blind spot is that he must disavow his presumption that informal 
markets already exist everywhere, and in all contexts. Thus, a migrant’s willingness to risk their 
life crossing the Mexico/U.S. border does not register on Becker’s scale of “incentive” as a 
marker of desire to become a resident of this country. Becker’s public (non-academic) work is 
suffused with this type of oversight—he aims to force nonmonetary market relations into 
monetary ones, which results in a reduction of what “counts” as economic, even for him. Yet 
despite all this, the term’s prevalence reflects the growing prestige and importance that orthodox, 
neoclassical economics has in questions of social policy, and cultural formations. “Incentive” is a 
term that offers retroactive symbolic coherence for complex social phenomena; it is the 
paradoxically indispensable surplus that stitches up reality. The social logic of the incentive 
attributes enjoyment to actors with the fantasy that they are “enjoying” economically in 
accordance with neoclassical theory. 
Although this is a universalizing logic, I do not presume it to be presently hegemonic in 
everyday life. Thankfully, we have not yet arrived at the point where “incentive schemes” are 
universal or assumed to be natural. Instead, it is a specific discursive formation within what 
Grossberg calls “economic culture.”14 For its proponents, “incentive” becomes a point of 
investment—a place where quintessentially neoclassical commitments about humanity, politics 
and social organization are condensed into a single term. The economists, journalists and 
politicians that invoke this trope in cultural and political sites mark their commitment to the 
                                                
14 Lawrence Grossberg, “Interview with Lawrence Grossberg, November 14, 2012,” Interview conducted by James 
Hay, eds. James Hay & Lawrence Grossberg, Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies 10 (2013), 84-85. 
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power of neoclassical economics to define, circumscribe, and contain potentially any context. 
Incentive-driven logics provide a story about how and why the various outcomes within 
capitalism are distributed. This is not to say that other ideological discourses are inoperative—
current events remind us daily of the importance that individualism, nationalism and class 
consciousness play in this conjuncture. Whereas these strictly ideological discourses constitute 
habituated practices of enjoyment revolving around social antagonisms (the outsider, the 
indolent, the parasite), “incentive-driven” logics perform a double duty of their own—they work 
both proactively and retroactively to provide (symbolic) coherence over an inconsistent reality. 
This figural occlusion performs the duty of evading any question of structural economic 
inequality—according to its commitments, enjoyment is already counted as part of a system, 
even if it does not appear as social power, monetary wealth, etc. All outcomes are registered as 
having been the result of a prior incentive, so any unequal treatment or outcome is buffered by 
the logic that renders it sensible. Incentive-driven behavior is a figure that both names and covers 
over a gap in social life: Absent alternative explanations, we infer, and enjoy, the stable 
explanation of why other people behave as they do—and when the Freakonomics series arrives, 
we see it provides a coherent account for why we ourselves do. We fill in this gap of 
indeterminacy with the term “incentive”—and as Gérard Genette says, like any gap, it has a 
form. In the face of competing explanations for the behavior of others, “incentives” retroactively 
fill in this opening with the assumption that people act in accordance with their preferences, and 
have stable sets of motives by which they are incentivized. Incentives allow economists to figure 
what the others want in a stable rubric, but crucially, this question is two-faced. It is simply 
another way of asking, “What do I want?” Jacques Lacan posits that desire is structurally 
metonymic and intersubjective: We do not know what we want in advance; we come to know 
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our desire as both contingent and learned from others. And further, the tacit acknowledgement 
that we do not know what we want causes anxiety and a desire for fixity. “Incentives” solve 
problems by joining cause and effect, and by promising any unexpected outcome is 
understandable once we discover the “hidden forces” of markets that pervade our existence. 
The economy of enjoyment accounts for why these common tropes are repeated, and why 
they purport to have explanatory power. In each case, these tropes provide explanations of 
human behavior that fits at the level of lived reality, especially in times of economic trouble, and 
that there is surplus enjoyment in the deployment of these baseline assumptions about capitalism 
and human nature. In troublesome times, “economic” explanations for behavior become more 
attractive, not less, since this vocabulary explains potentially any outcome—inequalities are 
managed, high salaries are justified, and we have a straightforward rubric for objectifying, for 
cognizing, what we desire. When people have to do more with less, I contend that we are 
beholden even more to orthodox understandings of ourselves, of society, and of others: We 
“double down” on incentive logics a means of control when an object (an economy, another 
person, ourselves) performs differently than we expect to. As a result, to counteract our anxiety 
about fundamentally unknowable things, we invest in a vocabulary that promises the underlying 
rule of all social reality is knowable and controllable. The result is an imagined unicity for what 
is inherently an unstable multiplicity of practices. As a set of publicly persuasive acts, 
“incentive-driven” analysis invites subjects to identify themselves and their own desires with 
economic axioms of human nature. We must behave like economically rational agents, because 
we already do. 
Finally, I do not contend that the deployment of the term is intentionally nefarious—
while I do argue that the neoclassical commitments embedded within this term are inescapable, 
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not every use of this term is a tacit endorsement of neoliberalism, or something similar. This 
signifier, like all signifiers, moves through bodies in a non-subjective manner; as Kenneth Burke 
once wrote, “We use words, and words use us.” My inquiry is uninterested in assigning personal 
responsibility to the individuals who use “incentives” in everyday conversation, or even to 
engage with social problems. (There may be a Utopian impulse to the discourse of “incentives”: 
Who would refuse a calculable and measurable means of predicting behavior and engaging with 
the world’s trickiest problems of unemployment, discrimination, and climate change?) Rather, 
the use of “incentive” as a rhetorical shortcut—especially by non-economists—signals only to 
me the paucity of our collective imaginations and available discursive resources to explain a 
chaotic reality. 
If my hypothesis is correct, the unconscious signifying content of “incentive” should 
serve as an “incentive” for critical scholars to develop robust, critical, and careful explanations 
for the shape of social life as it is, away from the standard answers that neoclassical economics 
proffers. By critically examining the limits of this discursive formation, it paradoxes and its 
surpluses, we can develop a critique that actively resists the foreclosure of alternative 
possibilities that neoclassical economics performs; we can begin to tell a better story about how 
social life is complexly articulated. What follows is a brief layout of the following chapters, after 
which I describe my method for reading the metastatic rhetorical logic of the incentive. 
Chapter Layout 
Chapter 2, “From the Fire to the Tune,” traces the word “incentive” first on its own as a 
poetic term, then through the history of economic thought, where it was adopted with a fairly 
specific definition. “Incentive” formerly hung between “subjective” and “objective” descriptions 
of motivation (the fire and the tune, respectively), with neither taking precedence. Modern 
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economics, influenced by Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism, and embodied in the work of Alfred 
Marshall, adopts the term strictly as a descriptor of an external, objective, measurable and 
especially financial motivation within competitive markets. “Incentive” shares an etymological 
history with both the phrase “to be incensed” and the term “incantation” (or charm); today, 
modern economics uses the term primarily as a set of external levers or techniques to induce 
outcomes. The externalization of the term “incentive,” and its decoupling from the subject, has a 
paradoxical consequence: Incentives become essentially the domain of reactive forces, despite 
the term describing motivated behavior. The discipline of economics appropriated a fairly 
general synonym for motivation to describe a fairly narrow band of activities, constricting the 
term “incentive” into a set of external, objective relations. 
Chapter 3, “Gary Becker: The Godfather of Incentives,” examines the work of a 
tremendously influential economist, Gary Becker, who rose to prominence through the “Chicago 
School” of economics, eventually winning a Bank of Sweden prize in “Economic Sciences” for 
his career-long endeavor to bring the “economic approach to human behavior” into quite literally 
every single avenue of social, political and cultural life. If Chapter 2 represents the constriction 
of “incentive” into financial gain, in Becker, it extends outward again. The term, however, is not 
re-generalized—instead, the particular “economic” style of analysis inaugurated by Marshall and 
Samuelson is. I present a close reading of his academic and popular writings, including the 
weekly column in BusinessWeek for a decade, wherein I describe in detail the consequences of 
generalizing his fairly skeletal rendering of human interaction. Each of Becker’s articles 
centralize “the incentive”: For him (and for economists like him), all social phenomena can be 
seen as either the retroactive effect of incentive-driven behavior, or, for policymakers who 
support this approach, potentially malleable according to strict neoclassical assumptions about 
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behavior. I take his threefold approach to the letter—utility maximization, stable preferences, 
market mechanisms—and explore how social, political and economic inequalities are 
retroactively produced as rhetorical effects of “incentive-based” analyses. 
Becker’s thought is the paradigm for a globalization of incentive thinking, and Chapter 4 
continues that work, but with a view toward an even more “popular” set of cultural artifacts. The 
bestselling Freakonomics book series, written by a New York Times Magazine journalist and 
another Chicago School economist, took seriously Becker’s challenge to apply the incentive-
based approach to human behavior to all phenomena. Over the course of three books and a 
collection of essays, the authors entreat us to see the outcomes of sumo wrestling matches, the 
fall of the Ku Klux Klan, global climate change, Zappos shoe company policy, and many other 
things as the results of “hidden forces,” a term borrowed from the first book’s subtitle. The 
“hidden force” in literally every case comes from the application of neoclassical market 
principles onto social phenomena. The discourse of Freakonomics is a discourse of perversion, 
in which the rhetorical strategies of the books mandate that its readers take part in the “freakish” 
outcomes of neoclassical economics by becoming the object of market operations, rather than its 
active subjects. If “incentives” organize the distribution of enjoyment, Freakonomics as a 
cultural artifact signals that individual, idiosyncratic subjects become the objects of market 
enjoyment as they behave according to the axioms laid out by neoclassical theory.  
Chapter 5 regards the metastasis of incentive logics into the political realm—namely, the 
fights for women’s equal pay legislation. In this chapter, I examine two bills, the Lilly Ledbetter 
Act and the Paycheck Fairness Act, both debated in Congress from 2007 to 2009. I track how 
both those who supported and opposed the bills deployed incentive-based logics to argue for 
their position. On its own, the unified strategy is an indicator of how much the discipline of 
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economics has intervened into questions of social policy. Those who opposed the bills smuggled 
in essentialist concepts of womanhood and femininity, arguing that there was such a thing as 
“women’s incentives”—to raise children, to perform service, care work, and domestic labor—
that retroactively justifies pay inequality. That some women take low-paying jobs, rear children 
and leave the workforce means that any opposition to equal pay has its empirical alibi: Women 
demonstrate an incentive to remain unequal, because they are “incentivized” by things other than 
equal pay. Incentive logics metastasize traditional gender norms as “human capital factors,” thus 
justifying unequal treatment in the future. By and large, those who supported the bills remained 
locked in an “economic” frame of argument, severely attenuating the vocabulary for articulating 
social change. Whereas the existence of an inequality can be, and ought to be, a place where 
antagonisms can be pushed, analyzed, and critiqued, the incentive-based vocabulary hypostasizes 
social reality and closes off alternative discursive operations. This, I believe, partially explains 
the failure of the Paycheck Fairness Act. 
Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the frontiers of social, economic and cultural life 
within the boundaries of an incentive-driven approach to human behavior. The Obama 
administration recently announced an executive order to encourage the use of behavioral 
economics in policymaking; this came on the heels of one of the authors of the highly popular 
book Nudge: Improving Solutions in Health, Wealth and Happiness appointment to the 
administration to advise on social policy. Yet his is not altogether a new strategy for the 
Democratic Party: Philip J. Cooper argues that presidents since Jimmy Carter have attempted to 
solve “regulatory problems through market mechanisms, including incentives and rewards.”15 
Nudge, and behavioral economics more broadly, depends heavily on the precepts of neoclassical 
                                                
15 Phillip J. Cooper, The War Against Regulation: From Jimmy Carter to George W. Bush (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 2009), 20. 
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economics, foregrounding the role “incentives” play in any social and economic policy decision. 
Rather than regulations and laws governing the behavior of individuals and institutions, the 
“libertarian paternalist” philosophy of Nudge authors Sunstein and Thaler appears more 
consonant with Jeremy Bentham’s vision of government, in which appetites cannot be created by 
the state, only channeled through prudent policy. Instead of the state taxing income, investments, 
and property in order to redistribute it via social welfare programs, the behavioral 
economics/“nudge” trend aims at contorting individuals’ behaviors toward supposedly socially 
beneficial ends—perhaps even eliminating the need for social welfare programs altogether. 
“Libertarian paternalism” represents a significant shift in the aims and ends of the state, and I 
believe this to be the frontier of where debates about “incentives” are heading.16 This concluding 
chapter looks to these developments as both a summation and potential turning point for the 
social logic of the incentive. I use the psychoanalytic distinction between the “goal” and the 
“aim” of a desire to account for how economic thinkers argue against progressive/social 
democratic policies. 
Defining and Expanding the Domain of Incentives 
The Oxford Dictionary of Economics defines an “incentive” as: 
Rewards or penalties designed to induce one set of economic agents to act in such as way 
as to produce results that another economic agent wants. As rewards for good results, 
incentives can include higher pay, better working conditions, better job security, better 
promotion prospects, or prestige. As penalties for poor results, incentives may take the 
form of lower pay, worse working conditions, poorer promotion prospects, demotion or 
sacking, or loss of reputation. Incentives may be applied in response to actual results, 
such as output or profits, or to management's perceptions of inputs, such as attendance 
and disciplinary record. Incentives cannot be based on inputs or outputs unobservable by 
                                                
16 By both presuming in advance the socially beneficial goals individuals ought to have, and pushing against 
redistributive justice through taxation, it has the honor of appearing like the worst possible outcome for both 
libertarians and statists simultaneously. 
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management: to motivate these it is necessary to rely on self-respect or team spirit.17 
 
This definition gets more complex as we pull on each of its threads, but is a useful starting point. 
Incentives are designed to induce certain behaviors. They can be both monetary and 
nonmonetary—to incentivize your daughter to go run errands, you may promise a trip to a taco 
stand afterward. They can be material, like a corner office, and “immaterial” (like prestige, 
although “prestige” necessarily correlates to a material of some kind, even if it is discursive, like 
a title). 
Perhaps at one time it would be considered revolutionary to include monetary and 
nonmonetary activities as fundamentally equivalent, but today, the particular logic of “incentive” 
has been expanded to account for all monetary and nonmonetary interactions on a single plane. 
The aforementioned Judge Richard Posner, herald of the “law and economics” field of judicial 
decision-making, is the single most cited legal scholar in the country, and advocates a market-
based approach to all matters, legal, moral and ethical. Economists, using this style of analysis, 
no longer need to justify entering non-monetarily motivated actions into neoclassical utility 
functions: Non-monetary desires and rewards (or penalties) become functionally equivalent 
when observing behavior.18 Take this claim from data guru Nate Silver’s FiveThirtyEight site on 
the “economics” of hospital choice: “Even in settings where patients have little information 
about providers’ efficiencies, and insurance and time pressures reduce any incentive to find out, 
we see that patients still find their way to better hospitals. Something in the market is able to 
                                                
17 “Incentives,” Oxford Dictionary of Economics (3rd Ed.) eds. John Black, Nigar Hashimzade & Gareth Myles 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
 
18 Utility functions are sets of equations into which economists enter initial “capital” or “human capital” outlays, 
preferences, prices and choices in order to produce equilibrium models. 
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collect and transmit that performance information to patients or to someone who knows them.”19 
“Incentive” here indicates the presumption that despite not having an incentive to perform 
research on a matter of life and death, “something in the market” promotes rational action. 
Ironically, the unnamed “market force” ought to be the explanatory innovation that economics 
brings to the table, but unsurprisingly, the crucial function of conveying survival rates is “black-
boxed” or hand-waved as the result of a market force, and not an example of a communicative, 
advertising or cultural process. In the end, the rhetorical form that sutures a “good outcome” to 
“market force” is the “incentive.” 
This distinction between monetary and nonmonetary incentive is only useful to 
demonstrate how the line between them is blurred, and then elided. The original logic of the 
incentive is thus expanded to include any context or situation, and can even be used in an 
intrapersonal context. In other words, it can act as a vocabulary for an individual to motivate 
oneself to act differently. For example, GQ and Deadspin columnist Drew Magary wrote in a 
2015 column, “I have yoyo-ed when it comes to weight loss, and I have kept the tight clothes 
around as an incentive, simply because I can't bear the thought of disposing of them and 
admitting that I will never recover.”20 Incentives have not just expanded into the intrapersonal 
realm—incentives become synonymous with motives writ large, so instead of simply being the 
object of a motivated force, “incentive” is the motive itself. 
Such a trajectory was set out at the outset of neoclassical economic thought. Marshall, 
                                                
19 Chad Syverson, “Market Forces Appear to Apply to Hospitals, Too,” FiveThirtyEight, March 28, 2014, Accessed 
January 27, 2016. http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/standard-market-forces-appear-to-apply-to-hospitals-too/. The 
article’s main claim is that patients go to hospitals with reputations for not killing their patients as frequently as 
other hospitals do. This is taken as a warrant that “market forces” work. And the relevant question worth asking—
why do people go to these hospitals?—is simply hand-waved as a result of said market forces (“something in the 
market is able to transmit that performance information” instantaneously). 
 
20 Drew Magary, “Russell Wilson’s Ball-Bread Is Fucking Weird,” Deadspin, February 24, 2015, accessed January 
15, 2016, http://theconcourse.deadspin.com/russell-wilson-s-ball-bread-is-fucking-weird-1687735421. 
 23 
one of the most influential figures in early neoclassical economics, identifies “incentive” not as 
reward, but as motive, or desire, and sutures desire to satisfaction to satisfy equilibrium 
requirements. And finally, the final part of the Oxford definition, regarding whether incentives 
must be empirically observable, frays somewhat upon its cultural metastasis. Becker, the subject 
of Chapter 3, posits unobservable “psychic costs” onto actors that equalize his utility functions; 
the inheritors of his legacy, the authors of the Freakonomics book series also assiduously seek 
out the reality of “hidden forces” that motivate people. In other words, taking seriously the logic 
of the incentive means nothing is outside of the purview of the neoclassical gaze. 
But either way, this vocabulary is a unity of opposites, since it represents a commitment 
to a unifying explanation for all of social reality. Whether they are monetary or nonmonetary, 
inter- or intrapersonal, observable or unobservable, incentives function to mediate disparate 
orders of being. It performs the discursive work that signals how different orders of time (past, 
present and future), as well as disparate orders of being (social, political, economic) become 
fungible with one another. Crucially, term “incentive” does not do the work of commensuration, 
but is rather a signal that different elements of reality are being mediated on a single plane by 
economic analysis. To invoke the incentive as an explanatory mechanism entails the collapse of 
different levels of causality (material, formal, efficient) onto the “final cause” of economic 
causality. Overall, incentive logics obey similar formal properties across different contexts—as it 
metastasizes, it folds a number of discrete social and theoretical functions into an overarching 
logic. What this move purchases in terms of intelligibility, and in mobility, it forfeits in terms of 
specificity. The following section introduces my reading practices for interrogating the 
metastatic logic of incentives. 
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Reading Practices 
As mentioned, it could be that the invocation of “incentives” adds nothing to any given 
situation; at first glance, it appears as a synonym for motive or desire. When a journalist 
offhandedly mentions a political or social “incentive” to act in a certain way, it may not 
necessarily guarantee that neoliberal values are being smuggled in. Consider the following claim 
by baseball writer Jonah Keri: “Major league hitters, like all human beings, are motivated by 
incentives, so when they come to the plate with runners in scoring position, they’re flooded with 
team incentives (a chance to put runs on the board and help produce a win), individual incentives 
(a chance to feel the rush of driving in a run), and financial incentives (even amid the advanced 
stats movement, RBIs still = $$$).”21 Yet my gamble is otherwise: The re-description of social 
reality as a set of economic factors is no natural or neutral act. It is the signal of the investment in 
this stable explanatory matrix, and this investment is a point of enjoyment, wherein a rhetorical 
practice takes root, repeats, and takes hold to produce meaning for publics and subjects. The act 
of speaking into the void, of coding all practices as some form of a neoclassical utility function, 
is not an act of discursively creating reality, but rather of taming and managing it. This 
management is the mark of a libidinal surplus—jouissance—that represents a specific form of 
affective investment in stable ideological commitments. 
I am concerned with a discursive cluster of terms (and commitments) that cut diagonally 
across the social field—my case study consists of objects that demonstrate the essential character 
of incentive-based vocabularies. “Incentive” is a framework for thinking about the ways in which 
economists, policymakers, influential thinkers and even ordinary people have attempted to deal 
with a financial crisis, a recession, and a predicted low-growth future, and contains within it a set 
                                                
21 Jonah Keri, “The Duncan Way: How Cardinals Pitchers Continue to Dominate by Exploiting Hitter Tendencies,” 
Grantland, May 21, 2014, accessed May 22, 2014. http://grantland.com/the-triangle/st-louis-cardinals-pitchers-
dave-duncan-adam-wainwright-michael-wacha/. 
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of commitments to an “economic” (neoclassical) approach to literally every social phenomenon. 
The commitment to “incentive-driven behavior” is a conjunctural response to a crisis, a “story” 
being told, and a process of articulation in and of itself. Economics as a discipline poses a serious 
challenge to alternative modes of articulating sociality, politics, power, and even communication 
itself (however fraught that term may be), so I forward a mode of critique that allows us to resist 
it. 
As Grossberg puts it, the coding of discrete, contextual actions as “economic” demands 
serious criticism, and we should cast aspersions on a discipline with serious empirical 
shortcomings.22 He writes of economics, “What other discipline is of such immediate concern to 
so many people and yet so totally obscure, even dismissive of popular curiosity? ...What other 
discipline claims the right to directly shape real policies, while building analytic tools that enable 
it to operate by abstracting models that are only weakly if at all connected to reality? What other 
discipline could claim to be the only true science in the human sciences, while still clinging to its 
founding texts…as if they were sacred… What other discipline can claim to be authoritative, 
even a ‘science,’ and yet have such a bad record?”23 And elsewhere, in an interview with James 
Hay, Grossberg contends, “I do think that there is something happening that is useful to refer to 
as ‘economic culture.’ Partly, I am referring to the discourses of Economics, as a discipline and 
as popular discourses, and partly I am referring to economic practices as discursive… The 
cultural presence of economy, what I would call economic culture, has changed significantly and 
become part of our popular culture in ways that I think it never used to be.”24 He attributes this to 
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the disappearance of our dominant commenusrating apparatuses: “as they have collapsed, 
disappeared, or become dysfunctional, there seems to be a tendency for them to increasingly 
become what Deleuze and Guattari (1977) describe as ‘paranoiac machines.’”25 My own inquiry 
describes the rhetorical means by which “economic culture” takes hold in political and cultural 
formations. In the absence, or bankruptcy, of other orienting logics (nationalism, class 
consciousness, the “American Dream”) incentive logics intervene to render a chaotic reality 
sensible, and the “economization” of everyday life is part and parcel of what Grossberg identifies 
as “economic culture.” 
Psychoanalysis, particularly that of French analyst Jacques Lacan, is the necessary 
apparatus to inquire about the discursive labor that stabilizes and habituates the neoclassical 
commitments to incentives. The psychoanalyst’s gambit is that the borders between text and 
meaning, between a subject’s interior and exterior, and even between language and reality can be 
organized and thought of as a process of affective investment, or enjoyment. The privileged site 
for Lacan, a practicing psychoanalyst his entire professional life, was speech. As he puts it, “We 
can let ourselves be taken in by our first initial contact with the subject …[this] brings us to the 
point of going beyond [meaning] and positing the term discourse. For to be sure, these patients 
speak to us in the same language as ourselves. Without this component, we would be in total 
ignorance. It’s therefore the economy of discourse, the relationship between meaning and 
meaning, the relationship between their discourse and the common organization of discourse, 
that allows us to ascertain that a certain delusion is involved.”26 
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26 Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-1960: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII, ed. Jacques-
Alain Miller, trans. Dennis Porter (New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 1988), 33. 
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Speech, for Lacan, is a way to evade the twin traps of both subjectivism and 
structuralism—Lacan’s “rhetorical” artifact is not the individual(istic) discrete utterance of a 
knowing subject, nor is it the epiphenomenal effect of a dominant ideology. Speech is not 
reducible to the body, or the subject, or ideology, but is itself a practice that is contoured by each 
of these. The sign moves through the body. Merleau-Ponty, discussing Ferdinand de Saussure, 
one of Lacan’s early influences, writes, “language is not a function of the speaking subject. 
Involved in the speaking community, the subject is not the proprietor of his language… For 
Saussure, the individual is neither the subject or the object of history but both simultaneously.”27 
For a Lacanian, the movement of signs through bodies is not to deny the agency of either, but to 
mark that this process is habitual and inescapable. 
Wherever the trope of “incentive-driven behavior” functions in cultural formations, it 
exemplifies the Lacanian concept of enjoyment, or jouissance; it squares the circle between and 
among individual subjects, and offers a cohesive version of what the social bond looks like. I 
deploy reading strategies that identify the loci of enjoyment in economic thought. It is not that 
economic actors simply “enjoy” their idiosyncratic, individual choices, but rather, economists 
enjoy in their place by attributing economic rationality to their actions, thus validating their 
simplifying mechanisms and organizing metaphors for social life. So another way of talking 
about jouissance is to ask: What are the precious objects, or objets a that a discourse organizes? 
Or as Žižek puts it, “The easiest way to detect ideological surplus-enjoyment in an ideological 
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formation is to read it as a dream, and analyse the displacement at work in it.”28 While Žižek 
contends elsewhere in the quoted work that metaphor precedes metonymy (at least logically, in 
his interpretation of the symbolic order), in this chosen discursive formation, the process moves 
from displacement to condensation, then to metastasis. The result is a site at which all of social 
reality can be represented stably and habitually as a universally applicable logic, and one that has 
cultural purchase by professional policymakers and prominent thinkers. 
I evoke the Lacanian concept of jouissance (enjoyment) in two related senses in the 
following chapters. First, as mentioned above, I note the habitual repetition of the term in sites of 
social importance as a logic of attribution. Economists “enjoy” the ability to attribute 
economically rational (or irrational) behavior to individuals. This is a second-order enjoyment, 
and highly symbolic: Economists enjoy in the place of the other by pointing to where and how 
individuals act in accordance with their own desires. As we shall see in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, this 
second-order enjoyment has nothing to do with the actual behaviors of people. Policymakers and 
lobbyists opposed to equal pay for women are able to attribute enjoyment onto underpaid women 
by claiming that they enjoy (i.e. incentivized by) the nonmonetary remuneration that comes from 
raising children. Becker, in an argument against the American welfare system, claims that people 
who do not sign up are “incentivized” by dignity more than money—which gives theoretical 
(and calculable) cover for the system’s destruction. Lacan defines the contemporary superegoic 
injunction as “Enjoy!”, which I interpret as a sort of forced freedom—everything is permitted, as 
long as it can be retroactively narrated as the result of a stable utility function. Enjoyment is the 
result of metastasis: By ascribing economic meaning to all actions, be they idiosyncratic, 
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individual, or irrational, the economist’s tools are authorized to intervene in all social milieus.29  
The next sense of jouissance is more fundamentally psychoanalytic—a first-order 
enjoyment. Any discursive system—the symbolic order itself, mathematics, or a more specific 
formation such as this—has an adequation problem with “reality.” It is both too much and too 
little. On the one hand, the symbolic order (for better and worse) over-codes what we think of as 
reality—our ideological commitments, our terministic screens, or even an ordinary conceptual 
system (such as Kant’s transcendental aesthetic, or Lakoff and Johnson’s orienting metaphors) 
produces stable and habituated explanations for an inconsistent totality, and often results in a 
foreclosure of alternative possibilities. What gets lost in this account are the cracks, the margins, 
the resistances, and the exceptions that must be reintegrated or discarded. On the other hand, the 
symbolic order, by necessity, must play “catch up” with reality, and bind the new to the old. This 
alternative sense is also inadequate to reality itself, and merely produces a retroactive ascription, 
or an underlying logic, that makes it stable. Reality’s inadequation to our conceptual systems, 
and our conceptual system’s inadequation to reality is precisely the orbit of desire that Lacan 
identifies as the symbolic ground of jouissance. 
Like Zeno’s tortoise, the symbolic order can never catch up or equal to life as lived in 
some non-artificial manner. Rather, I invoke the term “artifice” advisedly: Since there is no such 
“thing” as adequation, all we have are elliptical orbits around the poles of “the Real” (the non-
discursive, hard kernel) and “reality” (our clumsy systematization or assemblage of a discursive 
and non-discursive world). For these reasons, the language of trope offers a rich vocabulary for 
inquiring about economic discourse. 
                                                
29 As Godelier points out below, the rhetorical sleight of hand that equates “rational,” “economic” and “purposive” 
action is what allows for any action to be coded “as economic.” The goal is not to simply ascribe rationality to 
actors, but because rational action is post hoc assumed to only be done to satiate one’s utility function, the goal is to 
ascribe “economic” meaning thereto. It is a question of emphasis, from “rational” to “economic,” implying that there 
is a deeper level of “rationality” that organizes reality. 
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Lundberg writes, “for Lacan, ‘trope’ marks the idea that no connection in the life of the 
subject or its discourses is given in advance. Rather, such connections are the result of habituated 
accidental connections between signs, representations and the world…[T]he formal properties of 
tropes are a function of the ways that ritually repeated connections elicit the investment of the 
subjects who employ them.”30 Without a necessary connection between words and things, we 
manage this gap through signifying practices. As Gérard Genette puts it, a rhetorical figure 
marks this gap: “We see that here, between the letter and the meaning…there is a gap, a space, 
and like all space, it possesses a form. This form is called a figure, and there will be as many 
figures as one can find forms in the space that is created on each occasion between the line of the 
signifier…and that of the signified.”31 Economic tropes are figures that cover over a structural 
inconsistency in social life, and participate in the relationship between feigned and failed unicity 
that Lundberg identifies as the proper domain of rhetorical inquiry. 
He writes, “Failures of unicity in speech, subject and the sign are put to work as forces 
that call forth our investment in the supplements, fantasies, and imagined totalities that work to 
cover over failed unicity: instead of becoming fatal in the life of speech and the speaking subject, 
failures in unicity become the driving forces that animate human existence. Thus, a provisional 
definition of rhetoric as a compromise formation: rhetoric is both signifying in a condition of 
failed unicity and a way of feigning unicity in the context of failed unicity.”32 Rickert writes, “If it 
is through signifiers that function not so much as representations of the world and people but as 
their representatives, then the relations between language and audience are mystified each time 
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we isolate the two as separate entities. The signifiers, images, and objects that circulate in socio-
symbolic space, however, are never neutral in regard to our comportment toward them. Above 
and beyond the mechanism of identification, they are continuously penetrated or suffused with 
jouissance.”33 For my case study sites, “incentive driven behavior” works as a metastatic trope 
that organizes investments in a particular neoclassical understanding of the social bond. The orbit 
between “feigned” and “failed” unicity is the locus of jouissance: “Incentive” works as an 
argument to bind an inconsistent reality to a stable code. In other words, it attempts to bind 
“reality” to “the Real”—the very impossibility of doing so is what spurs its repetition. 
As Lacan puts it, “[t]o be a psychoanalyst is simply to open your eyes to the evident fact 
that nothing malfunctions more than human reality.”34 Parapraxes (slips of the tongue) as well as 
habituated, repetitive invocation of terms are one in the same process, since both betray the fact 
that what is outside speaks within the individual utterance. Rickert notes, “Errors, slips of the 
tongue, accidents, and other such phenomena whereby more is said than intended, or where the 
unconscious makes itself heard, constitute a form of excess or surplus signification that returns 
through the symbolic.”35 I mark “incentive” as a point of investment because of its habitual 
repetition in cultural formations outside of mainstream economics. The habituated repetition of 
“incentive” is one example of this phenomenon—it takes the place of, and stands in for, any 
other potential description of motivation, reward, or desire. It sticks out like a sore thumb even as 
it partakes in the cultural cache donated from economic thought. Here, I introduce the Lacanian 
concept of the objet a to diagnose how the term functions in a given cluster of utterances. 
                                                
33 Thomas Rickert, Acts of Enjoyment: Rhetoric, Žižek, and the Return of the Subject (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2007), 63-64. 
 
34 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III: The Psychoses 1955-1956, trans. Russell Grigg (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1997), 82. 
35 Rickert, Acts of Enjoyment, 55. 
 
 32 
Any psychoanalytic reading must pass a fairly high threshold for both intelligibility and 
intellectual utility, so I deploy the concept of the objet a under advisement. Lundberg, in a 
similar vein, denounces what passes for psychoanalytically flavored criticism in the academy 
today: “This tradition promises the possibility of access to the psychic economy of the author via 
an exegesis of the unconscious logic of signs and desires that are really writing the text. Flavors 
of this rendering of psychoanalysis are not unique to the Freudian tradition, and they range from 
utterly naïve to excruciatingly sophisticated… Instead one must read economically, that is, at the 
site of exchange between the two, a ‘text’ is never readable on its own terms, but must be 
situated in relation to the whole field of intertextual discursive effects.”36 “Incentive” functions 
as the objet a for the discourse of economics not just because I identify it as a point of 
investment, but more precisely because it designates the point at which “object” and “cause” of 
desire are sutured. 
Lacan introduces the concept of the objet a in his work to designate the “object-cause” of 
desire in a given discursive situation. As Evans writes, “In 1957, when Lacan introduces the 
matheme of fantasy ($◊a), a begins to be conceived of as the object of desire.”37 For Lacan, the 
objet a is not a “real” thing, but, using the example of romantic love, that which is “in you more 
than yourself” that generates desire. When one is in love with a partner, no single feature of the 
beloved can be isolated as “the thing” that generates the feeling of love, there is always 
something “more” within their body. You could be asked, and would answer in the negative: Is it 
their eyes? Their intellect? Another isolable feature? And further, even if these objects or 
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components were aggregated, the objet a works as the unifying feature—the “you-ness” of a 
“you.”38 In this formulation, the objet a is a non-empirical object that acts as an indicator of 
desire. 
Thanks to the development of his own theoretical apparatuses, Lacan subtly sublates his 
definition to incorporate (the problem of) causality in the realm of human affairs. In his eleventh 
seminar, Evans writes that Lacan denotes the objet a as the “object which can never be attained, 
which is really the cause of desire rather than that towards which desire tends; this is why Lacan 
now calls it ‘the object-cause’ of desire. Objet petit a is any object which sets desire in 
motion.”39 The objet a both causes desire—spurs, sparks, motivates, incenses, charms—and 
(using its first definition) represents the satisfaction of that desire. As I write in Chapter 2, Alfred 
Marshall sutures “desire” and “satisfaction” with the term “incentive;” as mentioned above, the 
standard definition of incentive means both an internal motivation and an external reward. 
Ultimately, the innovation that objet a gives us is the ability to think through symbolic 
causality in any given discursive formation, and as Bracher argues, it is the singular contribution 
that Lacanian psychoanalysis gives to us: “[p]sychoanalysis…is a social link that is based on the 
object a.”40 Lacan ruminates on Aristotle’s “four causes” discourses from his Physics and 
Metaphysics to pinpoint how the objet a functions. Aristotle explains that any result comes from 
an intermingling of four causes: the formal, material, efficient, and final cause. He writes, “In 
one sense, we say that the substance or the essence is a cause (for the why leads us back to the 
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ultimate formula, and the first why is a cause and a principle); in another, it is the matter or the 
underlying subject; in a third, the source which begins motion; and in a fourth, the cause opposite 
to the previous, namely, the final cause or the good (for this is the end of every generation and 
every motion).”41 Every end results from its essence or form,42 the material used to produce it, 
the activity that effectuates it, and the reason why it is produced. For the purposes of this section, 
I restrict myself to considerations of the efficient and final causes, the causes that, as Lacan 
writes in his essay “Science and Truth,” are closely aligned with magic and religion, 
respectively.43 At first blush, these causes straightforwardly align with the dual nature of the 
“incentive” as simultaneously motive and reward. But instead, using Lacan’s concept of the objet 
a, I argue instead that “incentive” functions as a retroactive narration of the “final cause” in any 
given context. 
Aristotle writes of the “final cause” as the reason why any action is taken: “Also, the end, 
and this is the final cause [that for the sake of which]; for example, walking is for the sake of 
health. Why does he walk? We answer, ‘In order to be healthy;’ and having spoken thus, we 
think that we have given the cause.”44 That is, by walking, we set out the final cause ahead of us, 
and by walking, we accomplish having caused the action. Aristotle’s “final cause” concept 
allows us to posit situations in which the effect precedes the cause. This formulation somewhat 
differs from Aristotle’s attempts “to find the direct and the remote efficient and material causes” 
of events, that is, to reconstruct the chain of events that led thereto, but this is merely a question 
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of emphasis.45 Apostle contends that Aristotle wishes to rescue the “prime mover” concept in his 
ontological system, but as we shall see, this set of concepts does not require a god-function, since 
any goal-directed behavior appears to exemplify retroactive causality.46 
As Lacan puts it, “Whenever we find ourselves faced with this final functioning of the 
cause, irreducible to critique, we have to seek out its foundation and its root in this hidden object, 
this object in syncope. A hidden object lies behind the faith put in Aristotle’s Prime Mover, 
which earlier I depicted for you as deaf and blind to what causes it.”47 In human affairs, the “final 
cause” is always something missing from the chain of our causality—there is no “guarantee” 
about what causes what (to answer the question “Why did this thing happen?”), so we presume 
it, given our available interpretive resources. We produce a form of retroactive causality, in 
which, only through the view of the present, can we infer the “final cause” of that which 
happened. For example, when we are faced with a stranger on the street and we distance 
ourselves from them when we pass, we fill in this gap of causality by reconstructing what must 
have caused such an action. We tell ourselves we saw an uneven sidewalk in our path, we claim 
that the person would have entered our path had we not moved, or finally, that the stranger did 
not notice, even if we did distance ourselves. This retroactive narration of our unconscious 
activities covers over the fundamental guilt of being not fully in control of our actions (or of 
being in full control, but being a bad person for avoiding human contact). 
Lacan posits the objet a as the “hidden object” that fills in the gap between cause and 
effect, and does so via a critique of philosophical considerations of cause writ large. Critics of 
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understanding causality—think Hume, although Lacan leaves him unnamed—may be misguided, 
but their concerns nevertheless contain a kernel of truth: “This criticism consists in noting that 
the cause is ungraspable, that the propter hoc is always necessarily at least a post hoc… The 
more cause was criticized, the more the requirements of what might be called determinism were 
imposed on thought. The less the cause is graspable the more everything seems caused—right up 
to the final term, the one called the meaning of history.”48 Lacan’s position is neither that 
causality is fictitious, nor that the universe is determined in advance by inviolable laws. Instead, 
he navigates a middle ground by locating in both positions the same anxiety, that causality 
designates a gap in our understanding. “Thus, if cause is constituted as presupposing effects, then 
it is based on the fact that primordially its effect is missing. You will meet this in any 
phenomenology of cause. The gap between cause and effect to the extent that it gets filled in—
and this is precisely what is called from a certain perspective, the progress of science—makes the 
function of cause fade away, I mean, wherever the gap gets filled in.”49 
Lacan rescues causality from determinism by accentuating the symbolic order—the “final 
cause”—as that which is surplus to any phenomenon. At first glance, the essence of the thing, the 
material thereof, and the activity undertaken (the formal, material, and efficient causes 
respectively) ought to answer any question of causality. Yet this is a world of determinism: Such 
an approach leaves no space for human action; we are all the results of passive (efficient) forces 
effectuating forms through raw material. Thus, the “final cause” is what is added to action—not 
as the expressive causality of the Prime Mover, but its inverse—that which we symbolically (and 
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retroactively) attribute to our actions as having had caused them. In essence, Lacan’s gamble is 
that we rescue idiosyncratic, idiotic, habituated, thoughtless action from itself by attributing 
meaning to our actions—“final cause” of the objet a (the object-cause of desire) rescues us from 
the idiocy of the drive. 
Psychoanalysis’ gamble is that “final causality” is identical with “retroactive causality”—
that which must have been true in order to produce what we do. For psychoanalysis (and as we 
shall see, economics), the symbolic order governs this notion. This is why the “final cause” acts 
as a button-tie for the other orders of causality—with no guarantee of what the “actual cause” is, 
we use “final cause” as a substitute—the thing that “actually did” the thing we presuppose. It is a 
libidinal and discursive surplus that sutures, or rubber-stamps, the other causes. Van Haute 
writes, “Consider, for example, a mother who holds her crying child up before the mirror and 
says, ‘Look, that’s Johnny! Isn’t he a big boy!;’… The expression ‘Look, that’s Johnny! Isn’t he 
a big boy!’ establishes a meaning that was not there before; it introduces an order into reality that 
previously did not exist. It compellingly assigns our crying baby boy a place he could not 
previously have occupied (‘big boy!’)”50 The “raw material” of Johnny preexists its symbolic 
designation, but the symbolic order confers what will have been there all along. As Lacan puts it, 
“This is a retroversion effect by which the subject becomes at each stage what he was before and 
announces himself—he will have been—only in the future perfect tense.”51 
In a commentary on Lacan’s influential “Subversion of the Subject” essay, Žižek 
explains how we produce retroactive causality in the symbolic order: 
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This then is the fundamental paradox of the point de capiton: the ‘rigid designator,’ 
which totalizes an ideology by bringing to a halt the metonymic sliding of its signified, is 
not a point of supreme density of Meaning, a kind of Guarantee which, by being itself 
excepted from the differential interplay of elements, would serve as a stable and fixed 
point of reference… In itself it is nothing but a ‘pure difference’: its role is purely 
structural, its nature is purely performative—its signification coincides with its own act 
of enunciation; in short it is a ‘signifier without the signified.’ The crucial step in the 
analysis of an ideological edifice is thus to detect behind the dazzling splendour of the 
element which holds it together (‘God,’ ‘Country,’ ‘Party,’ ‘Class’…), this self-
referential, tautological, performative operation.52 
 
I claim that, pace Lacan, that the term “incentive” functions as the objet a for this given 
discursive cluster—it holds together the field by acting as the object-cause of desire, and fills in 
the gap of causality in any economic, social or political outcome. This retroactive narration of 
causality then has formidable, and serious consequences. 
Incentive Logics as Retroactive Causality 
Fredric Jameson once called technology the “cultural logo of capitalism,” in that it is 
emblematic of the best of its ideological promises, or the story that capitalism tells about itself. 
“Incentive” logics function as a coherent narrative for its metastasizing domains—if technology 
is capitalism’s cultural logo, then “incentive” is its cornerstone. Overall, incentive logics 
authorize the production of retroactive causality in the places it appears. The other types of 
causality—material, formal, efficient—are collapsed into the “final cause” through the reduction 
of each to data points that are renamed as “incentives.” That is, incentives “work” as a 
retroactive re-description of what must have been true in order to cause any outcome; this 
typically entails the reaffirmation of the rectitude of neoclassical economic thought. As a result, 
the discourse of incentives renders all people retroactively responsible for the (contingent, 
constrained) choices they make, because they are presumed to have voluntarily chosen the action 
from an available menu of (market) choices.  Furthermore, this form of knowledge production 
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then exploits this retroactive causality as a way to proactively prescribe (and proscribe) 
behaviors in accordance with neoclassical utility functions. In this way, past, present, and future 
are blurred: Centralizing “incentives” both presumes in advance that market structures have 
always determined people’s non-economic actions, but also, that they should act in accordance 
with said dictates. 
“Incentive” marks a gap in the intelligibility of social reality, and covers it over 
symbolically by attributing enjoyment to the actors under analysis. The term allows its prophets 
to return a stable answer to any complex, conjunctural question. First and foremost, incentive 
driven vocabularies assume that all actors intentionally and voluntarily take actions in 
accordance with their preferences. Because commands and coercion purport to be on the 
opposite end of the spectrum from “incentive-based” approaches, those who truck in the 
language of incentives assume actions to be always freely chosen from an available menu of 
options. Kaushik Basu writes, “In traditional economics, it is presumed that if a person chooses 
an alternative x over y, then the person must receive at least as much utility from x as from y. Let 
me call this the ‘choice equals utility’ or ‘choice equals preference’ axiom. This is called ‘selfish 
behavior,’ by definition, in microeconomic theory and game theory.”53 This is also by and large a 
restatement of the basic definition of freedom under the capitalist mode of production—because 
no monarch or sovereign can coerce our activities, or colloquially, because “no one holds a gun 
to your head,” we freely choose our actions from within our circumstances. As Anatole France 
sardonically put it, “The poor must work for this, in presence of the majestic quality of the law 
which prohibits the wealthy as well as the poor from sleeping under the bridges, from begging in 
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the streets, and from stealing bread.”54 The voluntarism embedded within incentive logics 
ultimately means we have a normative justification for the status quo, since we can assume that 
people are incentivized to take the actions they do. 
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, two nominally progressive economists, make the case 
in Nudge that when an organization (like a state or a corporation) raises the costs of socially 
unacceptable behaviors, like smoking or obesity, actors who choose these “higher priced” 
behaviors are thus assumed to be equipped to pay a penalty, be it monetary or social. They call 
this position “libertarian paternalism.” It is, as they write “a relatively weak, soft, and 
nonintrusive type of paternalism because choices are not blocked, fenced off, or significantly 
burdened. If people want to smoke cigarettes to eat a lot of candy, to choose an unsuitable health 
care plan, or fail to save for retirement, libertarian paternalists will not force them to do 
otherwise—or even make things hard for them.”55 For the Nudge authors, all choices of all 
individuals are assumed to have been voluntary, and thus these individuals are assumed to be 
responsible for having made them. Their approach also assumes that all decisions are made 
rationally within a given context.56 This does not mean that anyone resembles the strictly 
autonomous, rational economic agent in textbooks, but rather, that each individual maximizes 
their utility function as they see it. 
Maurice Godelier notes that equating “rationality” and “economical” performs a 
conceptual sleight of hand, the result of which is a tautology. He writes: “the very subject matter 
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of economics as defined by the majority of present day economists is nothing else than the 
subject-matter of the formal theory of purposive action… We are thus confronted with a formal 
definition of ‘the economic’ which is good for nothing, and a principle of rationality which, in 
order to elucidate something in the economy, has to assume that the latter has already been 
correctly defined.”57 Every action taken is “economical,” because it depends on stable 
preferences and utility maximizing. And because it is economical, it is assumed to be rational.58 
And because each action is assumed to be voluntarily taken, we have no grounds upon which to 
criticize the existing order of things. The result is that all actors are held responsible for their 
choices. If an incentive structure is put into place to motivate socially beneficial behaviors, like 
the cessation of smoking, or paying into a retirement plan, and someone refuses to participate, 
the assumption is that they are simply willing to “pay the price” for their behaviors.  
The tenet of responsibility also paradoxically restricts what can be considered coercion, 
since in this view any potential instance of coercion can be analyzed as a cost/benefit problem. 
Basu uses his experience with a mugger to argue that the nominal presentation of a choice does 
not exclude the presence of coercion: “When the man pointed the knife at me and asked for my 
watch, he was giving me a choice: I could give him my watch or my life. I chose to keep my life. 
In fact, it was a bargain since mine was a cheap, unreliable watch. So having a choice cannot be 
equated with noncoercion. It is depriving me of my right—namely, the right to both my watch 
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and life—that made it a case of coercion.”59 The discipline of economics acts in bad faith by 
disavowing that choice and coercion are not contraries of one another. 
Gary Becker, the subject of Chapter 3, makes this responsibility-oriented point equally 
forcefully when discussing the differences between criminals and consumers. He writes, “If a 
rich man purchases a car and a poor man steals one, the former is congratulated, while the latter 
is often sent to prison when apprehended. Yet the rich man’s purchase is equivalent to a ‘theft’ 
subsequently compensated by a ‘fine’ equal to the price of the car, while the poor man, in effect, 
goes to prison because he cannot pay this ‘fine.’”60 Becker’s point is that, while using this 
incentive-based approach to analyze all of human existence, there is no difference between 
criminals and law-abiding people, aside from economic factors. To his credit, he claims that 
there is nothing innate, natural or pathological that produces criminals.61 As Febrero and 
Schwarz point out, Becker’s “idea was to treat delinquents as rational persons who calculate the 
utility of rewards and costs of their peculiar calling but who have a positive risk preference and 
discount the future.”62 
But because all actions are assumed to be voluntarily chosen from one’s starting position, 
one is assumed to be willing to pay the price for whatever behavior one takes. Such a position 
becomes even more pernicious when we recall that incentive logics claim to cause behaviors by 
                                                
59 Basu, Beyond the Invisible Hand, 139. 
 
60 Gary Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, 67. 
 
61 Becker also gets us the furthest in thinking through the immanent nature of incentives—in this realm, there is no 
such thing as negation, only an alternative choice. The classic example of this is the assumption that the persistently 
unemployed are simply choosing leisure time instead of work. But this also entails that incentives are immanent 
because potentially any distant or discrete phenomenon can be rendered ontologically equivalent. Becker, in his 
“household production function,” renders all children equivalent to consumer goods, and equates poor families 
having more children to rich families having better ones. 
 
62 Ramón Febrero and Pedro S. Schwarz, “The Essence of Becker: An Introduction,” in The Essence of Becker, eds. 
Ramón Febrero and Pedro S. Schwarz (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press), xviii. 
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making them appear economically rational. The result is that people are, paradoxically, held 
responsible for choices that are beyond their control. Individuals both take actions according to 
their preferences and passively obey price signals and attune their behavior thereto—i.e., their 
actions are predetermined according to an external force and as such, are involuntarily 
performed.63 In the fall of 2015, the political news cycle was dominated for several weeks by a 
series of heavily altered videos portraying representatives of Planned Parenthood allegedly 
detailing how the organization sells fetal tissue from abortions to biomedical research 
companies.64 In an interview with a local Iowa news station, Sen. Marco Rubio expressed 
outrage about the practice: “Because now what you’ve done is you’ve created an industry. 
You’ve created an incentive for people to be pushed into abortions so that those tissues can be 
harvested and sold for a profit… I just think you’ve created an industry now—a situation where 
very much, you’ve created an incentive for people not just to look forward to having more 
abortions, but being able to sell that fetal tissue—these centers—for purposes of making a profit 
off it, as you’ve seen in some of these Planned Parenthood affiliates.”65 Here, the mere existence 
of a rule (the opportunity for reimbursement for the costs of making tissue donations) produces a 
                                                
63 In other words, the commitments to idiosyncratic freedom promised by Smith’s “invisible hand” metaphor runs up 
against neoclassical economics’ parsimonious theoretical commitments to market signals determining proper 
behavior. 
 
64 Eugene Scott, “Latest Planned Parenthood Video Spotlights New Company in Alleged Fetal Sale,” CNN, 
September 1, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/01/politics/planned-parenthood-intact-fetuses/index.html. 
Accessed September 29, 2015. Although a number of states opened investigations into Planned Parenthood, none 
found any legal wrongdoing. As the New York Times stated, “a state report found no evidence that a Planned 
Parenthood clinic in Missouri illegally handled fetal tissue. The report by the Missouri attorney general was the 
latest to announce results of an investigation arising from secretly recorded videos claiming that Planned Parenthood 
was ‘profiteering in baby parts. Christine Hauser, “Missouri Finds Planned Parenthood Didn’t Mishandle Fetal 
Tissue,” New York Times, September 29, 2015, accessed September 29, 2015. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/30/us/planned-parenthood-fetal-tissue-missouri.html?_r=0.  
 
65 Quoted in Anna Merlan, “Marco Rubio Backs off Suggestion that Women ‘Look Forward’ to their Lucrative 
Abortions,” Jezebel, September 21, 2015, accessed September 28, 2015. http://theslot.jezebel.com/marco-rubio-
backs-off-suggestion-that-women-look-forwar-1732124335.  
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financial incentive to behave in a certain way.66 As I discuss in the following chapter, this move 
to externalize “incentives” as an objective signal is a necessary step along its cultural 
metastasis—once they have become objective mechanisms, they become a metonym for the 
mechanisms of supply and demand writ large. 
Following from this, we infer that incentive logics are prescriptive, meaning that once 
economists, governments, and corporations introduce incentive logics into social reality, the 
available set of choices and outcomes are circumscribed in advance. Prescription, in this view, is 
the figural surplus of retroaction, since the introduction of incentive schemes depends on the 
existing presumptions of neoclassical utility maximization. As mentioned above, the social logic 
of “incentive-driven” behavior presumes two simultaneously incompatible things: One, that 
market structures always already contour social reality, and two, that incentive schemes ought to 
be introduced into social reality as to produce more efficient outcomes. This is not a case of 
separable logics, or separate contexts—these two depend upon one another. For instance, the 
University of Kansas employee healthcare system has a program whereby partaking in healthful 
behaviors earns “points” for the employee—when one earns enough “points,” one’s monthly 
premium is cheaper. So in order to motivate an employee to take healthier action, the healthcare 
plan motivates her through “points” which are ultimately redeemable as a monetary reward.67 
Health, achievement, and yes, the pocketbook, are tied together in an incentive structure. 
                                                
66 As I argue elsewhere, “incentive-based” approaches hypostasize reality into a set of discrete data points to the 
detriment of understanding complexity. So here, whatever contextual reasons that motivate a woman to go to 
Planned Parenthood for an abortion (as opposed to it being covered under an insurance plan, or because a hospital 
does not perform them, or an abortion clinic is too far away) are deliberately suppressed. Only the financial 
incentive remains as the result of a hypothetical profit opportunity. 
 
67 One should easily glimpse a sinister (Foucaultian and Marxist) aspect to incentives here: Ultimately the healthcare 
plan seeks to produce a self-governing subject, a subject of governmentality, but for what end? The healthier the 
workforce, the less a healthcare management system must reimburse hospitals and clinics for procedures, resulting 
in a healthier bottom line for the company. 
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Although the authors of Freaknonomics repeatedly stress their distaste for governments 
as being largely responsible for costly and ineffective solutions thereto, they still enjoin 
governments to introduce incentive schemes into specific problems, such as global warming and 
counterterrorism.68 The Freakonomists’ intellectual forebear, Becker, dedicated a chapter of his 
1972 Economic Approach to Human Behavior to the proposition that companies ought to 
overtake most, if not all, of the state’s functions, because states are more susceptible to 
inefficiency and corruption.69 In other words, even if they disagree that governments should 
produce incentives, they still agree that governments do create them. So while Becker’s ultimate 
political end is the privatization of all state functions, he devotes many of his later BusinessWeek 
columns to entreating the federal government to incentivize businesses and individuals to take 
actions with which he politically agrees (ending environmental regulations, destroying unions, 
privatizing schools, etc.). 
This is because incentives are designed to cause certain behaviors through inducement, 
reward, or “lowering the cost” of certain behaviors, effectively making them involuntary 
responses to objective market signals. The upshot of this is an implicit presumption that social 
reality is controllable as a set of techniques, or levers, that technocrats or corporations can use for 
their own ends. Following from a presumption that individuals act in accordance with their own 
utility function (and because economists assume that market signals produce “economically 
rational” actions), the right incentive structures can produce certain outcomes. In this view of 
                                                
68 “Governments aren’t exactly famous for cheap or simple solutions; they tend to prefer the costly-and-cumbersome 
route. Note that none of the earlier examples in this chapter were the brainchild of a government official. Even the 
polio vaccine was primarily developed by a private group, the National Foundation for Infant Paralysis. President 
Roosevelt personally provided the seed money—it’s interesting that even a sitting president chose the private sector 
for such a task.” Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, SuperFreakonomics: Global Cooling, Patriotic 
Prostitutes, and Why Suicide Bombers Should Buy Life Insurance (New York: William Morrow, 2009), 157. 
 
69 See Becker, The Economic Approach to Behavior, chapter 3 “Competition and Democracy.” 
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society as structured by market principles, we presume that people will do the thing that has the 
lowest “cost.” Levitt and Dubner’s Think Like a Freak, the third book in the enormously popular 
Freakonomics series, exemplifies this approach: “Once you understand how much psychology is 
at work when people process incentives, you can use your wiles to create incentive plans that 
really work—either for your own benefit or, if you prefer, for the greater good.”70 Thaler and 
Sunstein also aim to encourage socially beneficial behaviors by “nudging” individuals toward 
behaviors using their preexisting values and preferences. The global persistence of the incentive 
means that the complex, contradictory social field is rendered into a set of calculable techniques 
for social organization. 
However, as soon as we enter the domain of causality, the invocation of incentives 
becomes tricky. When incentives are retroactively inferred as having been the result of existing 
incentive structures, and incentive structures prescribe (or claim to cause) behavior, we severely 
narrow our ability to determine “what caused what,” however provisionally. To centralize 
incentives means that if any unexpected or suboptimal outcome appears, the only explanatory 
mechanism we have is that a stronger incentive caused an outcome—this is the precious objet a 
for economic analysis.71 For example, prior to the Côte d’Ivoire’s match versus Greece in the 
2014 World Cup, the country’s minister of sport announced that should “Les Elephants” qualify 
for the knockout round from the group stage, each player would earn nearly $50,000 in an 
                                                
70 Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, Think like a Freak: The Authors of Freakonomics Offer to Retrain your 
Brain (New York: William Morrow, 2014), 117. 
 
71 This builds off of the above point—if incentives are exclusively voluntary, only another incentive could motivate 
the behavior of another actor to induce an unforeseen outcome. 
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“incentive payment.”72 Unfortunately for his team, late in the game, Ivorian player Giovanni Sio 
clumsily swung a leg at Giorgios Samaras, a Greek forward, in the penalty box. The referee 
awarded Greece a penalty kick, Samaras converted it, and Côte d’Ivoire failed to qualify for the 
knockout rounds. The question is: Was Sio incentivized by something other than $50,000 when 
he clumsily fouled his Greek opponent? Or were his incentives misaligned—did the promise of a 
bonus motivate him to be overzealous in his tackle? I do not aim to have a satisfactory answer to 
why the match ended the way it did, but strictly using the logic of the incentive, we are left with 
a gap in the order of causality, since what motivated behavior is lost to a voluntaristic, retroactive 
narration of what happened.73 
Here appears the gap in this explanatory matrix: If someone fails in a competitive 
context, was the winner better incentivized by a reward (monetary or otherwise), or is there 
anything else (a competitive advantage, i.e. a material inequality) that explains the outcome? If 
the answer is that it a stronger incentive determines outcomes, as opposed to a stronger 
distribution of forces, then all outcomes are the result of voluntaristic decisions instead of 
material inequalities and unequal distributions of power. Incentives, then, function as an 
ideological buffer zone for inequality, since inequality becomes abstracted and rendered invisible 
by competing incentive structures. Force cannot be part of an “incentive economy,” as Henry 
Wallich puts it, but with recourse only to incentive structures, we are left with a vocabulary that 
                                                
72 See Andy Hunter, “Ivory Coast Given Incentive to Transform Elephants’ Forgettable Record,” The Guardian, 
June 23, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/jun/23/elephants-ivory-coast-world-cup-greece accessed 
February 2, 2016.  
 
73 Becker would point to “human capital” factors that influenced Sio’s actions—he spent more time practicing 
shooting than defending, and hence the outcome is the result of historical accretions outside of the individual 
decision to attempt a foul. Yet Becker, as we shall see, is rigorously committed to the idea that people act 
“economically rationally” by choosing the activity that has the lowest cost to perform given an exiting utility 
function. So we are caught in a continuous regress wherein it is impossible to determine the “difference that makes a 
difference,” to borrow Sarah Dempsey’s phrase, but we have a name for the gap—at some point, Sio was motivated 
by his “incentives.” 
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only accounts for outcomes by saying that people are differentially incentivized by rewards. This 
is especially true when incentive schemes are implemented at the interpersonal level: If two 
individuals react differently to identical incentive schemes, we may only infer that their 
“preferences” are different, which disallows the possibility for generalizable conclusions at all! 
So while incentive logics may function in the aggregate as conditioners of behavior, at crucial 
decision points, we are left asking a set of voluntaristic questions rather than structural ones. 
Consider the way Levitt, Chiappori, and Groseclose describe the logic of penalty kicks in 
one of the economics discipline’s most prestigious journals.74 Based on historical conversion 
rates, the authors the contend that the “rational” shot is dead center, since one assumes in 
advance that the goalkeeper will move either left or right, in an attempt to block a shot nearer the 
corner. In their book Think Like a Freak, Dubner and Levitt take this dubious conclusion and 
extrapolate it to sets of competing noneconomic “incentives” that affect the shooter’s behavior. 
In the following passage, take note of the positional shift from economic analysis to a personal 
narrative. The authors cite historical data from the 1990s and enjoin readers to imagine 
themselves as the actors in question: 
At this most turbulent moment, what is your true incentive? The answer might seem 
obvious: you want to score the goal to win the game for you team. If that’s the case, the 
statistics plainly show you should kick the ball dead center. But is winning the game your 
truest incentive? …If you follow this selfish incentive—protecting your own reputation 
by not doing something potentially foolish—you are more likely to kick toward a corner. 
If you follow the communal incentive—trying to win the game for your nation even 
though you risk looking personally foolish—you will kick toward the center.75 
 
The “incentive” to kick toward a corner is the “selfish” one, according to the authors, because it 
                                                
74 Derek Thompson, “The Economics of Penalty Kicks in Soccer,” The Atlantic June 10, 2010, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/06/the-economics-of-penalty-kicks-in-soccer/58001. Accessed 
February 2, 2016. 
 
75 Levitt and Dubner, Think Like a Freak, 6-7. 
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obeys the social expectations of a footballer—go for glory, smash a spectacular shot. The 
“communal” incentive is instead to follow the wisdom of the market and guide the ball into the 
middle, because it is the most economically “rational” decision. No other contextual factors can 
matter here—there are simply competing sets of incentives that explain the outcome. Or rather, 
the contextual factors can be numerically represented as different “incentives.” 
The problems here are manifold. First, equilibrium models that predict (and prescribe) 
behavior are ultimately self-defeating—in accordance with standard theory, once new 
information enters the system, a new equilibrium is reached (so that once shooters begin kicking 
down the middle, keepers will stand still and easily swat away attempts). Next, the authors make 
predictions that both actors move simultaneously based on predictions that both shooter and 
keeper move toward their dominant sides more often than not.76 Such a prediction is empirically 
testable, but the authors decide against this analysis.77 Savvy penalty takers frequently judge the 
movement of a keeper before striking the ball. Eden Hazard, of Chelsea Football Club, scored 9 
penalties in a row in the 2014-2015 season using the strategy of “looking off” the keeper and 
anticipating his opponent’s movement. Another way of saying this is that outcomes are not 
always immanent to a situation, but can be thought of as subtractions, or negations, from a given 
situation. One simply kicks where the keeper is not. 
But ultimately, this approach has two major consequences. First, it ossifies social reality 
into a set of decision points and concrete outcomes—when in fact each simplifying assumption 
                                                
76 P.A. Chiappori, S. Levitt & T. Groseclose, “Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogenous: 
The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer.” American Economic Review 92 (2002), 1139, 1141. 
 
77 The authors infer that both goalkeeper and shooter move simultaneously—not through empirical observation, but 
through scientific inference: Because a ball can theoretically travel upwards of 100 miles per hour, and the distance 
from penalty spot to goal is 12 yards, the authors infer that no human being can react to a shot in order to stop it. 
This mathematical simplification beggars belief, and is belied by their own conclusions (mentioned above) about the 
unpredictability of strategic decisions and the intra-game game theory employed by both shooter and keeper.  
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excises, cleaves and eliminates the process by which the outcome was produced. It is a 
tremendous reduction of complexity to a “market signal,” and the process and result are 
confused, or worse, reversed.78 As the authors write, “We cannot reject that players optimally 
choose strategies, conditional on the opponent's behavior,” which in effect nullifies the 
predictive power of the analysis.79 One simply assumes that actors have already gone through a 
complex decision-making process, but the authors both predict (and prescribe) that other actors 
follow the market signal, and not the complex dialectic of behavior at any given moment. Milton 
Friedman articulates his vision of “positive economics” contra this predictive account, preferring 
instead to think of economics as a post hoc heuristic, as Lundberg puts it.80 Whereas Friedman 
chides economists for seeking realism in explanations, since such a realism would entail 
essentially a non-representative map of reality itself, the “incentive” approach errs in the 
opposite direction by presuming reality itself is circumscribed solely into incentive structures. 
Hence what authorizes the predictive account: One must only map out the relevant incentive 
structures to cognize what “causes” the action at hand. 
But finally, more interesting than these fairly easy criticisms of their methods is that this 
data was used not as a prediction about strategy, but used to render these decision points into a 
set of voluntarist notions, and moreover, a moral one. Recall how Levitt and Dubner re-narrate 
this economic journal article’s findings: The “true incentive” was not even an objective market 
signal, which is what authorizes this anecdote as a “freaky” one. Instead the authors’ explanation 
                                                
78 The character Peggy Blomquist in the television show Fargo sums it up nicely. When asked about a split-second 
decision she made to set a series of murders into motion, she replied, “You say it like these things happen in a 
vacuum. Like it’s a test—check A or B. But it’s like decisions you made in a dream, you know? …I’m livin’ in a 
museum of the past.” Quoted from http://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/view_episode_scripts.php?tv-
show=fargo-2014&episode=s02e06. 
 
79 Chiappori, Levitt & Groseclose, “Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogenous,” 1150. 
 
80 Lundberg, Lacan in Public, 121. 
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for a given behavior is simply a competing incentive—to be selfish, or to follow a “communal” 
incentive. Failure—either through the competitive power of an opponent, a slick patch of grass, 
or any other explanation for an outcome, is instead retroactively narrated as an individual choice 
based on an incentive. “Incentive” is a placeholder to mark the absence of a more robust 
explanation of social behavior—it is a black box for complexity in social explanations, and this 
placeholder switches the “code” of behavior, if you will, from a rational economic response to 
stimuli into a moral, character-based explanation.  
To borrow a sports metaphor, incentives “hide the ball” when used as the singular 
justification for differences in outcomes; it follows the structure of neurosis in which we ask 
what was the proper incentive (and attempt to retroactively infer which was the effective cause 
of an action). Lacan calls these “button ties,” or points du capiton, in which a given enunciation 
retroactively acquires symbolic legitimacy. Rickert writes, “Conceptual stability is achieved 
retroactively, and insofar as this occurs through hegemonic foundations, we should see that these 
stabilities can achieve striking sedimentation.”81 Because incentive logics offer stable 
explanatory mechanisms for why people behave the way they do—it was their preference, it 
fulfills their utility function, one was incentivized—any outcome could not have been otherwise. 
It is always too late to talk about change when the vocabulary is invoked to retroactively account 
for any outcome. While the retroactive nature of incentives relies on the idea that social reality is 
at equilibrium, and the prescriptive introduction of incentives presumes that society is operating 
inefficiently, or at a disequilibrium, both are unified by the overarching commitment to seeing 
social reality as a set of market mechanisms. 
                                                
81 Rickert, Acts of Enjoyment, 98. 
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In sum, incentive-based logics depend on a form of retroactive causality that re-narrates 
outcomes as being the result of neoclassical presumptions about market behavior. The 
complexities and contingencies of individual situations are elided—or better, sutured, to a notion 
of neoclassical market behavior. The result is an individualizing ascription of responsibility for 
any outcome. For the prophets of incentives, “incentive” works as the enigmatic hidden force 
that joins together cause and effect, the paradoxical object that renders the world intelligible. 
“Incentive” is the name of a surplus—it is that which is added to the realm of “actual” causality 
as a rubric or interpretive schema in order to render behavior intelligible to the discourse of 
economics. Material, formal, and efficient types of causality are reduced to differential data 
points for determining the strongest “incentive” which ultimately causes an outcome. What 
makes this reduction so pernicious is the collapse of orders of causality entails a collapse into a 
freely chosen outcome. Material inequality can be refigured as a marker of desire rather than a 
problem to be interpreted, and changed. “Incentive” is the name for the “final cause” because it 
exists to authorize behavior as “having acted in accordance with neoclassical utility functions”—
it is the answer to its own question. Why did she act in this way? She was incentivized by the 
outcome—or was willing to pay the price for it. 
The following chapter traces a story of the incentive historically, first throughout history 
as a poetic term, and second as it is taken up and transmogrified by neoclassical economic 
thought. Through these discrete terminological movements of the term’s usage through Jeremy 
Bentham, Paul Samuelson, and others, we can discern what accounts for the term’s prevalence 
today.  
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Chapter 2: Between the Fire and the Tune, or, A History of the Term “Incentive” in Economic 
Thought 
 
“Semblably Pythia the priestesse of Apollo, being once come downe from her three footed 
fabricke, upon which she receiveth that incentive spirit of furie, remaineth quiet and in calme 
tranquility: whereas the rage of love, after it hath once in good earnest caught a man, and set 
him on fire, there is no musicke in the world, no charme, no lenitive song, no change of place 
able to stay it”—Plutarch, Morals, vol. IV (“On Love”)82 
 
For the ancient Greeks, to be “incensed” and to have an “incentive” was synonymous; as 
Plutarch points out, to have an incentive was to have an uncontrollable fire lit beneath you. Yet 
the term “incentive” (and “incense,” for that matter), when translated into Latin, also shares an 
etymological relation with “incantation”: An incentive can “set the tune” of behavior, or “charm” 
someone into a certain behavior. The word “incentive” comes from “the past participle stem of 
incinere, ‘strike up,’ from in- ‘in, into’… + canere ‘sing,’” and its “sense [is] influenced by 
association with incendere ‘to kindle.’”83 So even at its root, “incentive” partakes in an 
etymological bivalence, between a fire and a tune—that is, something poetic, subjective, 
uncontrollable; and a melodious charm—extrinsic, motivating, yet regularizable. Through 
readings of three economic thinkers, Jeremy Bentham, Alfred Marshall, and Paul Samuelson, 
this chapter traces how a formerly general synonym for motivation is introduced into economic 
thought and how this term is reduced to a strictly financial motive. This terminological shift 
happens in the gradual externalization of “incentive”—from the fire to the tune. Through these 
three thinkers, I demonstrate how “incentive” becomes a free-floating, objective and autonomous 
                                                
82 Plutarch, Morals vol. 4, ed. William W. Goodwin, http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/plutarch-the-morals-vol-4, 
accessed December 22, 2015. 
 
83 Online Etymology Dictionary, “Incentive.” Accessed September 7, 2015. 
http://etymonline.com/index.php?term=incentive&allowed_in_frame=0. 
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phenomenon. I invoke the Lacanian concept of the objet a to describe how “the incentive” 
functions as a universal object for the discipline of economics. By investigating this initial 
terminological reduction we can account for the metastasis of a particularized, economized 
version of what to be “incentive-driven” means thereafter, and discern the grounds upon which 
the eventual metastasis occurs. To be clear, the other side of the term—the history of the fire, so 
to speak—does not necessarily contain my wish for the road not taken. I do not wish to reclaim 
some lost vision of “incentive,” but to point out that the term itself is already caught between 
these two poles of incantation and inflammation, between subjective and objective motivation; 
the fact that the term performs double duty is a testament to how it sums up wildly divergent 
situations. 
Bentham’s utilitarian decision-making depends upon objectively tabulating all of the 
pleasures and pains of the world under the rubric of the “principle of utility;” he also introduces 
“incentive” as a way to properly motivate individuals. Marshall picks up Bentham’s use of the 
term “incentive” and applies it to neoclassical economics, and he uses it to define the parameters 
of Bentham’s utility function. Marshall’s economic method starts by assuming money, and the 
monetary motive is the best accounting system we have devised for human motivation writ large. 
We can and must assume that if someone has any desire whatsoever, it is expressible in some 
sense by its appearance in money. By the 20th century, incentives do not represent poetic, 
intrinsic motivation, but are instead objective results of competitive markets and the existence of 
profit opportunities therein. In this vision of incentive-driven thinking, incentives become 
fundamentally reactive, and exteriorly generated from market signals. In other words, the 
propositions, “Incentives are a reward” and “Incentives are a desire” are contradictory once 20th 
century neoclassical economics gets its hands on the term. 
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Paul Samuelson, one of the most influential economists of the 20th century, appears here 
for his role as a systematizer of this line of thinking.84 Upon the presentation of his 1970 prize in 
“economic sciences,” Samuelson was credited by the Bank of Sweden for “contribut[ing] to 
raising the general analytical and methodological level in economic science.”85 The term 
“incentive” appears in Samuelson akin to how we typically think of it today: an external reward 
for behavior. Samuelson also evokes what I call the “fragility thesis,” since he fears the 
dampening of the entrepreneurial spirit by incentives that work against market precepts. While 
he forwards a generally orthodox understanding of incentives as monetary, he still stands against 
the metastasis of the term to describe all of social reality. For this reason, he represents a 
conceptual middle distance between the strict neoclassical position, and the later “Chicago 
School” metastasis. Samuelson also advocates, intentionally or not, a notion of the incentive as a 
behavioral modification: He is concerned with the state’s ability to retard or alter incentive 
structures in free market societies. Samuelson allows economists to imagine the pernicious 
consequences of taxation, but in a very limited manner. Overall, Samuelson’s notion of incentive 
as “behavioral modification” contains an intriguing theory of mediation, which I pick up in the 
concluding chapter of the dissertation.86 
                                                
84 Samuelson coined the term “the great neo-classical synthesis,” which at the time, represented a grand détente 
between Keynesian and neoclassical economics. Today, that synthesis is less important to the discipline of 
economics, since neoclassicism has largely superseded macroeconomic Keynesian dominance since the “marginalist 
revolution” of the 1970s. 
 
85 “Paul A. Samuelson - Facts.” Nobelprize.org. Nobel Media AB 2014, accessed September 22, 2015. 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1970/samuelson-facts.html. The generality of 
this endorsement is almost certainly a testament to the newness of that prize, first established in 1969, but also 
simply to Samuelson’s widespread influence in the field, mainly thanks to his seminal Foundations of Economic 
Analysis and his textbook Economics. 
 
86 A brief preview: If social and economic policy by the U.S. federal government continues along the lines of 
incentivization, the state will have abdicated a role in wealth transfer in favor of a solely entrepreneurial vision of 
the social and political bond. 
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But the story of the term’s journey through these thinkers is not simply textual, or 
authorial—it is a story about the discipline of economics’ search for a universal object that 
stitches up reality. Here I describe the term “incentive” as a Lacanian objet a, the object-cause of 
desire that produces subjective coherence to an inconsistent totality. The objet a allows for the 
phrasing of struggles in economics as a search for a signifier that performs the double duty of 
being internal and external, subjective and objective, desire and reward. But in addition, it allows 
us to think through the libidinal economy that sustains economic discourse. The logic of the 
incentive is fundamentally about the distribution of jouissance, but this distribution is not onto 
actors in the social field, but rather, within the discursive economy of economics itself.87 
Conceptualizing “incentive” as a universal object may account for its habitual, sustained 
repetition once it metastasizes onto the social field. 
Lacan introduces the objet a as a designator of a fragment of “reality” that offers 
consistency in a subject’s relation to the world; it is both an object of desire and its apparent 
fulfillment. It is that which is “in you something more than you.”88 This object is, for Lacan, a 
fragment discoverable in speech, a “symbolic object.” He writes, “What is at stake in analysis is 
the advent in the subject of the scant reality that this desire sustains in him, with respect to 
symbolic conflicts and imaginary fixations, as the means of their accord, and our path is the 
intersubjective experience by which this desire gains recognition.”89 The word, however, is a 
                                                
87 This innovation also marks a gentle re-figuration of the relationship between Marx(ism) and Lacanian thought. 
Samo Tomšič, in the recent The Capitalist Unconscious, argues for the structural homology between surplus value 
and surplus jouissance that Lacan identifies in his post-1968 seminars. Here, I keep the relationship at the level of 
the signifier: There is a discursive surplus in the invocation of the term “incentive” by economic thinkers because of 
the work it performs. See Samo Tomšič, The Capitalist Unconscious: Marx and Lacan (New York: Verso, 2015). 
 
88 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. 
Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 1998), 268. 
 
89 Jacques Lacan, “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis,” in Écrits, trans. Bruce Fink 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2006), 231. 
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gap—an interjection into reality but without positive consistency on its own; as Slavoj Žižek puts 
it, it is “an objectification of a void,” but with a useful theoretical twist.90 The positive 
consistency it offers, or better, the libidinal surplus, is “the retroactive act of naming itself,” so 
what we call self-identity is itself already a discursive surplus imputed into the signifier.91 This 
operative signifier is “the incentive.” Economics is a discipline in search of a stable object in the 
20th century, and within theoretical debates we can discern how this term metastasizes. This 
chapter represents how the sense of “incentive” is constricted by the discipline of economics into 
an external reward; the following chapter on demonstrates how this narrow, calculative, 
economized utility function then is able to describe all of human behavior.92 “Incentive” 
becomes a universal unifying mechanism through the aforementioned struggle within the 
discipline itself.  
Early Uses of the Term: From Incentivum to Incentive, and to Incentivize 
 According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the first appearance of the term “incentive” 
in English appears in the translation of Ranulfi Higdan’s Polychronicon, a “universal historical” 
chronicle originally written in Latin and translated in 1425. Higdan uses the term “incentivum” 
in a prologue, self-aggrandizingly praising the virtues of the writers of history, and calls 
historical writing the noblest of all. The Middle English translation, from the Latin, reads: “For 
in the contexte historicalle the rewle off lyvenge and forme of vertues morale, and the incentive 
                                                
90 Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 95. Lacan also calls this the “presence made of absence,” see Jacques 
Lacan, “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis,” 228. 
 
91 Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, 95. 
 
92 I tend to think of this movement like an hourglass shape, with a nonspecific synonym for motive in the top bulb. 
This chapter represents where the glass narrows, and the sand transforms from an undefined mass to individual 
grains. When Becker introduces the “economic approach to human behavior,” this represents the second widening, 
with only the style of analysis (the neoclassical utility function) that remains intact. 
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of manhode, giffe grete resplendence thro the diligence of chroniclers.”93 (The text, in modern 
English, ought to read, “For in an historical context the rule of living and form of moral virtues, 
and the incentive of manhood, give great resplendence through the diligence of chroniclers.”) As 
mentioned, the term comes directly from Latin, and this translation is the first evidence the OED 
has of its appearance in English. Interestingly enough, the specific term skips a translation: 
“Incentivum” appears in the original Latin, but does not appear in the first translation of the book 
by John Trevisa (a contemporary of Higdan’s)—it then reappears in the above translation that 
was done by an unknown translator, also in the 15th century (according to Churchill Babington, 
the editor of the volume in 1865). Rather, “incentivum” was roughly translated as “blaiseth and 
schyneth” by Trevisa, giving credence to the idea that this use of the term incentive is related to 
the fire, lit beneath the actor in question. Although the Polychronicon translation may be 
inconclusive in the specific appearance of the term between Latin and Old English, the fact that 
“incentivum” can disappear between translations tells us something important, that the term was 
not fixed by Higdan’s readers as a specified description of a phenomenon (like a “tax incentive” 
functions today). Put differently, for one translator, Trevisa, “incentivum” indicated both a 
“blaze” and a “shine,” whereas for his 15th-century contemporary, “incentivum” could be 
directly translated to “incentive.” 
 If the first appearance of “incentive” in English is tantalizingly inconclusive, we can turn 
to the second, indicated in the epigraph to this chapter. Here, a translation of Plutarch conveys 
the indomitable “incentive spirit of furie” of a person in love, for “there is no musicke in the 
                                                
93 Ranulfi Higdan, Polychronicon vol. 1, trans. John Trevisa (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts & 
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world, no charme, no lenitive song, no change of place able to stay it.”94 In this poetic version of 
the term, “incentive” functions as a subjective motivation, not one organized by an external 
reward. Once again, in a different translation, the exact term “incentive” does not appear at all in 
this passage. The phrasing is instead: “Whereas the fury of love, wherever it seizes either man or 
woman, sets them in a flame.”95 Plutarch continues, later, “the fancies and visions of Lovers 
being imprinted in their cogitations by fire or enambled [sic], leave in their memorie lively 
images surely engraved.”96 There is no doubt that “incentive” was understood, for Plutarch’s 
translators at least, as inextricably linked to the notion of the flame, something motivating for the 
“incensed” subject. “Incentive” here also functions as an adjective, not a noun: “Incentive” 
modifies “spirit,” whereas today, in something like a “tax incentive,” incentive functions a noun, 
as an objective thing that the adjective “tax” modifies. Unfortunately, the specifically “fire”-
based deployment of the term is harder to find today; even if one is “incensed,” this typically 
conveys anger, not “motive.” (Indeed, “lighting a fire” underneath someone has become its own 
idiom.) 
 In contrast, there is another sense of “incentive,” that of a “tune,” borrowing from the 
above notion of “incantare,” closely related to “incantation.” Here I lay the groundwork for the 
terminological reduction of the term to an external monetary reward in Samuelson and other 20th 
century thinkers, since this tune comes from an outside source to motivate action. A 1612 poem, 
Michael Drayton’s Poly-Olbion, notes that the harps, tympanum and chorus of the people of 
                                                
94 Plutarch, Plutarch’s Morals. Translated from the Greek by Several Hands. Corrected and Revised by William W. 
Goodwin, with an Introduction by Ralph Waldo Emerson.. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1878). Vol. 2. 
September 7, 2015. 
 
95 Plutarch, Plutarch’s Morals. Vol. 2. http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1212#Plutarch_0062-02_977. 
 
96 Plutarch, Morals vol. 4, edited by William W. Goodwin. Accessed December 22, 2015. 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/plutarch-the-morals-vol-4,1143. 
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Ireland, Wales and Scotland can produce a “musicall incentiue to warre” against their foes, as 
well as “charme” their compatriots.97 To step, to fight, and contemporarily, to work, is to be set 
in motion by the tune. The notion of incentive as extrinsic motivation is also embedded within its 
etymology—as Harper notes, “incantation” comes from the Latin incantationem, a “noun of 
action from [the] past participle stem incantare.”98 “Incentive” here is more like a charm, 
something spellbinding to its listener—so when an organization or entity attempts to motivate a 
specific behavior, the inflection is on the “tune” rather than the “fire.” (And interestingly, recall 
that when the “incentive spirit of furie” seizes Plutarch’s subject; no lenitive song could stay 
him. The two senses of “incentive” go to war here, and the fire wins.) In this sense of the term, 
we are charmed by the tune, and it acts upon us. In contrast, the “fire” is “in” the subject—it 
wrangles the spirit of the actor. 
The turning points this term takes is also evident in its more modern usage. Today, the 
prevalence of the term “incentive” ought not strike us as surprising: According to Google, the 
prevalence of the term has sextupled since 1800, taking an acutely advanced leap between 1925 
and 1950, and maintaining its height until roughly 2000.  
                                                
97 Michael Drayton, Poly-Olbion, (Ann Arbor: Text Creation Partnership, 1624). 
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A20847.0001.001?view=toc, 97, 96. 
 
98 “Incantation.” Online Etymology Dictionary, accessed September 7, 2015. 
http://etymonline.com/index.php?term=incantation&allowed_in_frame=0. 
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Fig. 1 – Frequency of the term “incentive,” 1800-2000. 
As I argue below, the capture of the term by neoclassical economics, its use by economic 
policymakers, and its usage by businesses as a way to conceptualize motivation in the 20th 
century largely accounts for this rise. 
Although “incentive” and “reward” seem roughly synonymous, at least in a standard 
reading, the 20th century witnessed a gradual rise in “incentives” and a gradual decline of 
“reward” in print form, although incentives do not surpass it. The alternative sense of the term 
“incentive,” that of a motivation, also witnesses a dramatic rise, while “inducement” gradually 
dwindles. 
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Fig. 2 – Frequency of “incentive,” “inducement,” “motivation,” and “reward,” 1800-2000 
There could be multiple competing explanations for this. The logic of the incentive 
“works” today because it presents a fairly elegant explanation for people’s behavior, especially 
in what Thomas Piketty hypothesizes will be a “low-growth” society for decades to come. But 
even throughout the 20th century, the question of motivation arose alongside industrial, and then 
service-based, capitalism. After all, business and management literature is comprised of nothing 
but attempts to engineer motivation in workers. “Incentive” is thus a way to domesticate, and 
respond to, the anxiety surrounding motivation in capitalism, so the simultaneous rise of 
“motivation” and “incentive” is unsurprising. 
Yet while the term “incentive,” aside from spikes thanks to rare books before 1800, 
greatly rises in popularity in the 20th century, two different linguistic instances—“incentivize” 
and “incentivization” come out of virtually nowhere: 
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Fig. 3 – Frequency of “incentivize,” 1800-2000. 
 
Fig. 4 – Frequency of “incentivization,” 1800-2000. 
The words “incentivize” (only 1,880,000 overall Google search results in 2016) and 
“incentivization,” (53,000 search results) may have fairly minuscule results, but it is these 
neologisms’ rise over time that is much more interesting than their amount. Only since roughly 
1980 have either of these terms appeared at all, and this is roughly coterminous with the rise of 
“neoliberalism,” however broadly construed. 
At the “neoliberal” moment, “incentive” gets “verbed”! This anthimeria, or the turning of 
a noun into a verb, is what results when economics wrangles the term into a discursive 
bottleneck. In other words, there are many ways of conveying the sense of the statement, “I wish 
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to motivate my workers,” or “I aim to reward my workers for their hard work.” The term “to 
incentivize” steps into this gap precisely because it offers a particular vision of human 
motivation by presuming that people are motivated by incentives—once “incentive” moves 
through Marshall and Samuelson, “incentivize” is an explicable outgrowth of the term. After all, 
the suffix “–ize” implies causation (to mobilize is to make mobile, to standardize is to render 
things standard), so the work is doubly metaphorical here. The term supplants its own metonyms, 
so that motivation, reward, and inducement are all made into particular cases of a narrower term, 
the incentive. 
For instance, in a podcast on the Grantland sports website, two writers made suggestions 
about how to prevent teams in the National Basketball Association from “tanking,” or losing 
intentionally to gain a better spot in the following year’s amateur draft. Note the explicit use of 
the term “incentivize”: 
Bill Simmons: We always think about, all right, what are the prizes with a tournament 
like this? You get a guaranteed spot, or what would incentivize all 30 NBA teams to 
actually try in a midseason tournament? I think I came up with the answer: 5 million 
extra for the salary cap the following season. 
 
Brian Windhorst: …But you have to give a piece of candy to the players too. You’ve 
got to figure out something for them… You have to incentivize the players to really want 
to go hard in it. Otherwise, you’re going to get exhibition-style effort. 
 
Bill Simmons: Oh, so they all get $500,000 bonuses, the first-place team. 
 
Brian Windhorst: Yeah, I think either monetary or something with the schedule, where 
they get an extra four days off.99 
 
To motivate someone’s behavior is to set them into motion with a tune, to externally motivate 
their activity toward a certain end. The “incentive” becomes a technique, an external reward 
                                                
99 Bill Simmons and Brian Windhorst, “B.S. Report: Brian Windhorst (Plus a Transcript of Brian and Bill on a 
Possible Midseason NBA Tournament),” Grantland, August 5, 2014, accessed Sept. 14, 2015. 
http://grantland.com/the-triangle/b-s-report-brian-windhorst-plus-a-transcript-of-brian-and-bill-on-a-possible-
midseason-nba-tournament. 
 65 
instead of a subjective or intrinsic, “fiery” motivation, and “to incentivize” becomes the 
implementation thereof. To be clear, the “tune” is not the object of satisfaction, but is rather the 
scheme that sets the activity into motion. With this brief etymological sketch in hand, I now 
move to Jeremy Bentham’s work to determine how “incentive” enters an economic, then a 
cultural, lexicon in a narrowed manner. 
Jeremy Bentham: The Pleasure/Pain Calculus  
Bentham’s work accomplishes three things in this history of the incentive: First, he 
renders all action as incipiently rational and calculative according to his “hedonistic calculus,” 
and thereby reduces all action to the “simple utility function” of weighing pleasure and pain. 
Next, he interiorizes, or psychologizes outside motivations—turning all present and future 
motives into coefficients for enjoyment. And finally, in a dialectical return to the first point, 
Bentham operationalizes the pleasure/pain calculus as an objective measurement, one that 
polities deciding on a course of action can tabulate, to implement the proper incentive schemes. 
In other words, he presents an elegant justification for a psychologically rooted methodological 
individualism. Bentham is vital here in displaying how to we arrive at the presumption that 
humans are “incentive-driven animals.” Bentham’s “principle of utility” is a way to imagine how 
and why other people act the way they do. 
Bentham first provides us with a list of sentiments that motivate human behavior, after 
which he offers a set of conceptual tools to reduce these motives for action down to two general 
containers for all human behaviors (pleasure and pain), and finally, offers a set of guidelines for 
how to judge the rectitude of any action (the principle of utility). Taken with Marshall’s 
economization of the selfsame process, we have in our hands the keys to understanding how all 
motives are reduced to a positivistic inference from market behavior. Davis claims that 19th and 
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20th century economists such as Jevons, Walras and Alfred Marshall developed their cardinal 
utility theories of consumer choice based on Bentham’s work: “Bentham, in terms of a 
hedonistic, pleasure and pain calculus, had laid the original foundations for a utility 
understanding of choice, promoting the idea that human psychology thus understood represented 
scientific advance.”100  
In his 1789 An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Bentham writes, 
“Nature has subjected to man the dominion of pleasure and pain. To them we are indebted for all 
our ideas… Be it understood that I take the words pain and pleasure in their common 
acceptation, without inventing arbitrary definitions, either to exclude certain pleasures; or to 
deny certain pains. No subtility, no metaphysics; we need not consult Plato nor Aristotle. Pain 
and pleasure are what every body feels them to be; the peasant as well as the prince, the 
uneducated man as well as the philosopher.”101 For Bentham, the body does not deceive—the 
“common understanding” of pleasure and pain has to be universal, or else it could not serve as 
the common denominator of calculating utility. To feel pleasure is an intrinsic good, to feel pain 
is intrinsically bad. This may appear straightforward, but his position authorizes his later 
attempts to universalize his pleasure/pain calculus, since the presumption of rational action 
means that from the outside, we infer all people’s actions as having brought them pleasure. This 
becomes an injunction against state action that could potentially make someone less “happy” 
because of a higher tax bill. He writes, “Now, pleasure is in itself a good: nay, even setting aside 
immunity from pain, the only good: pain is in itself an evil; and, indeed, without exception, the 
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only evil; or else the words good and evil have no meaning.”102 He also defines pain and pleasure 
dialectically, so pleasure involves the avoidance of pain and vice versa. He identifies 14 different 
“simple pleasures” (among them benevolence, amity, skill, and imagination), and 14 “simple 
pains” which are simply the contraries of the pleasures (thus, the pain of benevolence, the pain of 
amity, the pain of awkwardness, and so on).103  
Bentham next identifies eleven primary motives for action (Good-will, Love of 
reputation, Desire of amity, Religion, Displeasure, Physical desire, Pecuniary interest, Love of 
power, Self-preservation, the love of ease, and the love of life)104, and how each of these terms 
could be positioned as “bad” or “good” motives depending on context and intensity. For 
instance, the love of power in some contexts is deemed “ambition,” whereas in others, it is 
termed the “lust for power.” Bentham next identifies several ways to characterize motive, first as 
internal or external, and secondarily in prospect and in esse (or in existence). For Bentham, 
“[t]he internal perception of any individual lot of pleasure or pain, the expectation of which is 
looked upon as calculated to determine you to act in such or such a manner; as the pleasure of 
acquiring such a sum of money,” qualifies as an internal motive, while “the breaking out of a fire 
in the house you are in, which makes it necessary for you to quit it,” is an external motive.105 
Note here that for both types, motives appear as not-yet-realized desires—even an external 
motive like a fire is strictly anticipatory of the pain a fire would wreak. Bentham then attempts to 
distinguish among motives in prospect and in esse: “for a man to be governed by any motive, he 
must in every case look beyond that event which is called his action [the act in esse]; he must 
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look to the consequences of it: and it is only in this way that the idea of pleasure, of pain, or of 
any other event, can give birth to it.”106 
But this is merely a restatement of the prior distinction, with one vital twist: External 
motivation is subsumed under internal motivation by way of an anticipatory gesture. As Bentham 
puts it: “Of all these motives, which stand nearest to the act, to the production of which they all 
contribute, is that internal motive in esse which consists in the expectation of the internal motive 
in prospect: the pain or uneasiness you feel at the thoughts of being burnt. All other motives are 
more or less remote.”107 So in a sense, Bentham’s house fire example retains the traces of 
“incentive” as subjective motive, especially since a fire appears in both examples. By reducing 
our considerations down to whether pain or pleasure will be felt, the external world is reduced to 
a subjective psychological impression. Sigot writes that “The incentive to innovate depends on 
potential profit: it rests on a calculation made by the innovator which should in no way be 
different from that made by any individual regarding the pains and pleasures of any given 
action.”108 In the hands of Bentham and Becker, this entails that humans are more rational and 
more calculating than in Samuelson and other neoclassical economists. 
In fact, Bentham introduces the notion of incentive schemes into public policy. Given 
that in his framework, individuals are naturally pleasure seeking and pain avoiding, he leverages 
several notions of “incentives” to, in effect, contour people’s natural dispositions toward 
economically beneficial ends. As one biographer writes of Bentham, “In his plan for prisons, 
workhouses, and other institutions, Bentham devised compensation schemes, building designs, 
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worker timetables, and even new accounting systems. A guiding principle of Bentham’s schemes 
was that incentives should be designed “to make it each man’s interest to observe on every 
occasion that conduct which it is his duty to observe.”109 That is, Bentham’s notion of incentives 
is provocatively modern, especially coupled with his notion that the mechanisms of capitalism 
provide objective incentives for people to behave rationally on their own. He writes: 
“Competition—preference given to the best bidder among candidates bidding upon each other, 
under the spur applied by that incentive—competition, affords, in the instance of the party 
chosen, a better chance of fitness for the office and its services, than will in general be afforded 
by preference given.”110 Bentham’s innovation here is the suturing of his concept of human 
nature to the idea that actions can be organized both by savvy legislators and by market 
mechanisms. 
Yet this is a careful line that he treads, because Bentham’s individualized pleasure/pain 
calculus is used to determine the proper actions of legislators. Étienne Dumont, Bentham’s 
translator and editor, writes, “To get a precise knowledge of the principles of utility, it became 
necessary to exhibit all the pleasures and all the pains, in a table; for they are the first 
elements—the figures which are to be employed in a moral calculation. As in arithmetic, we 
proceed upon numbers…so in legislation we are to work with pains and pleasures, the value of 
which it is necessary to have exactly estimated.”111 Bentham delivers an objective formula for 
determining proper legislative action: 
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Sum up all the values of all the pleasures on the one side, and those of all the pains on the 
other… Take an account of the number of persons whose interests appear to be 
concerned; and repeat the above process with respect to each. Sum up the numbers 
expressive of the degrees of good tendency, which the act has, with respect to each 
individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is good upon the whole…do this again 
with respect to each individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is bad upon the 
whole. Take the balance which if on the side of pleasure, will give the general good 
tendency of the act, with respect to the total number or community of individuals 
concerned; if on the side of pain, the general evil tendency, with respect to the same 
community. 
 
Elsewhere, in Principles of the Civil Code, Bentham writes: “Legislation, which has hitherto 
been founded principally upon the quicksands of instinct and prejudice, ought at length to be 
placed upon the immoveable base of feelings and experience: a moral thermometer is required, 
which should exhibit every degree of happiness and suffering.”112 
How is one to measure happiness? Bentham has an answer: money. He writes, “Each 
portion of wealth is connected with a corresponding portion of happiness. Of two individuals, 
possessed of unequal fortunes, he who possesses the greatest wealth will possess the greatest 
happiness.”113 But Bentham does allow one escape route. For Bentham, “[w]hat is here said of 
wealth, ought not to be limited to pecuniary wealth: the term is used with a more extended 
signification, and includes every thing which serves for subsistence and abundance.”114 On the 
one hand, this means that for Bentham, money is not always equivalent to happiness. Yet on the 
other, does this definitional expansion actually contradict the fusion of money and happiness? I 
say no, for two reasons: If “subsistence and abundance” entails durable capital goods and real 
estate (i.e. fungible commodities) then he has not fully opened up his utility function. And 
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secondly, if Bentham’s “extended signification” is anything that produces happiness, then the 
definition is entirely circular: happiness equals things that make us happy.  
Finally, Bentham’s characterization of legislation anticipates the neoclassical approach 
thereto. As he puts it, “What can the law do relative to subsistence? Nothing directly. All that the 
law can do is to create motives; that is to say, to establish rewards and punishments, by the 
influence of which, men shall be induced to furnish subsistence to themselves.”115 In other 
words, states cannot (or ought not) directly produce or redistribute social resources, they can 
(and should) only incentivize and disincentivize certain behaviors to increase total social 
utility.116 For Bentham, legislation ought to primarily be used for behavioral modification. 
Governments cannot create resources, they can only channel motives into different avenues 
depending on their priorities based on the infinite desires of individuals. 
In sum, Bentham interiorizes motive to such a degree that even external motives  
(charming tunes set from outside and house fires) become internal contemplations. He 
accomplishes this by the terminological reduction of different sensations down to pleasure and 
pain, and then down to a single utility function (essentially the subtraction of possible pains from 
the possible pleasures). But this is still a forward-looking, anticipatory calculus: In an 
anticipatory gesture, we take actions because we believe that they will be valuable for us, or 
avoid things we fear might cause us harm. And finally, Bentham characterizes legislation as 
behavioral modification, which Samuelson takes up more rigorously. 
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Alfred Marshall: Reducing Poetics to Positivism 
Robert L. Helibroner, the renowned economic historian, contends that Alfred Marshall 
introduced “nothing less than a new figure who will epitomize the Marshallian vision of the 
economy as aptly as, if much less dramatically than, the great monarch of the Hobbesian era. The 
new figure is The Individual, whose calculations not only symbolize the workings of the market 
system, but are in fact the rock on which the economy itself ultimately rests.”117 Heilbroner 
overstates his claim, if only because he downplays how influential Bentham was in this regard. 
(Indeed, Heilbroner even writes that Bentham’s “Felicific Calculus” was merely a “philosophical 
view of humanity as so many living profit-and-loss calculators, each busily arranging his life to 
maximize the pleasure of his psychic adding machine.118) However, Marshall does prove a 
pivotal figure for the history of the discipline of economics. His importance is threefold: First, he 
adapts much of Bentham’s methodology into the field of economics; next, he gently refigures 
Bentham’s equivocation of money and happiness by instead claiming that money is a marker of 
desire and effort (and subsumes even “non-economic” motives under this umbrella). And 
crucially, he introduces the vocabulary of incentives into economic theory to correspond to the 
tenets of equilibrium theory: Marshall explicitly uses the term to describe both motivation and 
reward—and this fusion is critical for neoclassical equilibrium analysis. Marshall is the crucial 
intellectual link between Bentham and Samuelson, and thus the 20th century neoclassical 
economic tradition. Bentham retains the link to our initial framing of “incentive” as a poetic, 
internal motivation, Marshall pivots toward positivistic inferences about economic activity, and 
Samuelson fully externalizes “incentive” as external motivation. 
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 In Principles of Economics, Marshall outlines why economics as an academic discipline 
is better suited to answer questions about human activity than others. He writes, “The advantage 
which economics has over other branches of social science appears to arise from the fact that it 
concerns itself chiefly with those desires, aspirations and other affectations of human nature, the 
outward manifestations of which appear as incentives to action in a form which is easily 
measurable, and which therefore are amenable to treatment by scientific machinery.”119 
Marshall’s enthusiasm for scientism is on full display here, but a scientism with a twist. In his 
More Heat than Light and several other works, economic historian Mirowski painstakingly 
elucidates how 19th-century physics influenced the foundations and assumptions of neoclassical 
economics—the seemingly random movement of stock prices, the law of diminishing returns, 
supply and demand curves, and especially the notion of market equilibrium all have precisely 
adopted analogues from the domain of physics. Marshall’s gambit is not just that human 
behavior can be observed scientifically, for any statistician could measure patterns of behavior. 
But rather, his gambit is that human beings behave according to the theories of neoclassical 
economics already—with defined consumption preferences and initial outlays of resources, each 
of which obey the ironclad laws of supply and demand. 
 More specifically, Marshall is concerned with developing a positivistic interpretation of 
all human behavior—one that can avoid looking “inside” of people’s heads for their motivations 
or desires. Consider the following passage: “But the economist studies mental states rather 
through their manifestations than in themselves; and if he finds they afford evenly balanced 
incentives to action, he treats them primâ facie as for his purpose equal. He follows indeed in a 
more patient and thoughtful way, and with greater precautions, what everybody is always doing 
every day in ordinary life… He estimates the incentives to action by their effects just in the same 
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way as people do in common life.”120 If Bentham’s pleasure/pain calculus was anticipatory, 
Marshall’s is positivist—this divergence has consequences for whether we assume people are 
hyper-rational or only boundedly so. Bentham presumes that people measure, however 
incompletely, actions for whether it will bring them pleasure or pain, Marshall’s orthodox 
neoclassicism assumes that people have taken an action because it has brought them material 
gain. 
He further asserts that these motives are measurable precisely because they show up in 
market behaviors—we can measure effort and desire by measuring the movements of money: 
“Thus though it is true that ‘money’ or ‘general purchasing power’ or ‘command over material 
wealth,’ is the centre around which economic science clusters; this is so, not because money or 
material wealth is regarded as the main aim of human effort, nor even as affording the main 
subject-matter of study for the economist, but because in this world of ours it is the one 
convenient means of measuring human motive on a large scale.”121 Convenience is not the only 
alibi for Marshall’s terminological reduction of effort to money. Rather, Marshall reinforces his 
“money-as-motive” thesis in two ways: first, he offers a widened version of “economic” activity 
as simply goal-directed action for gain, and second, he sums all potential contexts (both internal 
and external, both cultural and individual) into a single utility function. 
Following from his endorsement of positivistic inferences of economic behavior, 
Marshall contends that “this indirect comparison can be applied to all classes of desire,” so like 
Bentham, he does not simply restrict economic analysis to what we restrictively consider “the 
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economy.”122 Maurice Godelier contends that once the definition of “economic” is stretched (I 
would say metastasized) to include all purposive behavior, “it is no longer possible to distinguish 
between economic activity and activity directed towards obtaining pleasure, power or salvation. 
At this rate, while all purposive action comes to be called economic in principle, no action 
actually remains economic in fact.”123 Godelier prefers to restrict “the economic” to “the 
production, distribution and consumption of goods and services,” granting a certain autonomy to 
habits, practices and activities that obey their own logics, even if they intersect with economic 
activity. In contrast, Marshall, at the very outset of the formalization of neoclassical economics 
as a discrete discipline, opens the floodgates to bring all activity under the auspices of 
individualized utility function. Indeed, Marshall claims that the way to draw comparisons 
between different actors’ behaviors is to measure extra-economic motives, with money as the 
common measure.  
Next, Marshall offers that from a positivist standpoint, there is no sense in trading one 
influence in a utility function for another, because they are merely competing coefficients or 
points in a decision matrix. As mentioned, because the aim is to understand aggregated behavior, 
not psychologize individuals, one cannot assume an “animal instinct” was more or less powerful 
than a rational or “cultured” inkling. From Marshall, we get, as Aune puts it, the economist’s 
invocation of the phrase ceteris paribus—“all things being equal.”124 Marshall writes, “Thus 
measuring a mental state, as men do in ordinary life, by its motor force or the incentive which it 
affords to action, no new difficulty is introduced by the fact that some of the motives which we 
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have to take account belong to man’s higher nature, and others to his lower.”125 Either influence 
is functionally equivalent if it produces identical action. This motivational agnosticism is also 
why he endorses profit-seeking behavior as (a form of) deontological ethics: “Money is a means 
towards ends, and if the ends are noble, the desire for the means is not ignoble.”126  
To his credit, Marshall does not necessarily assume that people are rational or calculative 
to the degree that Bentham does: “When we speak of the measurement of desire by the action to 
which it forms the incentive, it is not supposed to be that we assume every action to be 
deliberate, and the outcome of calculation. For in this, as in every other respect, economics takes 
man just as he is in ordinary life: and in ordinary life people do not weigh beforehand the results 
of every action.”127 However, this skepticism about human rationality is in line with his concept 
of incentives overall: By analyzing human action positivistically, the economist can begin to take 
note of the incentives that motivate behavior, whether the incentive is a cultural influence or a 
monetary reward. One need not begin with the human as the hyper-rational computational 
machine if one instead believes that market mechanisms are the computational mechanism. To 
be clear, Marshall remains ardent for methodological individualism, just not that any one 
individual’s actions are hyper-rational, merely predictable from careful observation. 
Taken together, Marshall gives us a fairly coherent picture of human motivation: Assume 
that all human action can be indexed according to the money commodity, equate money to a 
measure of desire and effort, assume nothing about a subject’s interiority or influences on 
motivations, observe behavior, and finally, (begin and) end by assuming neoclassical postulates 
about behavior are true. The final step is crucial here. As mentioned, Marshall equates “desire” 
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with “satisfaction” in his Principles of Economics, in that the only way to express a desire for a 
commodity is to be motivated enough to purchase it, so that it registers on a supply and demand 
curve. Economist Maurice Dobb, mentor of Amartya Sen, writes, “The subjective theory of 
value has continued to rest on a very slender pediment: so slender that Marshall hid it in a 
footnote… This premise consists in the identification of ‘desire’ with ‘satisfaction.’ As Marshall 
said, ‘We call back on the measurement which economics supplies of the motive, or moving 
force to action, and we make it serve with all its faults, both for the desires which prompt activity 
and for the satisfactions that result from them.”128 From a layperson’s point of view (although 
not from someone interested in the libidinal investments in signification), Marshall’s complaint 
appears to be merely semantic: the term motive (i.e. “incentive,” as he writes elsewhere) simply 
does double duty. If one wishes to analyze behavior today, one can easily cleave the definition 
and speak precisely about one or the other—“tax incentives” are a motive, “piecemeal pay” a 
reward. 
Yet for neoclassical economics, the point is not semantic, but foundational: To produce 
market equilibrium, economists assume that every desire for a commodity is matched at a price 
point with its satisfaction—with the commodity. The whole notion of markets as efficient 
distributors of resources is predicated on the suturing of “desire” and “reward” together, and any 
disequilibrium is partial (and time-bound), since buyers and sellers make adjustments until 
equilibrium is reached. This point cannot be overstated: When in Chapter 1 I claimed that the 
vocabulary of incentives smuggles in the precepts of neoclassical economics, it is never more 
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true than here. Even when economists, politicians or companies take a “proactive” approach to 
incentives, it means they are attempting to induce a new partial equilibrium.129 
The introduction of the term “incentive” into neoclassical economic thought by Marshall 
allows us to see the confluence of forces that professionalized, regularized, and rendered 
axiomatic the founding assumptions of neoclassical economics itself. Three competing, though 
not altogether contradictory stories arise regarding neoclassical economics in this period: 
Bernstein argues that the demands of academic professionalism on the field of economics 
partially determined its rise to prominence in the 20th century.130 In a different vein, Mirowski 
claims that the necessary precondition for its professionalization is the adoption of a single 
organizing metaphor—that of mathematical equilibrium: “It was never quite enough to merely 
borrow some particular mathematical technique from elsewhere… What happened after roughly 
1870 was that the analogical barrier to a social mechanics was breached decisively by the influx 
of a cohort of scientists and engineers trained specifically in physics who conceived their project 
to be nothing less than becoming the guarantors of the scientific character of political 
economy… They succeeded where others had failed because they had uniformly become 
impressed with a single mathematical metaphor that they were all familiar with, that of 
equilibrium in a field of force.”131 This is corroborated by George J. Stigler’s own account, that 
“marginal utility” in economics came about as a result of a “unified explanation of behavior: 
everyone was a utility-maximizer, and all economic problems became simply problems of tastes 
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and obstacles.”132 We shall return to this unifying insight in the following chapter, but for Stigler, 
the question of motive is simply axiomatic: Assume that a person acts to maximize their own 
utility, and neoclassical analysis can address any problem as an equilibrium problem. 
But there is another compelling case to be made here, that “marginalism” in economics is 
itself a social response to a set of conjunctural questions: In other words, this self-aggrandizing 
story that Mirowski critiques, Heilbroner and Bernstein chronicle, and Stigler venerates, is a 
story that economics tells about itself, and the discovery of a unary trait is abstracted from its 
social milieu. Meek writes of economics, “[t]he new starting-point became, not the 
socioeconomic relations between men as producers, but the psychological relation between men 
and finished goods… the primary focus of attention in the theory of value was shifted from the 
relations between men as producers to the relations between men and goods.”133 In other words, 
neoclassical economics fell victim to the commodity fetish as a way to become a respected 
“science,” but also to produce a story that reduced all considerations down to buyers and sellers 
(and eventually, to treating all economic actors as buyers and sellers simultaneously). 
Ultimately, the equation of desire and satisfaction (in an equilibrium analysis) inevitably 
entails the admixture of cause and effect: Is monetary reward the cause of action (the external 
incentive) or the effect of internal motivation? For Marshall, the answer is both/and—money is a 
registration of effort and necessarily a motivational tool. In this section, I have traced Marshall’s 
influence in thinking about “incentives”— he uses Bentham’s utility calculus as a jumping-off 
point into economic thought more specifically. He explicitly equates money with desire/effort, 
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and sets up the precepts of equilibrium analysis by presupposing that “incentives” are both desire 
and its satisfaction. If Bentham reduced his hedonic calculus to interior weighing of future 
pleasures and pains, Marshall occupies a middle ground, in which money is the mediating agent 
to determine what efforts and what rewards motivate large-scale human behavior. I now turn to 
Paul Samuelson, who more fully externalizes the notion of “incentive.” Is money capable of 
serving as motive for all human activity? 
Paul Samuelson: Setting the Tune, or, Incentives as Behavioral Modification 
 By the time we arrive at Paul Samuelson’s Foundations of Economic Analysis and his 
textbook Economics, 20th century economics had already become professionalized and culturally 
influential. Samuelson has tremendous importance here because he serves as an index for how 
the term “incentive” becomes fully externalized as an autonomous function of the laws of 
capitalism. He extends Marshall’s insights about motive and desire and sutures them to supply, 
demand and the postulate of utility maximizing behavior. In other words, “incentive” in 20th-
century neoclassical economics becomes an external, autonomous effect of the hard-and-fast 
laws of supply and demand. Theoretical postulates of competitive markets serve as the argument 
for why people behave the way they do. Secondarily, and as a result, he defines incentives 
mainly as behavioral modification—while he rarely endorses state action because of its distorting 
effect on incentives, he did recognize (as Bentham did) that this is a legitimate state function.  
 Samuelson is also important here because he preceded the “marginalist revolution” of the 
1970s, and the rise of the “Chicago School” in economics. (In a 2010 edition of Economics, the 
final one he worked on before his death, he called for a “renewed centrism” against the rampant 
neoliberalization of the world’s economies.) Samuelson coined the term “grand neoclassical 
synthesis,” which at the time was a synthesis between neoclassical and Keynesian (or 
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microeconomic and macroeconomic) thought. Today, that ground has largely been ceded by 
Keynesian economics, and neoclassical economics has its own narrative for how to build 
macroeconomics up from microeconomic foundations. But this is all the more reason to study 
the use of the term “incentive” from within Samuelson’s corpus—while it has metastasized today 
beyond even what Samuelson or Marshall could have anticipated, it still has a discrete history 
from within economic theory. In other words, even an old-fashioned quasi-Keynesian 
unproblematically deployed the term “incentive,” because it is fully within the canon of 
economic theory. 
I begin with the notion that Samuelson develops of incentives being external motivations 
to gain-seeking activity. In the 1955 edition of his Economics text, Samuelson outlines different 
approaches to the issue of profit—as a reward for risk and innovation, as rent, and so on. One of 
his considerations describes profits as an incentive opportunity. He writes, “Profits are the 
carrots held out as an incentive to efficiency, and losses are the kicks that penalize using 
inefficient methods or devoting resources to uses not desired by spending customers.”134 We are 
very far away from Bentham’s internalized version of motive, and much further from the 
“incentive furie” of Plutarch. Samuelson registers this shift in economic thought, and writes, 
“One clearly delineated drift in the literature has been a steady tendency towards the rejection of 
utilitarian, ethical, and welfare connotations of the Bentham, Sidgwick, Edgeworth variety… 
Concomitantly, there has been a shift in emphasis away from the physiological and 
psychological hedonistic, introspective aspects of utility.”135  The shift away from Bentham’s 
                                                
134 Paul Samuelson, Economics: An Introductory Analysis 4th edition (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. Inc., 
1955), 605. 
135 Paul Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis Enlarged Edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1983), 90-1. 
 
 82 
internal hedonic calculus is, for Samuelson, necessary to derive postulates about individual 
consumer behavior from within economic theory. 
In Foundations of Economic Analysis, he postulates, “it is possible to derive operationally 
meaningful restrictive hypotheses on consumers’ demand functions from the assumption that 
consumers behave so as to maximize an ordinal preference scale of quantities of consumptions 
goods and services.”136 He continues, “The utility analysis rests on the fundamental assumption 
that the individual confronted with given prices and confined to a given total expenditure selects 
that combination of goods which is highest on his preference scale. This does not require that (a) 
that the individual behave rationally in any other sense; (b) that he be deliberate and self-
conscious in his purchasing; (c) that there exist any intensive magnitude which he feels or 
consults.”137 Samuelson’s position may seem paradoxical from the outside—we need not be 
rational, but we are calculative, according to our preferences. Even Samuelson somewhat admits 
this: “the consumer’s market behavior is explained in terms of preferences, which are in turn 
defined only by behavior. The result can very easily be circular, and in many formulations 
undoubtedly is.”138 
Yet as introduced through Marshall, this position is not inconsistent, and indeed, works 
only because it is the external propositions of neoclassical economics that are held up as true—
one can treat the internal, idiosyncratic desires of individuals as rational because he assumes that 
behavior changes according to the price of the commodity demanded. Marshall indicated that 
measuring motivation through the money commodity only works if he equated “desire” with 
“satisfaction”—we can trace someone’s motivation for, say, a monetary reward by seeing 
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whether they acquired that money. Samuelson uses this insight and renders it dynamic according 
to supply and demand curves; in so doing, he externalizes motive and treats it like an external 
fact of the laws of capitalism because for him, price determines action by individuals and firms. 
Given a certain ordinal preference structure, he postulates that “an increase in one good’s 
price will, ceteris paribus, result in a decrease in its quantity.”139 And if we switch from the 
consumer to the capitalist, the behavioral postulates remain the same: Samuelson assumes that 
utility maximization also entails the profit motive—by assuming that people maximize their 
preferences, people in competitive (capitalist) conditions will behave competitively for profits. 
As he writes, “Profits and high factor returns are the bait, the carrots dangled before us 
enterprising donkeys. Losses are our penalty kicks. Profits go to those who have been efficient in 
the past—efficient in making things, in selling things, in foreseeing things… Profits are the 
report card of the past, the incentive gold star for the future, and also the grubstake for your new 
venture.”140 With Samuelson, “incentives” become disarticulated from internal motivation, and 
exist “out there”—because there is a profit opportunity to be had, people must naturally be drawn 
to them. The mechanisms of capitalism itself provide the motive for gain-seeking behavior. 
Motives also exist “out there” as a result of market pressures—by presuming competitive 
competitions for behavior, if one does not take advantage of a profit opportunity, someone else 
will. (And later, one must never tax a future innovator, or else their “incentive furie” will be 
obstructed.) And once again, this does not presume internal motivations for any behavior—one 
simply must behave “as if” they are motivated by profits as a way to not go out of business. As 
Lazear puts it: 
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Incentives are the essence of economics. The most basic concept, demand, considers how 
to induce a consumer to buy more of a particular good; that is, how to give him an 
incentive to purchase. Similarly, supply relationships are descriptions of how agents 
respond with more output or labour to additional compensation. Incentive contracts arise 
because individuals love leisure. In order to induce them to forgo some leisure, or put 
alternatively, to put forth effort, some form of compensation must be offered…An 
employer in a competitive environment must induce a worker to perform at the efficient 
level of effort or face extinction. The reason is simple: if one employer can, through 
clever use of an incentive contract, get a worker to perform at a more efficient level, that 
firm’s cost will be lower. Lower costs imply that higher wages can be paid to workers 
and all workers will be stolen from inefficient firms.141 
 
The postulate of maximizing behavior, the assumption of competitive conditions, and the 
existence of price mechanisms over which actors have no control: These are the three ways that 
Samuelson is able to externalize the concept of “incentive.” 
Samuelson also characterizes incentives as “behavioral modification” by states and 
governments. Once the laws of free market economics are affirmed, with their concomitant 
behavioral postulates, state activity inevitably distorts incentives. This does not just mean that 
resources are redistributed in a way Samuelson opposes (although this is certainly part of the 
story), but because tax policy alters the incentive structures of individuals and firms to comport 
to new external rewards. In other words, Samuelson is suspicious that states can “set the tune” of 
individual behavior outside of market precepts. In the 2010 version of Economics, Samuelson 
introduces the notion of incentives very early on—but remarkably, introduces it in reference to 
government policy before referencing how markets provide incentives: “To maintain a healthy 
economy, governments must preserve incentives for people to work and to save.”142 Several 
pages later, the aforementioned notion of profits-as-incentives makes its first appearance: “A 
system of prices, of markets, of profits and losses, of incentives and rewards determines what, 
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how, and for whom.”143 Although he introduces the state’s role in producing incentives first, 
Samuelson does not give priority or preference to this view—as mentioned, once “incentive” is 
externalized as the result of the laws of competitive capitalism, governments can only morph, 
alter, and distort them. 
Samuelson notes the paradox inherent in capitalist democracies: When the economic 
system appears to be unfair, citizens will seek political redress outside of this system: “Where a 
democracy doesn’t like the For Whom pattern that results from laissez faire, it puts in tax 
changes, school and other expenditures, fiats and subsidies, to change the pattern. This helps 
some incomes, hurts others. These redistributions are acquired at a cost. What cost? The cost of 
distortions of incentives, distortions which may somewhat lesson the efficiency of the most 
efficient market system.”144 Samuelson’s argumentation strategy unjustifiably thwarts ways of 
thinking about how social policy works (including the decision of what and how to tax), because 
the postulate of maximizing behavior within the confines of a free market system provide all the 
incentive one needs to act. 
But before delving into Samuelson’s more negative version of state-based incentive 
structures, I introduce Henry C. Wallich’s The Cost of Freedom, which was written for Dwight 
D. Eisenhower’s Council of Economic Advisors in 1960.145 Wallich deploys the language of 
incentives in similar ways to Samuelson (even using the aforementioned carrot/stick metaphor), 
and although he makes nominal mention of “non-economic” incentives, like Marshall and 
Samuelson before him, ultimately settles on monetary incentive as the best way to motivate 
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American workers and stimulate the national economy. Wallich’s work is important as an 
illustration of the neoclassical approach in policy since he outlines a positive vision of how states 
participate in the incentive-generating process. First, he begins explicitly with an endorsement of 
incentives as external motive for Americans: “A free economy means a decentralized economy. 
A system so constituted will work poorly unless the actors display a high order of initiative and 
drive. Its sponsors are committed, therefore, to a strategy of powerful incentives. To be 
successful, a free economy must be an incentive economy.”146 Much like Samuelson, Wallich 
identifies economic competition as one external spur of action, but identifies two others: “What 
are the conditions likely to elicit initiative and effort, among a group of men…? As I see them, 
they are freedom, competition, and incentives in the narrower sense.”147 Interestingly, Wallich 
never endorses an “incentive economy” or even capitalism writ large because of its efficiencies, 
but rather, leans heavily on the notion of “freedom” as the value that should be upheld.148 His 
position is far afield from Samuelson, whose intellectual edifice is reliant on the idea that 
markets are efficient resource distributors, and alternative arrangements are less so. 
But Wallich does espouse what he calls a “narrower” version of incentives the best way 
to motivate people; for him this means monetary reward. But first, he takes us through how 
economic policymakers ought envision a wider version of incentives: 
Even the incentives cannot be wholly economic. All forms of power and prestige, of 
sense of accomplishment, teamwork and service enter in, probably more importantly in 
the upper reaches of hierarchy. And there are all the lesser trappings for the younger 
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set—the office rug, the desk placed catty corner, the private water pitcher, and whatever 
invidious distinctions an up-to-date personnel department can devise. All this is 
commonplace. But the moral that seems to follow is perhaps less wellworn: if non-
economic incentives are powerful, how essential are the purely financial? …To perform 
well economically, a society must appreciate worldly goods. Once it has acquired the 
taste, it will be receptive to and demand economic incentives.149 
 
On the one hand, most of these “non-economic” incentives are still economic, just not 
monetary—each “non-economic” incentive costs a firm some amount of resources. (If a new 
desk or water pitcher appears to be “worth” more to the worker who receives it than it cost the 
firm, it was a rational economic investment by the firm.) But Wallich’s incentive argument 
moves into “worldly goods,” into “economic incentives” as a form of cultural development. He 
notes elsewhere that even investment in the stock market is “not exclusively wedded to the profit 
motive. It is related to other motivations—competition, sheer expansionism, prestige—which 
were duly noted in the preceding chapter. But remove profit and enough of the motive force 
probably will be gone to slow down the rest.”150 
Here, “incentives” function seamlessly as the Lacanian objet a, defined earlier as an 
imaginary object that gives consistency to an inconsistent social reality (in this case, the social 
totality). It is both surplus and necessary for a subject, but that necessity is not obvious until its 
absence—as Wallich states, monetary incentives are not the only way to motivate people, but 
once they are taken away, each of the other motives (external and internal) lose their consistency. 
Bentham, Marshall and Samuelson all point to a “great outdoors” in which monetary motives do 
not explain all of human behavior, but for different reasons, shy away from embracing the idea 
fully. For Bentham, wealth and happiness are joined at the hip, but allows for an “extended 
signification” to include extra-monetary wealth as a measure of happiness. Bentham, to his 
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credit, argues that an equilibrium analysis of the amount of nurses and hospitals in England could 
be done, but since they “are due to a feeling of duty and love of one’s neighbour,” one ought not 
bring to bear the machinery of economics upon them.151 Samuelson’s utility maximization 
function does not presuppose that individuals are solely motivated by money, but that when 
markets function properly, their fluctuations contour individual behavior. 
It is the very centrality of the money commodity within economic theory—as the 
common measure of effort and desire, as Marshall put it—that forces these economic thinkers to 
gently and humbly say “that’s not all there is.” As we shall see in the next chapter, the prime 
inheritor of this tradition agrees—it is not the money commodity that is most central to economic 
analysis, but rather the market structure itself. The humble or world-weary nod to non-economic 
motives, the “activities, outlets, affections, satisfactions that lie far removed from the economic 
sphere” as Wallich writes,152 is perhaps a result of this gradual externalization of motive—the 
expunging of “fire” from the policymaker’s or corporation’s “tune.” It is a profound failure of 
imagination, but one inextricable from the problem-space Wallich himself set up. Once 
economic incentives are generalized, human beings gravitate toward them as a rightful restitution 
for their efforts. Finally, Wallich returns us to Samuelson, obliquely, in his discussion of tax 
rates as incentives. For Samuelson, tax rates function as distorting incentives because they 
fundamentally alter behavior toward non-market or inefficient ends, but for Wallich, a gentler 
writer, disagrees: “A system with moderate incentives, such as ours at present, has proved itself 
to be quite effective. Social security has not led to widespread sloth. High taxes, which erode 
high incomes, have been found to erode the will to work in no comparable degree—at least for 
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the time being.”153 In contrast, Samuelson maintains that “The issue of incentives must also enter 
in forming any decision on policy, since redistributing the pie may lesson its total.”154 
There are three vital parts of how Samuelson defines and argues against progressive 
taxation regimes: First, as mentioned, Samuelson treats incentives as part of the machinery of 
capitalism—they objectively exist “out there” because of the principle of utility maximization 
and the existence of profit opportunities. He next describes taxation solely in a negative sense—
taxation takes from productive, job-creating, value-creating innovators. That is, he asserts that 
incentives are strictly behavioral modifications for those who are taxed, and is able to downplay 
how taxation regimes are a complex articulation of class and democratic power, and that tax 
revenues are distributed toward ends that societies deem valuable. From this, Samuelson 
negotiates in bad faith by questioning the inattention or indifference to incentives by economic 
policymakers. And finally, and as a result of these facets of his argument, Samuelson critiques 
any notion of mediation outside of market structures. In other words, because any non-market 
(re)distribution of resources distorts market-based incentives, any outcome is suspect because it 
is not mediated by the market and verified by the law of value. 
Samuelson uses the example of taxing innovators as his way into tax policy more 
broadly. He writes: 
If hostility to profit makes you tax implicit returns, you should realize this will change 
(and often distort) people’s decisions. The case of taxing innovators’ profit is even 
clearer. Taxing a retired innovator’s income may seem to have no distorting effects. But 
we must not forget the young innovator who can then no longer look forward to reaping a 
tidy sum from his new ideas. He may decide to take that civil service job or remain 
thirteenth vice-president of a bank. You cannot tax the results of an old innovation 
without affecting the prospects of an as-yet-unborn innovation. If Congress taxes risky 
activities more heavily than routine activities, what can any reasonable person expect to 
happen? People will naturally tend to avoid venturous fields and to gravitate toward 
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routine, steady ones. Yet all of us—rich and poor alike—have a great stake in promoting 
vigorous exploration of new ways of doing things.155  
 
Of course, this noble-sounding stewardship model of economic supposed non-interference is 
solely limited by the economic imagination to the potential entrepreneur, who is only one 
progressive taxation scheme away from abandoning a lifelong dream. (Bentham also noted in 
Principles of the Civil Code that one improper—i.e., equality-minded—legislative act could lead 
to the downfall of society as a whole.) 
This raises an interesting counterfactual historical question: Were successful 
entrepreneurs under progressive taxation regimes simply made of better “stuff” than their 
quiescent contemporaries? But if nothing else, this hypothetical demonstrates the obvious limits 
of this line of thinking—what prevents us from imagining the young potential entrepreneur 
whose federally subsidized tuition helped devise a profitable enterprise while at a public 
university? Or that a low-income food program, paid for by taxes on innovators, aided a future 
industrialist while she was in primary school? These potential counterexamples only function to 
highlight the limited nature of this form of criticism, which is what the fragility thesis predicts. 
More specifically, this form of argument strategy is strictly negative, in that it complains solely 
of what is taken from economic agents, not what comes from such a policy. This also 
corroborates the claim that “incentives” are this objet a, the “special stuff” added to any 
discursive formation, but without which it would collapse. The “final cause” of any given 
incentive is, or must be, that of the individual profit motive, because only that corroborates the 
assumption that “incentives” exist in reality as the results of competitive market pressures. 
Samuelson here treats tax incentives strictly as behavioral modifications—as encouraging 
or discouraging certain types of behavior (capital stock-holding, speculation, etc.), instead of 
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thinking about how states mediate outcomes through decision-making. This performs certain 
rhetorical work for Samuelson and the allies of this position. It presumes that any tax policy is 
motivated by ressentiment, that a government is either indifferent to the behavioral consequences 
of said taxation policy, or it lacks knowledge that the market has. This attitude is extraordinarily 
rhetorically useful for partisans of “incentive-driven” positions, because one can humbly insist 
that one’s opponents are simply inattentive to the simple fact that people are driven by 
incentives. As McKenzie and Lee point out, “Care has to be exercised in using incentives 
because they are so powerful.”156 Of course, though Becker represents the strongest version of 
the idea that humans are always-already incentive driven, it is still a tenet of neoclassical 
economics writ large. And if this is true, then one must also accept that governments feel 
empowered to alter incentive structures. 
Yet Samuelson’s opposition is merely a question of emphasis, and a political one, not at 
the level of the concept—as mentioned, he explicitly points out that the role of government is to 
provide incentives for behaviors he deems socially necessary: to work and to save. If one does 
not accept that efficiency is the aim of state action, but rather, specific social outcomes for a 
polity’s wellbeing are, then the two argumentative positions are like ships passing in the night. 
This is true of all state actions: Government subsidies of healthcare, as some economists argue, 
mean that people consume healthcare inefficiently, and hence, if citizens were force to pay for 
every procedure on their own, they would consume it more efficiently. Yet for a social-
democratic government, increasing the health and wellbeing of the polity may be the aim, while 
subsides are the object (or incentive). But from the position that taxation alters behavior, 
governments can only produce perverse incentives when they act outside of market principles, 
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because what a legislator aims at is not the object that produces this outcome. Put differently, a 
state ought not tax certain behaviors to pay for other social goals. One should instead incentivize 
certain behaviors to bring about those goals naturally—so instead of government subsidized 
healthcare, the government should incentivize people to be healthier, or, incentivize them to 
purchase private healthcare from a subsidized marketplace. One can, as Bentham puts it, only 
alter motives, not outcomes, if one accepts the thesis of incentives as behavioral modification. I 
take this redefinition of state action (as I call it, a redefinition of mediation) up in my final 
chapter, but it is noteworthy that the genesis of this idea appears here in the work of a 20th 
century Keynesian, not in the work of a “neoliberal” later down the road. 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has traveled a considerable distance, both across time and across concepts, 
to return us largely to the place we ended up in Chapter 1. Beginning with one antiquated, poetic 
interpretation of the term “incentive,” and through Bentham, Marshall and Samuelson, we traced 
how “incentive” was introduced into economic thought, and how it has transformed from internal 
psychological motivation to an objective, external reward. In other words, this chapter 
documents the shift (due to the original, etymological bivalence of the term itself) between the 
fire and the tune. Bentham provided the philosophical foundation for later psychological theories 
of value; the “hedonic calculus” reduces all motives strictly to internal perceptions of pleasure 
and pain. Yet in his recommendations for legislation, he maintained that pleasure and pain must 
be something calculable and objective, must have some common measure. Marshall takes up 
Bentham here: For desires to be measurable, they must take some material appearance, and 
forwards that money is the proper concrete universal (for the domain of economics, at least). 
Marshall’s advance implies that the money commodity stitches up the internal and external 
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domains, but there are still complications associated with his account. Marshall insists that 
money best measures human effort, yet uses several examples that indicate the difficulty in 
acquiring money is a measure of desire. In other words, Marshall elides contextual differences by 
positing them as individual(ized) preferences for outcomes. 
Finally, this chapter concludes with one of the preeminent economists of the 20th century, 
Paul Samuelson, filtered through an economic policy-maker, Henry Wallich. Samuelson fully 
externalizes incentives as objective results of competitive free market pressures—one is 
incentivized by profit opportunities. In Samuelson, “incentives” are fully yoked to the axioms of 
competitive capitalism; because incentives are assumed to be non-subjective, external and 
autonomous, they become fragile and reactive if modified by states. State action can “distort 
incentives,” and the only available interpretation of this is that “incentive” is synonymous with 
profit seeking. And at least for him, this is definitional and univocal: Gain-seeking monetary 
reward is the “tune” set by the precepts of neoclassical economics, so any modification of this 
through taxation unduly retards the entrepreneurial spirit. Paradoxically, capitalism is 
simultaneously the most powerful force for freedom ever devised by humans, the natural state of 
living, yet we are only one legislative decision away from destroying civilization as we know it. 
The upshot of this is that Samuelson thinks of “the economy” as a set of technical arrangements, 
so the behavioral modification of incentives becomes simply a technical question. Samuelson 
provides the intellectual foundation for the disposition that alternative distributions of resources 
are not simply alternative, but inefficient; social priorities that elude market principles are 
insufficiently attentive to incentive structures—they are erroneous, not just different. 
As it migrates through economic thought, the “incentive” becomes the objet a for the 
discipline, the desired object that provides the key to unlocking an analysis of social reality. It is 
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a marker of desire, or effort, of motivation, and of reward, and when Marshall takes it up from 
Bentham, and when Samuelson objectifies it as part of the mechanisms of capitalism, it arrives 
as this universal object. Now we turn to the most vital figure in the dissertation, the one who is 
the pivot between economics as an academic discipline to an explanatory matrix for all human 
life: Gary Becker. Becker concludes that market mechanisms already structure human existence, 
because this inference has already been posited in advance of empirical work—he simply lays 
Samuelson’s neoclassical analytical precepts over the grid of all human activity. Whereas in 
Bentham, Marshall, and Samuelson, one positivistically infers the existence of a motivation in its 
appearance in market activity, in Gary Becker, one assumes (hermeneutically) the operation of 
market forces even in ostensibly non-market relations. Shadow prices, unobserved preferences, 
and non-monetary incentives organize all of social reality.157 Overall, in order to grasp the 
contemporary prevalence of “incentive-driven” logics, we must interrogate how the complexity 
of the term leads to these wildly varying outcomes. The fire and the tune exist concurrently, yet 
unequally, and the outcome of this discursive struggle has consequences for public life.  
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Chapter 3: Gary Becker, the Godfather of Incentives 
 
“This book retains the assumption that individuals behave so as to maximize utility while 
extending the definition of individual preferences to include personal habits and addictions, peer 
pressure, parental influences on the tastes of children, advertising, love and sympathy, and other 
neglected behavior. This extension of the utility-maximizing approach to include endogenous 
preferences is remarkably successful in unifying a wide class of behavior, including habitual, 
social, and political behavior. I do not believe that any alternative approach—be it founded on 
‘cultural,’ ‘biological,’ or ‘psychological’ forces—comes close to providing comparable insights 
and explanatory power.”—Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes158 
 
Once the discipline of economics adopted the term “incentives” from Bentham, it became 
a universal object, a positivistic inference about human motivation through economic activity. In 
this chapter, I document how, through the work of Gary Becker, a metastasis occurs. It is no 
longer that any human motivation can find expression within just a commodity market; it is 
rather that all human motivation obeys the foundational principles of market activity. In Becker, 
it is the style of “economic” analysis that metastasizes across the social field, not the monetary 
object. In the words of one of his contemporaries, economics is the one and only social science 
because of its universal applicability. In this universe, monetary and non-monetary incentives 
obey identical principles because they are functional equivalents, so it is no longer necessary to 
distinguish between the two. In effect, Becker proposes a single, universal market in which all 
things are potentially fungible with one another and instantaneously calculated by all actors. 
Becker is an apt figure for this phase of the inquiry, as the hinge point between standard 
neoclassical analysis and the metastasis of “incentives” into the social field. First, his 1972 book, 
The Economic Approach to Human Behavior, outlines the basic framework that most 
economists, politicians, legal scholars, and media figures deploy when they invoke “incentive-
                                                
158 Gary Becker, Accounting for Tastes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 4. 
 96 
based” vocabularies (whether his influence is explicitly stated or disavowed by these thinkers). 
Becker’s economic framework is a way to analyze any conceivable situation; his work openly 
metastasizes the neoclassical economic vocabulary of “incentives” onto choice of marriage 
partner, amount of children couples should have, proper penalties for crimes, the distribution of 
“love” in a household, and what sort of political system the United States ought to have. 
 Becker is the paradigmatic figure in the expansion of incentive logic from the narrow 
ambit of monetary logics to an all-encompassing description of the social field. Michel 
Foucault’s Birth of Biopolitics describes neoliberalism as a mode of social analysis defined by 
the use of  “analyses of the market economy to decipher non-market relationships and 
phenomena which are not strictly and specifically economic but what we call social 
phenomena.”159 On the basis of a close reading of Becker’s Economic Approach, Foucault 
concludes that Becker inaugurates a mode of analysis in which: “All the problems of 
[inheritance?]-transmission-education-training-inequality of level, [can be] treated from a single 
point of view as homogenizable elements… refocused no longer around an anthropology or an 
ethics or a politics of labor, but around an economics of capital.”160 Becker supplants analyses 
rooted in psychology, history, politics, anthropology and sociology with an “economic approach 
to human behavior.”161 
                                                
159 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2008), 240. 
 
160 Ibid., 233. 
 
161 This study has secondary importance as it relates to the term “neoliberalism” in both cultural studies and 
rhetorical studies. Neoliberalism here is not strictly reducible to “the privatization of everything,” because for 
Foucault, neoliberalism involves properly ordering the conduct of bodies into becoming entrepreneurial subjects. 
(And it almost does not bear repeating, but this in no way involves the end of the state, but rather the reconstitution 
of the state as one that compels as people as many people as possible to behave “economically,” to play the 
“economic game” (Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 209). Becker’s neoliberalism is suppler than this: To inoculate 
himself from criticism that market mechanisms must be instituted onto social relations, he simply presumes that a 
market exists there already, and that any given social phenomena exists at equilibrium. In other words, he is able to 
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Due to Foucault’s untimely death, he did not live to see the later accomplishments of the 
man he called “the most radical of the American neo-liberals.”162 Nor was he able to see that 
later in his career, Becker was given a weekly BusinessWeek column from 1985 to 1996, in 
which he answered all manner of political, social, and legal questions explicitly using the 
“incentives” framework. Nor was Foucault able to see that in 1992, the Bank of Sweden gave 
Becker a lifetime achievement award of sorts, a prize in Economic Sciences, precisely for the 
approach Foucault says characterizes neoliberalism. The prize committee writes: “Gary Becker's 
research contribution consists primarily of having extended the domain of economic theory to 
aspects of human behavior which had previously been dealt with—if at all—by other social 
science disciplines such as sociology, demography and criminology.”163 
This chapter is a sustained critique of his varied works, both popular and academic in 
which I work through the mechanisms by which Becker developed and extrapolated the 
“economic approach to human behavior,” by extending and applying the typology of incentives 
developed in Chapter 1. But the logic of the incentive is not reducible to Becker as an individual 
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poor with harsher jail sentences than the rich, destroying unions, and ending environmental regulations. But taking 
him at his word—to his letter—he does allow the possibility for this critique to be leveled.  
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figure—he is simply symptomatic of the logic, and its most fervent devotee. We can account for 
the tenacity, and the malleability of the logic of the incentive through a careful reading of his 
work. Becker radicalizes the notion that incentive-based thought “squares the circle” of human 
behavior because he posits rationality wherever action is taken, so that nothing can escape the 
purview of the neoclassical utility function. Further, by postulating that people are always and 
already incentive-driven, and that markets already organize social interactions (at equilibrium), 
the vocabulary of the incentive provides a retroactive justification for inequalities (particularly 
for gender); Becker’s axioms developed in The Economic Approach to Behavior and extended 
his BusinessWeek columns fill in any gap with references to a non-commodity incentive—an 
argument that “it must have been this way.” 
In the shift from Samuelson to Becker we can also note a shift in the central problem-
space of economics as a discipline. While it is inarguable that Becker’s approach parallels 
Samuelson’s methodologically, the conjuncture shifted monumentally between the 1950s and 
1970s. Authors such as John Bellamy Foster, David Harvey, and Judith Stein have exhaustively 
documented this shift from Keynesianism to neoliberalism, wherein the prime assumptions of 
economics and economic policy shifted away from the question of employment to the question 
of inflation. Stein writes that in the 1970s, as a result of multiple and overlapping economic 
crises, even Democratic economists and economic policy makers shied away from full 
employment and toward anti-inflationary policies.164 For Samuelson and Wallich in a prior 
decade, the problem for economists and economic policy was how to motivate people to take 
risks, to work hard, and how not to dampen incentives with high tax rates from within a largely 
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Keynesian framework. After the successive shocks of the 1970s—the Arab oil crisis, the 
Vietnam War, the end of Bretton Woods, this quaint notion was no longer in play. 
Foucault writes of neoliberal thinking, “Whatever the rate of unemployment, in a 
situation of unemployment you absolutely must not intervene directly or in the first place on the 
unemployment, as if full employment should be a political idea and an economic principle to be 
saved at any cost… [F]ull employment is not an objective and it may be that a reserve of 
unemployment is absolutely necessary for the economy.”165 Once the assumption that a state’s 
economy ought to work toward full employment, has been nullified (or rendered an aftereffect of 
good monetary policy), then the vocabulary of incentives can be unleashed in wholly new and 
variable ways. That is, by assuming in advance that markets are already perfect distributors of 
resources means that any inefficient or ineffective outcome is either an aftereffect of perverse 
incentives by a state policy, or that people who suffer from unjust or unequal outcomes deserved 
their fates because their human capital was inefficiently invested or their preferences are satisfied 
on a plane other than that of commodities. The result is that we cannot posit in advance that 
people desired better or even different outcomes (recall, in this view, all actions are voluntary, 
even as, paradoxically, states and corporations are able to alter incentive structures—equilibrium 
approach suggests people are simply the effects of aggregated economic behaviors). As a result, 
the levers of economic policy ought to be exclusively incentive-based, since all behavior takes 
place in a competitive market, and incentives are the best way to analyze market behaviors. 
First, I describe and analyze in detail Becker’s “economic approach to human behavior.” 
He identifies three key components of this approach: the theory of maximizing behavior, a 
stability of preferences by economic actors, and the presumption that market mechanisms 
(especially price signals) shape all human activity. His conceptual edifice is slim, but powerful, 
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for it allows Becker to analyze literally any economic, social or political phenomenon, and 
discount any alternative explanations. The logic of the “incentive” undergirds each of these three 
categories. It performs a tremendous amount of rhetorical labor for him: Incentives are 
simultaneously external/objective profit opportunities, psychic costs that discourage behavior, 
internally generated motives, and the satisfactions of individuals’ desires. The rhetorical 
ambivalence of the incentive gives Becker tremendous leeway in advocating for his preferred 
economic policies and making non-falsifiable predictions about human behavior. The result is 
that Becker retroactively provides a coherent account of social, political and cultural life, and 
makes prescriptive recommendations and predictions based on this approach. Following this, I 
develop three theoretical implications of Becker’s work, each of which correspond to the three 
axioms of his “economic approach to human behavior.” Ultimately, Becker’s work cannot 
escape from the animating paradoxes of incentive-driven vocabularies writ large, and these three 
theoretical take-home points help to express that idea: market mechanisms, stable preferences, 
and utility maximization. 
The first is that Becker posits “one big market” that structures all of human life, a market 
in which every behavior, action, belief, value, commodity, or policy is potentially fungible with 
anything else, and instantaneously sets up relations of externality among all relevant actors. 
Becker’s presumption that market mechanisms allocate resources and coordinate action allow 
him to set up relations of ontological commensuration between disparate elements, this is a 
process dependent on the ontological metaphor that “human life is a market.” 
Second, following the presumption that market structures coordinate all activity, Becker’s 
presumption of stable preferences allow him (or rather, force him) to explain disparate or 
contradictory behaviors as the expression of either a market mechanism (a higher or lower price 
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for an action or belief, otherwise known as the “shadow price,” the as-yet unobserved qualia that 
explains why people act “irrationally” according to orthodox neoclassical theory), or the 
expression of a more fundamental preference. So the presence of a non-market preference like 
“comfort” accounts for why people purchase heating oil in the winter despite its higher price. 
This should be non-controversial, but the end result is that Becker must constantly reference 
these non-market goods’ “shadow prices” as explanations for behavior. His presumption of 
stable preferences across all contexts allows Becker to “hide the ball” within his explanatory 
matrix, first by deferring the referent for why people behave as they do, and importing or 
donating meaning when he wishes to come to a conclusion. “Stable preferences” are a cudgel 
Becker uses to beat back accusations from imaginary competing economists in The Economic 
Approach to Human Behavior and a way to retroactively provide a smooth account for why 
people behave divergent to his political preferences in his BusinessWeek columns. Coupled with 
the final pillar of his project, the “stable preferences” approach also inhibits his ability to explain 
social change, since his models privilege rational action that is strictly the result of preexisting 
preferences and the historical accretion of social arrangements that weigh on each actor. 
Finally, I use Becker’s “household production function” to explain a fairly brilliant 
notion that Foucault initially picked up on in the Birth of Biopolitics lectures, the idea that 
consumption does not exist for its own sake, but that consumption is the production of 
satisfaction. Combined with the two previous concepts, Becker effectively sets up a univocal 
plane by which enjoyment is accounted for at all times—there is no lost energy or unsatisfied 
desire, only the infinite production and circulation of enjoyment at all times. Becker himself, in 
his Economic Approach, posits a Newtonian universe with (surprisingly) no entropy—no 
enjoyment can be unaccounted for. Becker’s universe is one of copulation without remainder, 
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and this tenet has ripple effects for each facet of his theory. However, one critical upshot of 
Becker’s universality is that, by taking this claim extremely seriously, there is no theoretical case 
that one can make to advocate for any economic outcome in the name of efficiency. That is, by 
taking Becker seriously—to his letter—his own prognostications, predictions and policy 
recommendations have no intellectual ground upon which to stand other than personal 
predilection.166 
Ultimately, Becker’s project is not simply to provide a retroactive account of all human 
behavior as obeying the principles of efficient markets and utility-maximizing atomistic actors. 
His project was explicitly aimed at extending the domain of economics into social formations, 
and offering both predictions and policy recommendations to politicians and the public. And his 
influence reverberates throughout the discipline of economics, even if his name is excised from 
its bibliographies. Tim Harford writes: 
Superficially, Becker appears to stand for the opposite of modern behavioural economics, 
which these days seems to be the acceptable face of the economics profession. After all, 
while the behavioural economists bring psychological insights into an analysis of 
markets, Becker did the opposite, imposing a rational-choice model on non-market 
situations such as marriage and parenting. Behavioural economists love empirical data 
but Becker was a theorist. Is he not, then, the opposite of all that is cool and forward-
looking in economics? That criticism only survives the most casual acquaintance with 
Becker’s work. His Nobel speech, for instance, opens with the comment: “I have tried to 
pry economists away from narrow assumptions about self-interest. Behaviour is driven by 
a much richer set of values and preferences.”167 
 
As I discuss in the conclusion to this dissertation, behavioral economics does not stray as far as it 
(or Harford) claims; it is far closer to Becker’s theories thanks to its explicit endorsement of 
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neoclassical axioms. Becker was instead a behavioral economist avant la lettre, since he imposed 
three and only three axioms of neoclassical economics onto any social formation—when 
contemporary behavioral economists claim that people act irrationally in given contexts, he 
merely claims that there is some unobserved rationality at work in a given market. And finally, 
late in his career, Becker advocated for a kind of “discursive struggle” for economists to take 
control over public policy debates through the gradual, methodical and sustained push toward 
market-based solutions to state functions and social problems.168 
Overview of Becker’s Economic Approach to Human Behavior 
Becker’s work rests on three, and only three components: “The combined assumptions of 
maximizing behavior, market equilibrium, and stable preferences, used relentlessly and 
unflinchingly, form the heart of the economic approach as I see it.”169 The story he crafts appears 
convincing, because its alleged simplicity because he nods to a complexity in disguise—the idea 
that hidden forces operate below the level of social phenomena that condition them, and that a 
single universal grammar can detect them if we look closely enough. That is, the apparent 
simplicity of any given situation signals a deeper registrar of complex activity—that of the 
market. The simplifying assumptions that Becker makes end up truncating any context to render 
it under a neoclassical production function—the elegance he proffers is a Trojan horse for 
neoclassical truisms of behavior. 
Arnsperger and Varoufakis, in a parallel way, argue that three and only three axioms 
account for “neoclassicism’s discursive success within the social sciences and…are the deep 
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cause of its theoretical failure.”170 These axioms are methodological individualism, 
methodological instrumentalism, and methodological equilibration, which correspond directly to 
Becker’s stable preferences, utility maximization, and market structure principles. “It is, 
therefore, uncontroversial to state that every aggregate phenomenon scrutinized by neoclassical 
minds is explained increasingly and exclusively as some axiomatically imposed equilibrium 
emerging from the interaction of instrumentally rational individuals who are either optimising 
consciously (as in rational choice or game theory) or are drawn to such behavior through a 
process of ‘natural selection.’”171 The authors use the recent example of game theory to explain 
how each facet emerges alongside the other—no instrumentalism without equilibration, and so 
on—and the same is true of Becker’s work. For Becker, these three principles, used 
“unflinchingly,” produce a stable account of the whole of human existence. The three pieces of 
his conceptual edifice all supplement and support the others like a Borromean knot—if 
preferences are not assumed to be stable, then shadow prices do not explain changes in behavior, 
if people do not maximize, then markets cannot reach equilibrium, if market mechanisms do not 
provide pricing information to inform consumer behavior, then actors cannot order their 
preferences or act accordingly. 
Becker’s three axioms of “the economic approach to human behavior”—utility 
maximization, stable preferences, market mechanisms—can account for so much because they 
purport to be content-free, a mere set of heuristics that can convincingly explain every single 
human behavior, interaction, or structure. Hirshleifer, in an essay celebrating the American 
Economics Association’s centenary, writes, “it is ultimately impossible to carve off a distinct 
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territory for economics, bordering upon but separated from other social disciplines. Economics 
interpenetrates them all, and is reciprocally penetrated by them. There is only one social science. 
What gives economics its imperialist invasive power is that our analytical categories—scarcity, 
cost, preferences, opportunities, etc.—are truly universal in applicability… economics really 
does constitute the universal grammar of social science.”172 Within Hirshleifer’s essay we can 
detect the metastasis in action: Hirshleifer advocates for the mutual interpenetration of all social 
inquiries and economics, but take note of what he argues that entails. The subject matter of other 
disciplines is simply the raw material for economic inquiry, since nothing about their methods is 
worth retaining. But these analytic categories he mentions (scarcity, cost, preferences, 
opportunities) are not forms without content, but rather entail specific contents and commitments 
to the “economic” point of view. Economic inquiry is placed outside the context of goods and 
services, and serves as a universal metaphor for all activity. Student truancy, discrimination 
against castes in India, pollution…they are all reducible to neoclassical analysis. 
On the one hand, Hirshleifer’s, Arnsperger’s and Varoufakis’ comments appear to imply 
that Becker’s approach is no remarkable departure from Samuelson’s, or from any other standard 
neoclassical economics, textbook. People enter into market relations with specific, unbounded 
desires, they work to ascertain them, and certain impersonal forces constrain their actions. But it 
is because of the seriousness with which he takes these dicta make him, as Foucault said, the 
most radical of the American neo-liberals (in the sense that “radical” describes getting to “the 
root of” something). Becker’s dogged insistence also exemplifies how incentive-based 
vocabularies were defined in Chapter 1: They are responsibility oriented, trans-contextual 
(despite notional nods to complexity), and retroactive. He deploys these axioms of neoclassical 
economics to address every issue imaginable, from the distribution of “love” to family members, 
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the appropriate penalties for criminal behavior (prison for the poor and fines for the rich), the 
reasons why people remain addicted to unhealthy substances, to the psychic benefits of 
advertising for consumers. 
And that is just his academic work. His columns for BusinessWeek include many dozens 
of articles written from his economic perspective. As Becker’s former graduate student and wife, 
Guity Nashat Becker wrote of these columns: 
They are unambiguously opposed to big government and central planning, illegal 
immigration, employment quotas and set-asides for minorities, union exemption from 
antitrust laws, highly subsidized tuition for middle-class and rich students at state 
universities, the NCAA restrictions on pay to college athletes, term limits for members of 
Congress, ESOPs and other subsidies to employee ownership of companies, and tariffs 
and quotas—even when other nations impose them. But the columns are not only 
‘against’ certain issues. Among other things, they advocate selling the right to immigrate 
legally, extensive privatization of public enterprises, introduction of school vouchers 
primarily to poor children, legalizing many drugs, substituting an individual-account 
system for pay-as-you-go social security…173 
 
The list goes on.174 
 The vocabulary of “incentives” is metastasized over these social formations; it provides 
the urgrund for both his academic work and public policy statements. Guity Nashat Becker 
continues, “In this approach, behavior crucially depends on incentives… Gary did not start the 
columns with any statement of purpose, but practically all of them have in fact emphasized this 
link between incentives and public policies and other events. Our experiences indicates [sic] that 
while readers have short memories about the content of individual columns, they appreciate the 
general thrust of a series of columns with a common theme.”175 The “incentive” is the key 
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feature that organizes social reality because it fills in any inconsistencies, and is the trans-
contextual hidden force that commensurates difference at an ontological level.  
 In order to demonstrate the power of the economic approach, Becker argues that it 
simultaneously subsumes and dismisses all other forms of analysis: “Indeed, many kinds of 
behavior fall within the subject matter of several disciplines: for example, fertility behavior is 
considered part of sociology, anthropology, economics, history, and perhaps even politics. I 
contend that the economic approach is uniquely powerful because it can integrate a wide range 
of human behavior.”176 In Accounting for Tastes, Becker writes, “This extension of the utility-
maximizing approach to include endogenous preferences is remarkably successful in unifying a 
wide class of behavior, including habitual, social, and political behavior. I do not believe that any 
alternative approach—be it founded on ‘cultural,’ ‘biological,’ or ‘psychological’ forces—comes 
close to providing comparable insights and explanatory power.”177 In other words, nothing 
escapes the approach because all action is already calculated by actors and markets, all 
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preferences are taken as illustrative of their desires, and no economist (and certainly no well-
meaning politician, judge, fellow worker, or family member) ought to decide amongst them. 
Markets register all of social reality immanently and instantaneously, and for Becker, life is 
coded “as economic” because for him everything is economic. 
What authorizes the presumption that economics is better suited to analysis than any 
other mode of inquiry? Becker’s response begs that very question with the first of his three 
pillars, utility maximization: “Everyone recognizes that the economic approach assumes 
maximizing behavior more explicitly and extensively than other approaches do, be it the utility 
or wealth function of the household, firm, union, or government bureau that is maximized.”178 
Much like Hirshleifer above, Becker simply transposes the assumption that individuals are utility 
maximizing onto other contexts as a warrant for his assertion. (Not to mention the idea that the 
individual utility function scales upward with no qualitative differences into/onto unions, 
families, firms, and political organizations.) Schlefer rightly notes, “Gary Becker’s insistence 
that individuals ‘maximize welfare as they conceive it, whether they be selfish, altruistic, loyal, 
spiteful, or masochistic,’ is only a colorful way of stating accepted theory. The problem comes in 
the next step, when supposedly practical economists turn around and impose their own 
conception of utility on the agents in their models. Complaining about this sleight of hand is not 
just a theoretical quibble. The sleight of hand affects important conclusions.”179 In other words, 
according to Becker, because some people view altruistic behavior as utility-maximizing, 
altruistic behavior obeys the principle of rational choice. Families operate like firms because the 
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“head” distributes “love” like a capital good, and seeks to maximize the family’s output (i.e. 
utility).180 
Second, he authorizes the supremacy of the economic approach with an appeal to the 
second pillar of his theory, that of stable preferences: “Since economists generally have had little 
to contribute, especially in recent times, to the understanding of how preferences are formed, 
preferences are assumed not to change substantially over time, nor to be very different between 
wealthy and poor persons, or even between persons in different societies and cultures.”181 He 
continues, writing that his approach is a “comprehensive one that is applicable to all human 
behavior, be it behavior involving…rich or poor persons, men or women, adults or children, 
brilliant or stupid persons, patients or therapists, businessmen or politicians, teachers or 
students.”182 That is, because economics as a discipline cannot speak to the formation of 
individual preferences, it is better to assume that people are fundamentally the same across all 
contexts, classes and temporalities, and that price difference explains why people act 
differently—i.e., why there is difference in the world.183 This is a tremendous feat of what I call 
“hiding the ball” in two way. First, noneconomic factors provide the “raw material” for 
economic explanations for behavior, but their effectivity and influence is reduced to a utility 
function leveraged by the lone economist, so broad trends (like feminism, civil rights, and 
racial/sexual discrimination) become deep background on some occasions and fundamental in 
others, depending on their ability to corroborate Becker’s account. As argued below in greater 
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detail, the invocation of “metapreferences” allows Becker to rationalize contradictory behavior 
as the expression of a more fundamental preference previously unseen by analysis. 
In some sense, Becker’s third pillar underwrites the other two. This is the view that 
“market mechanisms” exist in and at every level of human existence, that these mechanisms 
(especially price) constrain behaviors—and that these markets all exist at equilibrium. Becker 
writes, “Prices and other market instruments allocate the scarce resources within a society and 
thereby constrain the desires of participants and coordinate their actions. In the economic 
approach, these market instruments perform most, if not all, of the functions assigned to 
‘structure’ in sociological theories.”184 In other words, we can be agnostic about what motivates 
people and what they desire (i.e. their incentives) if we assume that in the final analysis, the 
supply, demand and cost of certain behaviors is what matters. Becker also contends that market 
mechanisms function according to what sociologists call structure, that is a “relatively stable 
patterning of the relationships of the…component actors or as the roles in terms of which they 
participate in social relationships,” as Parsons writes.185 The difficulty here is that Becker insists 
on two different, potentially incompatible phenomena simultaneously. On the one hand, by 
assuming people are basically identical, all social relations involve what I call “relations of 
externality,” in that the prices of behaviors actually do function like a commodity market, where 
prices are available and known to relevant actors. Yet on the other, Becker has an alibi regarding 
individual preference and utility maximization, arguing that while differences in behavior are 
located in the last instance in commodity price, behavior also depends on people’s own utility 
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function or preferences—otherwise, “psychic benefits” or “shadow prices” could not exist 
parallel to an empirically observed price. 
These three pillars, underwritten by the logic of the “incentive,” constitute Becker’s 
contribution to the field of economics. Incentives, for Becker, represent simultaneously the 
external principle of least action—the economically “rational” choice according to price signals, 
the tune set from outside—as well as an internal motive, represented by the “preferences” that 
economic actors purport to express in market activity. The attribution of an incentive like 
dignity, guilt, or love onto welfare recipients, children, and marriage partner is an immense 
discursive resource of Becker’s; these incentives fill in gaps to render behavior coherent absent 
numerical evidence. And finally, Becker openly advocates for the production of new incentive 
structures—the poor in particular are improperly incentivized by public schools and social 
welfare benefits.186 
As mentioned, Becker had both an academic and a popular writing career, and despite the 
remarkable uniformity of his approach, he does advance contradictory positions between the two. 
Most notably, Becker advocates for the supremacy of the market in his academic writings, and in 
his BusinessWeek columns, advocates, technocratically, for governments to introduce incentive 
schemes with which he politically agrees. That is, Becker’s commitment to “stable preferences” 
and a relatively robust vision of human rationality in his academic writing means that people’s 
actions are to be taken prima facie unimpeachable; in his popular writings, he advances the 
position that governments ought to shape the incentives of the poor to become less dependent on 
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welfare programs, mainly by cutting off their benefits. This apparent incongruity has serious 
intellectual implications, and is not simply reducible to Becker’s “rhetorical situation” as a 
national columnist for a pro-business publication.187 Rather, this demonstrates the inescapability 
of incentive vocabularies from partaking in the animating contradictions I outlined in Chapter 1. 
Becker’s privileging of incentives means that they are both proactive and reactive, self-generated 
and generated by an other, retroactive and predictive; these contradictions cannot be resolved 
from within his work (it is, as Lukács would put it, representative of the antinomies of bourgeois 
thought).188 Ultimately, the “incentive-based” approach in his popular-press columns reduces 
social life to a set of techniques, or levers pulled by economic technocrats who, in Lacanian 
parlance, are the sujets suppose savoir that can interpret what is best for people based on the 
metapreferences attributed to their behaviors. To believe that people are motivated primarily by 
incentives becomes a proactive way to contour their behavior by assuming that they are passive, 
reactive and malleable. 
 “Market Mechanisms”: The Copulating Metaphor and Ontological Commensuration 
 Here I evaluate Becker’s first claim, that market mechanisms always-already structure all 
of reality. Primarily, this means that relations of externality—of price, in particular—affect 
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people’s decision-making more than any other explanatory factor—culture, gender, class, 
history, etc. (As mentioned above, Becker is willing to place his approach against all others, 
precisely because it purports to subsume all relevant behavior under these pricing mechanisms.) 
This presents a serious challenge to the academic disciplines he names, and I would place the 
domains of rhetoric, cultural studies, and critical theory as similarly threatened by his account.189 
Grossberg identifies the growth of “economic culture” in our contemporary conjuncture, 
and I believe that Becker’s work is partially responsible for this development. Grossberg writes, 
“The cultural presence of economy, what I would call economic culture, has changed 
significantly and become part of our popular culture in ways that I think it never used to be.”190 
He gives the example of the name of the Federal Reserve head being common knowledge, and 
the preponderance of stock market tickers on television news channels. But more than that, 
elsewhere he points to how “the economic” is prevalent, inescapable, at an even more 
fundamental level: “the economic itself moves toward becoming the ground of our lived 
experiences of the world. That is, some economic apparatuses are functioning according to 
affective logics that enable them to be increasingly articulated to the popular, so that then the 
economic expands its ability to realize or articulate the virtual into the actual.”191 Becker marks 
this gesture because his argument is not at the level of signifying content in cultural formations 
(reality shows with “undercover” CEOs, “futures markets” for political candidacies), but at the 
level of form. It is at the level of the copula—the joining of subject and predicate in the statement 
“human reality is a market” that Becker’s metaphorical work happens. 
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Becker’s theories are a specific form of knowledge-production predicated on the very 
thing Grossberg warns against: the “becoming economic” of everything. Grossberg writes, 
“economies or, better, certain practices and relations[,] are constituted as ‘economic’ per se (and 
even as particular sorts of economic forms) contextually; the line between the economic and non-
economic is constructed…and hence the assumption of economic essentialism—that there is 
some stable, natural and universal distinction to be drawn between economic practices and non-
economic ones—is untenable.”192 Becker’s answer is remarkably perverse, from this perspective: 
Yes of course there is no distinction to be made between economic and noneconomic practices, 
because every practice is, prima facie, already economic. He writes: “In addition, the economic 
approach does not draw conceptual distinctions between major and minor decisions, such as 
those involving life and death in contrast to the choice of a brand of coffee; or between decisions 
said to involve strong emotions and those with little emotional involvement, such as in choosing 
a mate or the number of children in contrast to buying paint.”193 This is what Grossberg 
identifies: “the economic” articulates lived experiences through apparatuses of capture, so even 
if there are only ever local, provisional, contextual practices, they are coded “as economic” 
through financial capital, “big data” analytics of social media, micro-transactions, and the like. 
For Becker, if any cultural practice is assumed to be “noneconomic,” this is simply because the 
tools of neoclassical analysis have not been parachuted onto it—market behavior is already there, 
we simply have not yet discovered it. 
Take Becker’s assertion that “marriage” is a market. For him, only two features are 
necessary: “The first is that, since marriage is practically always voluntary, either by the persons 
marrying or their parents, the theory of preferences can be readily applied, and persons marrying 
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(or their parents) can be assumed to expect to raise their utility level above what it would be were 
they to remain single. The second is that, since many men and women compete as they seek 
mates, a market in marriages can be presumed to exist. Each person tries to find the best mate, 
subject to the restrictions imposed by market conditions.”194 These minimal criteria coincide 
with textbook definitions of markets.195 Perfect competition is, of course, taken as an article of 
faith in neoclassical analysis, thanks to Arrow & Debreu’s general equilibrium theory (in 
particular, the “proof of existence” presumption); Becker is agnostic about whether the marriage 
market has perfect competition because it satisfies the other tenets thereof.196 
For Becker, the decision to marry “is a decision related, ultimately, to the expected net 
gains (benefits minus costs) from marriage (compared with remaining single).”197 That appears 
fairly uncontroversial—people get married because they assume they will be happier after 
joining together. But the next move is trickier: He contends that marriage markets improve total 
social utility because they have been freely chosen by utility maximizing agents: “In other 
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words, the marriage market chooses not the maximum household commodity output of any 
single marriage but the maximum sum of the outputs over all marriages, just as competitive 
product markets maximize the sum of the outputs over all firms…Put still differently, the 
marriage market acts as if it maximizes not the gain from marriage compared to remaining single 
for any particular marriage, but the average gain over all marriages.”198 Note the action verbs in 
this section: Marriage markets, not even marrying agents, choose and act; these markets—
impersonal mediums of exchange and competition—maximize total social utility. This echoes 
Crouch’s observation that for the Chicago School of economics, of which Becker is a proud 
member, the creation of wealth is an intrinsic good no matter the type of distribution or manner 
of its procurement: “For example, all profits made by Internet gambling firms automatically 
contribute to wealth creation and therefore, it seems, to human welfare; as a result, they are 
beyond reproach. Medical research can only prove its worth when a corporation succeeds in 
turning its work into clearly effective cures—or, into medicines that can be traded 
commercially.”199 Orthodox neoclassical theory is explicitly hostile to questions of distribution 
(since alterations in distribution may affect the size of the “pie” being sliced, according to 
Samuelson), so Becker adopts this maxim for “marriage markets.” 
Finally, Becker claims that, even if people individually are optimizing “as they see it,” he 
argues that the marriage market is “assumed to be at equilibrium, in the sense that no person 
could change mates and become better off.”200 Given that, according to the National Center for 
Health Statistics, 74 percent of women remarry within 10 years of their divorce, this seems like a 
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dubious assertion to make—choosing a new mate ought to be empirical proof of being better off 
with a new partner.201 However, from the perspective of his intensified version of neoclassical 
economic theory, Becker’s assertion is true, since the monetary and social costs of divorce, the 
social time/cost of meeting new people after a divorce, and the opportunity cost of deciding on a 
legal partner are already calculated by the economic actor herself, so as a rule, total social utility 
is always raised when a partnering choice is made. This sufficiently insulates Becker’s position 
from criticism, since any voluntary decision is expected to raise individual utility, and by 
extension, total social utility is raised, QED. 
 For Becker, human existence is not like a market. It cannot be a simile, because that 
involves a minimal figurative distance between concept and thing. Instead, human existence is a 
market, at the level of identity, not relation. Margolis writes: “What happens is that a decaying 
metaphor deposits a developing literal assertion in the place of its figure. Also, be it noted, the 
decaying metaphor generates the property to be literally attributed to the object of interest, 
whereas the simile, on translation, discards completely the properties of that to which the object 
of interest is compared.”202 Lacan corroborates this assertion, for in the production of metaphor, 
“There’s not a comparison but an identification… Metaphor presupposes that a meaning is the 
dominant datum and that it deflects, commands, the use of the signifier to such an extent that the 
entire species of preestablished, I should say lexical, connections comes undone.”203 Becker’s 
metaphoric claims are at the level of form, not of content—even if his form is not a neutral, 
empty vessel in which to tabulate behavior. 
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 Contrary to the Ramist conception, metaphor is not strictly reducible to “ornamentation,” 
something that describes poetically that which has an already-existing content, but is a signifying 
gesture par excellence. In fact, the reduction of metaphor to “ornament” does an injustice to both 
the centrality of metaphor and the critical avenues opened thereby, particularly in the “rhetoric of 
economics” subfield. Mirowski argues that simply pointing out neoclassical economics relies 
primarily on a mathematical metaphor “has little cash value, because there are a potentially 
limitless number of possible metaphors that might have been proposed and a myriad of 
mathematical metaphors that might have been deemed to warrant sustained elaboration.”204 
Mirowski’s frustration is welcome, because focus on metaphors as ornamentation or explanation, 
or even as idiomatic (“time is money,” “a profitable encounter,” “opportunity cost,” “everything 
has a price”) distracts from what the founding neoclassical metaphor unlocks. 
Lacan points out in his “Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious” that “Metaphor’s 
creative spark does not spring forth from the juxtaposition of two images, that is, of two equally 
actualized signifiers. It flashes between two signifiers, one of which has replaced the other by 
taking the other’s place in the signifying chain, the occulted signifier remaining present by virtue 
of its (metonymic) connection to the rest of the chain… [M]etaphor is situated at the precise 
point at which meaning is produced in nonmeaning.”205 Here, Lacan does not mean that meaning 
is produced out of nonsense, but of nonmeaning—of an x signifier prior to a condensation of 
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affective investment.206 For Becker, social reality does not have signifying content prior to its 
condensation in the market metaphor it simply is economic, rather than being like the economic 
concept it parallels. For example, Becker does not enjoin us to act “as if” families are a firm, or 
argue that the psychic turmoil of hiring a Black person is “like” a monetary cost—they are joined 
at the level of identity. Regarding the second example, in Becker’s thought, hiring a Black 
person “costs” more in psychic energy to a white racist than it does to hire a white person, even 
if that white person has a higher wage. Thus it is psychically “cheaper” to hire a white person, 
and this conclusion is offered as if there were no discursive labor expended to map market 
mechanisms onto this complex process. 
What does the “market mechanisms” metaphor do for Becker? Its role is Janus-faced: It 
allows for retroactive narrative coherence for any social phenomenon, and it sets up relations of 
ontological commensuration. So although Becker’s claims are at the level of the copula—at the 
level of “X is Y,” I would still offer that it is a product of discursive labor, of artifice—partially 
because Becker’s claims never fully cover the social field (not just in effect, but in fact: for 
instance, Becker refers to children as commodities, but by any reasonable definition, 
commodities can be bought and sold in markets). His signifying gesture—“market mechanisms 
coordinate behavior, they account for what sociologists call ‘structure,” is still discursive labor 
expended in order to produce predictions and recommendations for behavior. Lundberg reminds 
us of an insight from Aristotle’s Rhetoric: to efface the traces of one’s own discursive labor is 
rhetorical work itself, and perhaps one of its most important components.207 These simplifying 
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gestures, coupled with the grandiosity of the scope of his project are part and parcel of the 
market metaphor. 
At its most benign, Becker’s “market metaphor” results in a set of tautologies or 
circularities: After all, Becker claims that while received economic/fertility theory predicts 
wealthier people ought to have more children, they in fact have fewer.208 What explains this? 
Becker posits that well-off people instead invest in better children, spending their money on 
dance lessons, piano recitals, summer camps, and so on. However, by Becker’s own admission, 
income determines behavior more than cultural or institutional factors, so the assertion could 
rightly be raised that wealthy people spend more money on their child because they have more 
money to spend. But ultimately, the notion that reality is a market is yoked to the notion that 
markets exist at equilibrium, and that notion hypostasizes reality in a way that resists any 
explanations for social change. To assume that any given social phenomenon is a market at 
equilibrium implies that resources are already being distributed efficiently. 
Yet this point is used to attack any alteration to the status quo—as the chapter on equal 
pay legislation demonstrates, assuming “incentive-driven behavior” by women means that they 
are already incentivized by their given (lower) wages, and to legislate equal pay would produce 
tremendous market inefficiencies and perverse incentives. And as William K. Black writes of 
Becker’s Treatise on the Family, “women and men are genetically predisposed to desire to work, 
respectively, in the household and paid labor sectors.”209 This results in a set of predictions that 
similarly hypostasize social reality into the given categories of his analysis (foremost among 
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them being “men” and “women” in this example).210 As Febrero and Schwarz argue, “one of 
Becker’s predictions is that, if all members of an efficient household have different comparative 
advantages, all (except at most one of them) will tend to specialize in either the market or the 
household sector. This implies that fully sharing household tasks would lead to an inefficient 
allocation of resources.”211 This prediction later became a policy recommendation: In a column 
decrying tax credits to defer childcare costs for households with small children, Becker argued 
against women entering the workforce because of the positive effect stay-at-home mothers have 
on child development.212 
It is here where Becker’s presumption of equilibrium runs up against itself: To presume 
that markets are the ontological structure of social reality, and that markets allocate resources at 
equilibrium, one must then presume that actors are already incentive-driven and acting according 
to their own utility functions and preferences. That is, one cannot use “efficiency” as a rhetorical 
resource for advocating behavior if people’s behavior is determined by their own utility function, 
especially if people’s voluntary activities by definition increase “total social utility.” For certain 
aspects of Becker’s work (like marriage markets and religious affiliation), this approach entails 
that all “buyers” of a given commodity have found a seller offering a corresponding price to the 
appropriate level of desire/incentive. Recall the argument from the previous chapter: Alfred 
Marshall infamously sutured desire and its fulfillment in his equilibrium approaches—virtually 
his only authorization for positing a “general equilibrium” at all. Yet for others—welfare, 
immigration, criminal punishment, the post office, social security, public education, etc.—
Becker insists that these “markets” are functioning inefficiently because incentives are 
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improperly distributed. According to his wife, he explicitly argues that political liberals “more 
frequently than conservatives ignore the importance of incentives when that helps their 
argument—as in considering whether welfare breaks up marriages and encourages dependency, 
or whether high income tax rates reduce work and investments.”213 
He is also able to make these claims because of the data-based bias of his work: 
Economic data incorporates wage changes, labor force participation, etc., over time—basically 
everything that would account for measurable, material economic progress (for women, for 
ethnic minorities, for different sexualities). And since economic data is capable of displaying 
such change over time, all change is the result of market forces: Women entering the workforce 
due to World War II represents a market force (for it was merely a change in the supply of 
labor). He writes, “the growth in the employment and earnings of women is explained mostly by 
market forces than by civil rights legislation, affirmative action-programs, or the women’s 
movement.”214 Asian parents prioritize schooling and private (for-profit) tutoring, which raises 
their human capital and renders them attractive to tech firms.215 
According to Becker all cultural, political, and historic formations occur at the level of 
the market, and this is where they are registered. This is why (even after some substantial 
theoretical revisions) Becker is silent on the origins of different incentive structures/utility-
maximization functions—he presupposes that it is the result of the rational calculus that is 
inherent within every economic actor, so all historical change is the result of some rational 
utility-maximizing principle. Why do Asian families and countries prioritize schooling and 
tutoring programs? It is in their best economic interest to do so. Why do women leave the labor 
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force and raise children? They have extra-economic incentives to maximize their own pleasure 
function. It is, in short, circular reasoning: If one posits that the market is an all-powerful, all-
encompassing information processor beyond the scope of any individual entity’s comprehension, 
then only “market activity” accounts for social, historical, political and cultural changes in a way 
that disavows the very nature of these changes as social, historical, political, or cultural. 
Culture, for Becker, is a black box, or a deep-enough background as to be meaningless in 
the face of “hard” economic data, or only methodologically relevant insofar as it produces 
“economic” effects. “The market” is simultaneously the registrar of cultural change and the 
explanatory mechanism thereof. Take his explanation of fertility patterns in America: “Secular 
changes in educational attainment, religious attachment, discrimination against women, and so 
on, may also have decreased fertility, and presumably there were changes other than the growth 
of income which increased fertility. It would take a major study—and even that might be 
inconclusive—to determine whether the factors decreasing fertility were sufficiently strong to 
produce a secular decline in fertility in spite of the secular rise in income.”216 Here, culturally 
significant shifts, such as “discrimination against women” are posited as explanatory factors, and 
just as quickly dismissed, or at least relegated to deep background behind market factors. All in 
all, Becker predicts a rise in fertility accompanying a rise in income, despite his own 
pronouncements to the contrary elsewhere, which predicts the production of “better” children as 
opposed to more of them.217 As if on a univocal plane, Becker sets up a relation of ontological 
commensuration between the amount of children and the “quality” thereof—not to mention 
equating the “quality” of a child with the investments made into her or him. And somewhat 
surprisingly, he later argues in a BusinessWeek column indicating his opposition to social welfare 
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payments to the poor that “values,” not money, are the most important things transferred to 
children.218 That is, “values” are assumed to fill in the gap when social welfare benefits are taken 
away from the poor—once again, he advocates for a univocal, immanent plane of “incentives” 
without empirical data to corroborate his assertions. 
Stable Preferences, or the Metonymy of Desire 
Becker’s second axiom, the “stability of preferences,” performs a tremendous amount of 
rhetorical labor. Primarily, with Jeremy Bentham’s help, Becker is able to narrate a smooth 
explanation of fluctuating or contradictory behavior by positing a deeper layer of rationality and 
decision-making beneath any commodity/behavioral choice. This strategy centralizes the 
economist in any explanation of human behavior; the economist alone can claim, “You 
purchased this, but what you really purchased was…” The result is that things like “guilt” and 
“pride” become quantifiable variables for why children care for the elderly, or why people do not 
sign up for social welfare benefits. This is a metonymic process, in which Becker links each 
commodity choice to one of fifteen distinct pleasures that Bentham enumerates. The second feat 
that Becker’s axiom of “stable preferences” accomplishes is that, with a major definitional 
overhaul late in his career, Becker subsumes historical and cultural accretions under the term 
“metapreferences.” This allows him to retroactively stabilize economic inequalities under the 
rubric of “preferences” and symbolize them as having already been chosen by the relevant 
actors. As argued previously, incentive-based vocabularies are “responsibility oriented” and 
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assumed to be voluntary; Becker’s reformulation from “stable preferences” to “stable 
metapreferences” is the theoretical warrant for this move. In sum, to paraphrase Linda Richman, 
“stable preferences” are neither stable nor preferences. 
Becker defines preferences, and his penchant for the “stable preferences” approach as: 
The preferences that are assumed to be stable do not refer to market goods and services, 
like oranges, automobiles, or medical care, but to underlying objects of choice that are 
produced by each household using market goods and services, their own time, and other 
inputs. These underlying preferences are defined over fundamental aspects of life, such as 
health, prestige, sensual pleasure, benevolence, or envy, that do not always bear a stable 
relation to market goods and services… The assumption of stable preferences provides a 
stable foundation for generating predictions about responses to various changes, and 
prevents the analyst from succumbing to the temptation of simply postulating the 
required shift in preferences to ‘explain’ all apparent contradictions to his predictions.219 
 
“Stable preferences” allows Becker to posit a non-empirical object that commensurates between 
disparate elements (pride, companionship, refrigerators, sporting goods) because what is being 
satisfied in any purchase is not the preference for the market good, but the satisfaction behind the 
purchase. He will change this definition later in his career, but now it is explicitly linked to 
underlying objects of choice that economic actors produce, and the values that undergird these 
actions. 
Becker inherits this position from Bentham, who, “in 1789 set out a list of fifteen ‘simple 
pleasures’ which he argued was ‘the inventory of our sensations.’ These pleasures, which were 
supposed to exhaust the list of basic arguments in one’s pleasure (i.e. utility) function are of 
senses, riches, address, friendship, good reputation, power, piety, benevolence, malevolence, 
knowledge, memory, imagination, hope, association and relief of pain… Alfred Marshall 
suggested an even smaller set of arguments for the utility function when he stated that the basic 
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sources of satisfaction are but two: distinction and excellence.” 220 As argued in the final section, 
Becker tautologically links all of these sensations under only one good, “utility.” But for now, 
the idea is that economic actors choose their preferences based on the underlying values that can 
express them: “Individuals help guide their destinies by exercising control over future stocks of 
personal capital that determine future utilities and preferences. Therefore, individuals, in effect, 
help to choose their own preferences, if ‘preferences’ are taken to mean not the extended 
preference function of goods and capital, but the (sub)utility function that depends only on 
goods, which is what the function economists usually consider.”221 By presuming in advance that 
people are fundamentally identical, and rejecting that fads, trends or changing tastes affect 
behavior, Becker is able to hold these variables constant and argue only changes in purchasing 
power determine behavior in the aggregate.222 
To explain any differences in market activity, Becker presumes that either the commodity 
itself changes price, or that the people in question simply have different purchasing power. This 
is the thesis of the first axiom, that of “market mechanisms” structuring all behavior. But what 
accounts for a change in purchasing power? Two things: Becker initially contends that there is 
simply an assignation of a “psychic benefit” or “shadow cost” to a behavior—the individual 
utility function is preserved because people assign different values to commodities. In other 
words, if a certain economically rational action is not taken (hiring a lower-waged Black person 
at a business, or purchasing a more expensive nearby meal because traffic is too bad to travel to 
one’s favorite restaurant), one has simply assigned a higher cost to the preferred choice or a 
lower price to the “easier” choice. In other words, Becker assumes that these internally generated 
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price signals affect behavior the same way external price signals do for “rational” economic 
actors—people simply follow their economic incentives because “economic” describes all 
behavior, not strictly ones based on commodity purchases. (The other explanation is that one’s 
“purchasing power” is changed because of prior purchases, preferences and investments—this is 
the “metapreferences” solution Becker proffers later in his career.) 
Of course, from the perspective of behaviorism, or even “standard” neoclassical analysis, 
people choosing a more expensive meal reveals a preference for expensive meals. This 
represents an undeniably different outcome than a prediction that people have “stable 
preferences” and act in accordance with them—which is why these non-empirical concepts 
(“shadow price,” “psychic benefits”) are so necessary for his theory. He writes:  
When an apparently profitable opportunity to a firm, worker, or household, is not 
exploited, the economic approach does not take refuge in assertions about irrationality, 
contentment with wealth already acquired, or convenient ad hoc shifts in values (i.e., 
preferences). Rather it postulates the existence of costs, monetary or psychic, of taking 
advantage of these opportunities that eliminate their profitability—costs that may not be 
easily ‘seen’ by outside observers. Of course, postulating the existence of costs closes or 
‘completes’ the economic approach in the same, almost tautological, way that postulating 
the existence of (sometimes unobserved) uses of energy completes the energy system, 
and preserves the law of the conservation of energy.223 
 
Phillip Mirowski, among others, has rightly critiqued the discipline of economics for indelicately 
borrowing metaphors from the 19th-century physical sciences to authorize their models of 
marginal utility, general equilibrium, and the price of stocks, so I shall not dwell on Becker’s 
appropriation of physics. 
However, the fact that this strategic concession is left untouched is telling. The best 
example of this “psychic benefits” comes in his analysis of American fertility. As stated before, 
Becker contends that since wealthier families have fewer children than poorer ones, wealthy 
families are invested in creating “better” children rather than “more” of them. He writes, “It is 
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possible that in the mid-nineteenth century children were a net producer’s good, providing rather 
than using income. However, the marginal cost of children must have been positive in families 
receiving marginal psychic income from children; otherwise, they would have had additional 
children. Even in 1850, the typical family in the United States was producing fewer children than 
was physically possible.”224 I shall leave aside what Becker believes to be the physical limits of 
the production of children. However, his argument is simply that if the physical possibility were 
met, this would be the equilibrium level, since having n+1 children would be a “profitable 
opportunity” according to this view. Since this opportunity is not being taken, there must be 
differential incentives that fill in this gap—there must be non-empirical (hence, “psychic”) 
benefits attached to children that account for their existence. Second, and most importantly, 
“stable preferences” allows Becker to evade the question of why people are (or become) 
different, because everything is re-reducible to the price mechanism. The axiom of stable 
preferences is nothing but an expression of the first axiom, that of market mechanisms, since 
every preference is reducible to a “relation of externality”—every action weighs on a prior one, 
and hence becomes the conditioning context for every future decision. In other words, the only 
thing that makes people different are their differences, and the preferences axiom is largely a 
way to leave intact the current state of affairs, to rhetorically justify inequalities. 
The stable preferences axiom entails hiding the source, direction and genesis of social 
change, and the meaning of the preference as expressed. Actions are never contradictory—the 
metapreference is simply expressed in a different manner, even if that manner actually is the 
inverse of a prior action. Becker uses the example of heating oil to explain what he means by 
“stable preferences.” In Economic Approach, he writes: 
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To illustrate the reliance on ‘changes in tastes’ in interpreting observed behavior, 
consider the following examples. If a household’s utility function has heating fuel as an 
argument then its tastes must change seasonally to explain why it purchases more fuel in 
the winter (when the price of fuel is usually higher). Or, couples must experience a shift 
in preferences toward snow removal services and medical care services away from 
sporting goods equipment and high-cholesterol foods as they age since the market prices 
of these items are not related to age and yet expenditure patterns appear to change with 
the couple’s age.225 
 
Here, Becker uses the tilt of the earth and aging of the human body as examples for why 
preferences do not change, and that an underlying, as-yet-quantified meta-preference better 
explains consumer behavior than what he calls the “received” theory of consumer behavior. For 
the first example, Becker claims that typical economists, via this theory of consumer behavior, 
believe that people who heat their homes during the winter change their tastes from “non-
consumer of fuel” to “consumer of fuel,” because otherwise, they would be either consistent 
purchasers of fuel, or the opposite. Economists, in Becker’s view, use “change in tastes” to 
explain away this apparently “irrational” behavior, because if they were truly economically 
rational, they would purchase heating fuel in the summer (at a lower price). 
The second example is trickier, but instructive: Becker elliptically claims that as people 
age, they do not change their preferences from sporting goods to snow removal, nor do they act 
economically “rationally” by responding to price fluctuations in the different types of 
commodity. After all, medical care is more expensive for an elderly person than for a young 
person, so a rational economic actor would purchase such care as a whippersnapper, and 
regarding commodities with relatively stable prices, like sporting goods, one could (presumably) 
better afford them, or purchase more of them, after a lifetime of waged income. If a person buys 
fewer skis in their 60s, it must be because they have changed their taste or predilection for winter 
sports, so sayeth Becker’s straw-person economist. At first glance, this seems altogether 
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reasonable to a reader, but Becker’s axiom forces him to be baffled that people change their 
consumption patterns across seasons and decades. 
The point is that another rational calculus is going on behind, alongside, through, and 
beyond commodity exchange: When people purchase fuel in the winter, they are satisfying an 
underlying non-commodity preference, like “comfort” or “satisfaction;” when they avoid such 
purchases in the summer, they either allocate their resources toward other “comfort”-inducing 
products, such as fans or air conditioners, and/or produce “comfort” without expenditure. (Here, 
incentives are an immanent field, and enjoyment occurs at every moment. Like the anorexic, 
what the comfort-seeker in summer consumes is nothingness itself.) For the aging person in 
Becker’s example, both sliding down snow from atop a mountain and removing it from one’s 
yard can be expressions of the same meta-preference, since they both fulfill an individual utility 
function. For Becker, commodity prices cannot, in the last instance, determine consumer 
behavior. If that were true, as mentioned, his exemplars would purchase heating fuel in the 
summer and medical procedures while young. Instead, he must have recourse to a “shadow 
price” that governs behaviors beneath that of the price of a given commodity. 
These extreme examples represent a remarkable intellectual contortion, but are vital for 
the remainder of his work. The rhetorical effect is that we as readers are inclined to agree with 
Becker’s interpretation over his unnamed intellectual foes, because his is more intuitive: People 
do not change at will, and people have very good reasons for their actions. People do not change 
their tastes every four months, or (perhaps hyperbolically) every four decades but rather, aim to 
satisfy a set of stable preferences throughout their lives, and every commodity purchased is 
simply the expression of some underlying desire. (Becker may be hostile to psychology, but his 
insight bears some resemblance to psychoanalysis.) Becker’s “metapreference” is unobservable 
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except through economic analysis, which centralizes the economist in any analysis of a social 
phenomenon; this process is a conversion of metonymic preferences into an overarching 
metaphor about human behavior. 
Lacan, following Roman Jakobson, defined metonymy as the axis of language 
perpendicular to that of metaphor. I use this term to describe how Becker’s interpretive work 
depends on arguing that any economic action is the expression of a non-commodity preference—
one of the fifteen he borrows from Bentham. For Lacan, metonymy is the structure of desire; 
“desire…is caught in the rails of metonymy, eternally extending toward the desire for something 
else.”226 Becker contends that every commodity purchase, every rational action taken by an 
actor, is done in the service of a non-commodity preference—the underlying values that motivate 
action in the first place. And because of this metonymic sliding, Becker is always able to defer, 
or better, to displace, the “meaning” of a commodity purchase into one he finds analytically 
palatable. For example, Social Security corrodes family values because children no longer feel 
obligated to care for their parents, family values can be measured by monetary gifts, and this is 
one reason to eliminate it entirely.227 And when Becker argues against social welfare programs, 
he metonymically slides “nonparticipation in welfare” into that of “values and self-respect.” He 
writes, “Some eligible families do not apply for welfare because it erodes a family’s values and 
self-respect. This may be partly because of the social stigma of being on welfare, but I believe it 
is mainly because some parents conclude correctly that welfare handouts badly affect their own 
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and their children’s motivation to help themselves. They decide that the harmful effects are too 
large a price to pay for welfare checks.”228 
Later in his career, Becker chose to engage with criticisms of his “stable preferences” 
axiom by retroactively redefining “preferences” from his original conception into one that better 
suits the principle of utility maximization. Recall that in his original definition, preferences were 
“values,” and “fundamental aspects of life, such as health, prestige, sensual pleasure, 
benevolence, or envy, that do not always bear a stable relation to market goods,” that remain 
stable. They are also partially contoured by economic actors, at least insofar as commodities can 
be purchased that satisfy a forward-looking expectation (like developing a “preference” for 
classical music by purchasing tickets to a symphony). However during a lecture at Northwestern 
University, Becker argues the following: “Some of you might be surprised to hear a coauthor of 
the de gustibus point of view, with its emphasis on stable preference, waxing enthusiastically 
about the formation of preferences. But what de gustibus assumes is that metapreferences are 
stable. Metapreferences include past choices and choices by others as arguments in a person’s 
current utility function.”229 This is a tremendous reversal, for two reasons. 
First, it contravenes the definition of “meta-preferences” originally introduced by Sen 
into economic theory. Sen initially coined the term “meta-preferences” as “rankings of 
preference rankings” to critique what he saw as a too-narrow vision of rationality in neoclassical 
decision theory.230 He writes, “Economic theory has been much preoccupied with this rational 
fool decked in the glory of his one all-purpose preference ordering. To make room for the 
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different concepts related to his behavior we need a more elaborate structure.”231 But more than 
that, Becker’s redefinition of “stable preferences” into “metapreferences” means he no longer 
places “preferences” under the rubric of “objects of choice,” or even values, but that of “choices 
by others.” Examples he gives of this are a parent’s decision to smoke, or a woman who 
experienced sexual abuse as a child. Each of these weighs on a person’s individual utility 
function because it “costs” more to perform an action in line with one’s own desires because 
these “meta-preferences” weigh on them. In some sense, this is a refreshing change to make: He 
argues in According to Tastes that culture affects the actions of individuals more than the other 
way round, so in some way this is a legitimate nod to how culture, history and politics complexly 
articulate the lived experiences of people beyond the scope of economics.232 But on the other 
hand, it is a form of retroactive determinism, in which people’s values and objects of choice are 
assigned as costs from the outside.  
This is perhaps an etymologically fruitful disagreement about the nature of the term 
“meta-”. Sen’s definition (“preferences of preferences”) partakes in the sense we have of “meta-” 
being both self-referential and “beyond,” much like “metaphysics” is physics outside of the 
bounds of physics. But Becker’s definition of “meta-” entails both “after” and “outside,” so that 
an individual’s preferences come after their stable metapreferences, or an individual’s 
metapreferences exist outside of their preferences. Either way, Becker’s shift from stable 
preferences to stable metapreferences is a significant revision to this theory, enough to be 
considered a reversal. Note the agentic reversal here: Becker’s original concept of “preferences” 
was based on the production of satisfaction, which authorizes the contention that commodities 
are simply the means to the various ends of different consumers. Yet later, Becker’s concept of 
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the stable metapreference entails the stability of non-subjective allocations of social forces—they 
are past choices, or choices by others, that contour behavior. 
And further, the appearance and disappearance of “metapreference” allows Becker to 
evade the full implications of the “stable preferences” axiom he posits.  For instance, other 
writers have rightly derided Becker’s stance that discriminatory business owners merely have a 
“taste for discrimination” that explains why they refuse to hire Black labor. Using Becker and 
Stigler’s “De Gustibus” approach, economists have nothing normative to offer about people’s 
preferences—that is perhaps the one area outside the scope of economic thought. Becker does 
provide a sophisticated, if unsatisfying rejoinder: economic actors can form and modify their 
preferences, but strictly in accordance with their individual utility function (see below section). 
The reason why this is unsatisfying is that it is avowedly circular: People act in accordance with 
their own desires (to fulfill their utility function) so they only alter their preferences when it suits 
their individual utility functions—and in this case, it means that the “price” of holding a bigoted 
belief is raised beyond the psychic benefit of holding it.233 In this conception, going along with 
social norms is “rational” economic behavior because one obeys the available price signals. 
When one disobeys social norms, laws, or customs (that is, partaking in behavior with a higher 
social “cost”) in either direction (whether for “good” or “bad” social outcomes, they simply 
signify they are willing to pay a higher “social cost” for their behavior. 
Utility Maximization: An Incipient Theory of Enjoyment 
In this final section, I describe the final piece of Becker’s economic approach to human 
behavior. Here, using Foucault as a springboard, I find that Becker’s utility maximization axiom 
                                                
233 There is a kernel of truth in here, even from a Marxist perspective: Discrimination is not about what goes on 
inside the head of an individual person, but is rather an objectively measurable phenomenon. (Becker simply 
disagrees that anything other than the sovereign individual ought to do anything about it.) And further, if the social 
basis for discrimination is not destroyed, the “taste for discrimination” remains, albeit disarticulated from economic 
activity.  
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is an incipient theory of enjoyment. Becker’s “household production function” best exemplifies 
the utility maximization axiom and primarily works by attributing qualia of enjoyment (of 
“satisfaction”) to actions. This ends up inoculating neoclassical economics from criticism from 
outside. Following his axiom of stable preferences, Becker is incapable of giving a complete 
account of difference in reality, since the only reason why people act differently is because it 
fulfills their utility function. Take the above example from Becker about the equitable 
distribution of household labor. For Becker, the prediction is that “women,” as a result of their 
metapreferences (i.e. their cultural and familial upbringing) have “human capital” better 
designed for domestic labor than men, ergo, women should either earn less at work or perform 
more domestic duties. 
But faced with evidence to the contrary, be it statistical or anecdotal, of a woman’s power 
to command a high wage or a man performing domestic duties willingly, Becker is simply able 
to point to differences in purchasing power, i.e. human capital, and thereby to differences in an 
individual’s utility function. So if a woman comes from a wealthy background without domestic 
labor “investment,” or a man was raised in an egalitarian household and happily performs 
domestic labor, Becker’s prediction can inhere in the aggregate. The couple in question is merely 
maximizing their utility as they see it, so once again any evidence to the contrary is insulated 
from implicating the theory. Becker in fact doubles down on his opposition to empirical proof as 
evidence one way or another on the thesis of utility maximization. He and George Stigler, in the 
influential “De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum,” write: 
It is a thesis that does not permit of direct proof because it is an assertion about the world, 
not a proposition in logic. Moreover, it is possible almost at random to throw up 
examples of phenomena that presently defy explanation by this hypothesis: Why do we 
have inflation? Why are there so few Jews in farming? Why are societies with 
polygynous families so rare in the modern world? Why aren’t blood banks responsible 
for the quality of their product? If we could answer these questions to your satisfaction, 
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you would quickly produce a dozen more. What we assert is not that we are clever 
enough to make illuminating applications of utility-maximizing theory to all important 
phenomena… Rather, we assert that this traditional approach of the economist offers 
guidance in tackling these problems—and that no other approach of remotely comparable 
generality and power is available.234 
 
Their argument is offered somewhat awkwardly: Direct proof of this assertion is not available, 
because the claim is being made about empirical reality, not via formal logic. And although there 
may be empirical evidence that contradicts this claim, the proposition is generalizable and 
therefore, more useful than provisional, contextual, atheoretical knowledge. In fact, Becker’s 
rejoinder to those who would throw empirical anecdotes that contravene his theory is to remind 
readers of empirical anecdotes wherein the stable preferences/utility-maximizing framework was 
proven correct.235 
But Becker, undeterred, invokes the notion of the “household production function” as a 
way to explain that any differences in reality are simply down to production functions of 
families. He defines the household production function thusly: “The household production 
function framework emphasizes the parallel services performed by firms and household as 
organizational units. Similar to the typical firm analyzed in standard production theory, the 
household invests in capital assets (savings), capital equipment (durable goods) and capital 
embodied in its ‘labor force’ (human capital of family members). As an organizational entity, the 
household, like the firm, engages in production using this labor and capital. Each is viewed as 
maximizing its objective function subject to resource and technological constraints.”236 In this 
view, “the heart of the theory is an assumption that households are producers as well as 
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consumers; they produce commodities by combining inputs of goods and time according to the 
cost-minimisation rules of the traditional theory of the firm.”237 
Foucault diagnoses the “household production function” here: 
And I will not talk about it here, because it would take too long, but in Gary Becker there 
is a very interesting theory of consumption, in which he says: We should not think at all 
that consumption simply consists in being someone in a process of exchange who buys 
and makes a monetary exchange in order to obtain some products. The man of 
consumption is not one of the terms of exchange. The man of consumption, insofar as he 
consumes, is a producer. What does he produce? Well, quite simply, he produces his own 
satisfaction. And we should think of consumption as an enterprise activity by which the 
individual, precisely on the basis of the capital he has at his disposal, will produce 
something that will be his own satisfaction.238 
 
According to an editor’s footnote, Foucault breaks off his lecture due to lack of time, and “does 
not develop the final points of the last part of the lecture dealing with the relevance of this kind 
of analysis for…the possibilities of analysis of familial behavior.”239 His subsequent lecture 
engages with Becker and other neoliberals’ approaches to crime, but he does not return to the 
“production of satisfaction” notion so briefly introduced. We may be able to piece together 
Foucault’s argument from his overall thesis, that under neoliberalism, “homo œconomicus is an 
entrepreneur of himself [sic].”240 That is, a subject continually produces her own enjoyment out 
of her “human capital” outlays, so any “consumption” is simply “production” in another guise. 
 For example, Becker contends that when a family purchases a refrigerator, it is not 
strictly a durable consumer good, but is rather a durable capital good, capable of “producing” 
preserved food for the family. When a family goes out to dinner, the family is not simply 
consuming a meal at retail price, but is producing an artifact of satisfaction—their utility—in the 
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act of eating out. Becker’s revolutionary theory of consumption is that we continuously produce 
our own satisfaction at a level other than (commodity) market exchange. In the restaurant 
example, we put a price on the “cost” of time and energy to go out, and/or put a higher price on 
the domestic labor one would perform at home for an equivalent meal. Yes, these things show up 
in the cost in money, but the commodity purchased is not wine or food, but “satisfaction,” or 
utility. This is why Becker enjoins us to think that whenever we witness what appears to be an 
“inefficient” or “irrational” economic behavior, it is that some other market is contouring the 
activities of the observed. 
Thus far, this is a fairly elegant solution to a persistent problem at potentially all levels of 
economic and non-economic thought: The real market is the “other scene,” the unobserved 
quantum field, or perhaps, the dark precursor that appears, lightning-like, when the economist 
retroactively infers what market consideration really mattered for the actor at hand. The 
attribution of this production matters here, as we shall see in the following chapter: When an 
economist or a politician is able to attribute enjoyment (utility, pleasure, reward) to an actor, 
there are serious discursive consequences, especially because in Becker’s model, one is always-
already enjoying one’s preferences. With the household production function, there is a kernel of 
truth in Foucault’s unease with “neoliberal” outcomes—the idea that human beings are forced to 
become, in essence, obsessional neurotics, always working to produce enjoyment/utility in the 
guise of the indefatigable entrepreneur (and never the rentiér, or the capital-owner). 
So rather than enjoyment being continually deferred, what if the opposite is true? For 
Becker, “incentives” signify an immanent field, a mechanism that ontologically links disparate 
elements under a single rubric, that of “utility.” Recall, utility maximization is taken as an article 
of faith by Becker—if someone performs an action, it is in line with their utility function, and are 
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maximizing it to the best of their abilities. Clearly this is an unsatisfying assertion, because after 
the assertion thereof, we have no normative grounds upon which to make judgments about social 
phenomena. (As mentioned, this does not stop Becker from making said judgments about social 
programs and social groups.) So Foucault’s diagnosis is that in Becker, we no longer consume, 
we produce, and what we produce is our own satisfaction—hence the entrepreneurial self that 
Foucault identifies as the subject of neoliberalism. I offer a brief reformulation, using a 
psychoanalytic diagnosis of the “obsessional neurotic” to explore how “enjoyment” functions in 
Becker’s thought. 
“Enjoyment” for Lacan is not coterminous with satisfaction, or happiness—it is, instead a 
mark of habituated repetition; it signals a fixation or tic that repeats without our conscious 
knowledge or control. For the obsessional neurotic, one’s neurosis is expressed, pace Laplanche 
and Pontalis, in “symptoms which are described as compulsive-obsessive ideas…and through a 
mode of thinking which is characterised in particular by rumination, doubt and scruples.”241 But 
as Mladen Dolar contends, this doubt and repetitive behavior does not signal a lack of 
enjoyment, but rather, expresses its preponderance—there is simply too much enjoyment 
happening, and this is why the obsessive seeks to categorize and stabilize it. (Alternatively, one 
could argue that the categorization and repetitive behavior is the enjoyment, that it is constituted 
in the act. Either interpretation is consonant with the idea that enjoyment is not deferred, but 
rather is present at every moment.) For the obsessive, according to Lacan, language is the 
currency of his symptom: “The neurotic symptom acts as a language that enables repression to 
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be expressed. This is precisely what enables us to grasp the fact that repression and the return of 
the repressed are one and the same thing, the front and back of a single process.”242 
It is my contention not that all subjects act in this way, but rather, for Becker’s 
“household production function” to work, he must attribute these obsessional qualities onto 
subjects. The economist, not his subject, performs the neurotic action, obsessively rooting out 
where and when people “enjoyed” in their given actions, be they irrational, habitual, socially 
beneficial or none of the above. How else do we make sense of contradictory or habitual 
behavior other than the “utility maximization” axiom? Mirowski writes that for neoclassicals, 
“noise was just waste; and the existence of redundancy was simply a symptom of inefficiency, a 
sign that someone, somewhere, was not optimizing.”243 Becker’s position is subtler than this, 
since his main rebuke to economics (akin to the critique he levels at the “received theory of 
choice” within his “stable preferences” axiom) is that his discipline is simply inattentive to the 
enjoyment that was happening in front of their faces at all times. The neoclassical fear that 
someone was “not optimizing” is not Becker’s, but that does not make the rooting out thereof 
any less obsessive. Instead of looking for inefficiencies (in the workplace, in family life even, in 
policies), Becker’s “utility maximization” axiom simply posits that markets are efficient at a 
much deeper, more fundamental level than we are even aware. And by positing all actions as 
fulfilling an individual utility function, and by positing all action not as the inefficient or 
“unproductive” logic of consumption, he places enjoyment at the center of his theory. Or rather, 
he must, since he cannot assume that enjoyment is happening non-economically. Were that true, 
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then something could escape the grasp of his axioms, and some normative, empirical, logical, or 
political rebuke could be made to oppose the shape of society he supports. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, Becker stands as the pivot point in this dissertation because he most 
thoroughly articulates the metastatic vocabulary of “the incentive” onto nearly every conceivable 
social phenomenon. His rigorous commitment to the three axioms of economic behavior 
successfully “square the circle” of human behavior, for any issue can be analyzed and 
retroactively justified as the result of incentives; through these theoretical commitments, he is 
able to make policy recommendations in line with his predictions. Becker’s argumentation 
strategy “works” discursively because of how simple it appears—all one needs is a market 
metaphor, the metonymic sliding of economic action, and the behavioral repository of 
enjoyment. Becker ends up flattening social reality into a single, univocal plane, upon which 
commodities, non-commodity desires, values, and even people can be made ontologically 
commensurate with one another. He metonymically links economic actions with a shortlist of 
preferences in order to make predictions and recommendations about the proper shape of society 
(for him, this proper shape means being under market structures). And finally, he reduces these 
metonymic values to a single catch-all term, “utility,” that becomes an alibi for any criticisms 
leveled against the other facets of his theory. “Utility” becomes a metonym for enjoyment, and 
this enjoyment is unimpeachable and a retroactive justification for any individual action. Becker 
discursively attributes enjoyment to people across all contexts: In a Nietzschean vein, his maxim 
becomes “thus I willed it.” The following chapter, on the Freakonomics phenomenon, describes 
the consequences of applying Becker’s theory to cultural life writ large, and the perverse 
pleasures of identifying with one’s economic symptom; the final case study, on the issue of equal 
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pay for women, exemplifies the consequences of when the vocabulary of incentives is applied to 
an issue of public policy.  
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Chapter 4: Freakonomics and Incentives as Perversion 
 
“Economists love incentives. They love to dream them up and enact them, study them and tinker 
with them. The typical economist believes the world has not yet invented a problem that he 
cannot fix if given a free hand to design the proper incentive scheme… An incentive is a bullet, a 
lever, a key: an often tiny object with astonishing power to change a situation.”—Stephen D. 
Levitt & Steven J. Dubner, Freakonomics244 
 
In the prior chapter, I worked through Gary Becker’s theoretical commitments to a robust 
vision of neoclassical economic analysis; this present chapter delves into the inheritors of his 
legacy, the authors behind a discursive cluster that have popularized—and metastasized—this 
vision of social reality as obeying the principles of neoclassical economics. Freakonomics: A 
Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of Everything, has grown beyond its “unlikely” roots 
as a happenstance collaboration between a New York Times Magazine writer and a Harvard and 
MIT-educated economics professor at the University of Chicago (the nation’s most prestigious 
neoclassical economics department) to veritable mini-industry of pop microeconomic analysis. 
An updated version of the original book, a sequel entitled SuperFreakonomics: Global Cooling, 
Patriotic Prostitutes and Why Suicide Bombers Should Buy Life Insurance (published in 2009, 
with its own illustrated “Super Sized” version published a year later), a third “self-help” style 
book from 2014, Think Like a Freak: The Authors of Freakonomics Offer to Retrain Your Brain, 
a blog (and a fourth published book which a compiled a number of blog posts), a movie version 
of the original book, as well as “a weekly podcast, a segment on [National Public Radio’s] 
Marketplace every two weeks, an upcoming series of five one-hour specials…that will be heard 
on public-radio stations around the country…and a few Freakonomics Radio live events,” have 
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all sprung up since the book’s initial publishing in 2005.245 At its peak popularity, Freakonomics 
was listed at No. 9 on Amazon.com’s list of “Business and Economics” books, and (curiously) 
No. 2 under its “Humor and Entertainment” category. 
Freakonomics, as a discursive system, begins with a remarkably simple formal 
proclamation from which all of its conclusions emanate. The authors, Steven D. Levitt (the 
economist) and Stephen J. Dubner (the journalist) approach their work with the premise: 
“Incentives are the cornerstone of modern life”246 and later, “You could boil it down to four 
words: People respond to incentives. If you wanted to get more expansive, you might say this: 
People respond to incentives, although not necessarily in ways that are predictable and 
manifest.”247 Later, in their 2014 self-help book, they write, “If there is one mantra a Freak lives 
by, it is this: people respond to incentives… Different types of incentives—financial, social, 
moral, legal, and others—push people’s buttons in different directions, in different magnitudes… 
But if you want to think like a Freak, you must learn to be a master of incentives—the good, the 
bad, and the ugly.”248 Every anecdote within the books is a confirmation of this apparently 
incontrovertible fact. Their position is an espousal of the tenets of neoclassical economic theory, 
which posits a rational, autonomous, utility-maximizing individual subject as the basic unit of 
analysis, stemming entirely from the work of Gary Becker, who, as we now know, devised the 
“economic approach to human behavior” at the University of Chicago in the 1960s. 
Following the 2008 financial catastrophe, “Chicago School” economics supposedly had 
its day of reckoning—and yet, the influence of Chicago’s own Gary Becker has metastasized via 
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this particular cultural avenue, and this chapter aims at interrogating this very phenomenon.249 
Specifically, The “freakish” outcomes that Freakonomics describes stems from a perverse 
relationship with the “economic approach”—by identifying with the economic approach to 
human behavior, and with market mechanisms, what we perceive to be “freakish” or 
idiosyncratic about our own behavior falls away. Overall, Freakonomics does the duty of 
disseminating neoclassical economic truisms about social life by wrapping them in perverse 
identification strategies. The neutrality of this statement smuggles in neoclassical precepts 
regarding human nature, market characteristics, and the state, which truncates our vocabulary for 
thinking through complex social formations. As a result, “incentives” in this discursive formation 
are fundamentally rhetorical, in that they retroactively symbolize the existing social order as the 
expression of a deep, hidden force—the ontological structure of a “free market” in all of social 
life. 
Undoubtedly, the titles (and audacious subtitles) of the books, their major publisher, as 
well as the pedigree of each of the authors in their respective fields, all have something to do 
with the series’ popularity, as well as its digestible format in podcast and short chapter format. 
Yet its ubiquity cannot be reducible to the conditions of its production, or its consumption. 
Freakonomics appears to have a pan-political allure, so its popularity also cannot be reduced to 
either a “conservative” or “liberal” echo chamber effect. Yet at first glance, there seems to be a 
political incongruity between the books’ content and its audiences. For the most part, the authors 
espouse libertarian political stances, while as mentioned, the authors’ work regularly appears on 
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NPR, and until 2011, was affiliated with the New York Times.250 The duo’s third entry, Think 
Like a Freak, was excerpted in the online version of the Guardian newspaper, despite the authors 
foregrounding a closed-door meeting with Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron in the 
very same book. And further, documentary filmmaker Morgan Spurlock, of Super Size Me, What 
Would Jesus Buy? and The Greatest Movie Ever Sold (all films nominally skeptical of laissez-
faire capitalism) directed the documentary version of Freakonomics. Freakonomics undoubtedly 
occupies a unique and popular ideological position within American economic and social 
discourse, and I believe the popularity of this series goes a long way in explaining why 
“incentives” have become so ubiquitous today. 
Freakonomics purports to provide a singular explanation for all human behavior—the 
incentive—and, in doing so, buries alternative vocabularies and explanations; it is a closed 
system of discourse that resists non-market descriptions of social phenomena. This is a massive 
challenge to rhetoricians of all stripes, as well as cultural studies scholars and critical theorists. 
Over a half century ago, James Carey recognized that “communications and economics 
constitute contradictory frameworks.”251 This assertion is even truer today, and for all of these 
reasons, it is vital to perform a critical, tropological dissection of the Freakonomics phenomenon, 
and the discourse of “incentive-driven behavior” contained within it. Once all context has been 
reduced to a set of fairly simple incentive structures that are guided by a set of fairly simple 
assumptions, alternative approaches risk being “crowded out,” to use an old-school neoclassical 
metaphor. 
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Overall, Freakonomics seeks, and manages to find, “markets” everywhere. Their works 
have a public character to them and aim toward public persuasion about the desires of the self 
and the desires of others. That is to say, “incentive-driven behavior” functions as a stand-in to 
imagine the desire of others, since we have no im-mediate access thereto. “Incentive,” in 
whatever form, functions as a way to mediate—to figure—desire in a regularized, calculable 
way. The anxiety associated with what the other wants is attenuated when we have a set of 
figures that render the actions of others explicable. Incentives function as both a condensation 
and a displacement of social analysis. That is, “incentive” is a powerful metaphor upon which 
the bulk of their analysis rests; its very trans-contextuality (which is instead a non-contextuality) 
signals its explanatory power for its proponents. And yet, conversely, it functions as a 
displacement, or as a metonym, for other forms of social analysis. Motive (profit and otherwise), 
intention, desire, punishment, reward—all of these wildly varying explanations for human action 
are linked in the trope of “incentives.”252 
This chapter follows three major arguments. First, Freakonomics functions as a 
representative anecdote for neoclassical economic discourse more broadly. The Freakonomists’ 
“incentive-driven approach” argues for neoclassical assumptions about human nature, the place 
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already. It is a remarkably circular argument that insulates the different registers of Freakonomics from outside 
criticism. 
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of the state, and characteristics of markets into/onto social phenomena. Second, the authors’ 
invocation of “incentives” is a quintessentially symbolic process by which the desires of groups 
and individuals are retroactively inferred from economic data—the result of which is a flattening 
of hierarchy and a reticence to engage with context. And third, there are two types of perversion 
operational in these books, the first being the standard economic notion of “perverse” incentives, 
which the authors use to describe incentive schemes with which they disagree. The other version 
of perversion, as described by Lacan, is a properly psychoanalytic deployment of the term that 
pertains to the structure and disposition of the “incentive-driven” approach as a whole. 
That is, the “freakish” outcomes Freakonomics describes comes from a perverse 
relationship with the texts—by identifying with the “economic approach to human behavior,” 
and with market mechanisms, what we perceive to be “freakish” about our own behavior falls 
away. The discursive strategies of the books have us identify not with our own idiosyncrasies, 
but with the economic mechanisms that organize social reality into a stable equilibrium. 
Freakonomics does the duty of disseminating neoclassical economic truisms about social life by 
wrapping them in perverse identificatory strategies. I begin with a review of the pertinent 
features of neoclassical economics from Becker—utility maximization, stable preferences, and 
market structures, as well as a fourth, borrowed from Samuelson and the mainstream 
neoclassical tradition—that of antipathy toward the state. Each of these piece together into a 
coherent worldview within Freaknomics. I then develop theoretical insights from Lacan and 
Kenneth Burke to explore how this discursive cluster works to make us perverts, not “freaks” by 
identifying with our symptom. 
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Neoclassical Economics and Freakonomics 
As influenced by Arnsperger and Varoufakis, rhetoricians Hanan, Ghosh and Brooks 
define neoclassical economics in the following three ways—methodological individualism, 
methodological instrumentalism, and methodological equilibration. They write: 
[T]he human subject is assumed to be atomistic, or self-contained, and therefore not 
subject to any kind of structurally imposed constraints. The assumption of atomism 
affords a certain kind of additive operation by which the neo-classical economist may 
deduce the aggregate behavior of a large group of individuals by simply “adding up” 
individual behaviors. In turn, individual behavior is assumed to be guided by a single, 
positively stated normative orientation, one of instrumental rationality, which requires 
that each individual employ the most efficient means to achieve her or his ends. 
Moreover, ends as preferences are given, not contingent or context-dependent, and are 
therefore assumed to be arbitrary… Further, a key feature of neo-classical scientific 
praxis is its emphasis on methodological equilibration, by which a state of equilibrium is 
axiomatically imposed upon the interaction of instrumentally rational individuals, and 
this allows an economy to be represented in a way that is aligned with the stabilizing and 
positivistic principles of modern science.253 
 
I endorse this definition, adding only the skepticism that neoclassical economists have with the 
state in practical matters. As mentioned, actors are all assumed to be individual, rational, selfish, 
self-conscious, utility-maximizing, and autonomous. Following this, agents are assumed to have 
stable bundles of preferences and initial outlays of resources (capital and labor).254 As Klamer 
writes, “In an economic analysis preferences are given and are usually assumed to be 
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constant.”255 The result of this is, as demonstrated, is that agents have underlying, non-empirical 
“metapreferences” that structure their actions, so even contradictory or changing behaviors are 
grouped under the same signifier (“comfort,” or “prestige,” and so on). 
Next, neoclassical approaches rely on the consistency of the mechanisms of capitalism, 
with markets finding equilibrium via supply and demand fluctuations. Roubini and Mihm, in 
Crisis Economics, note the near-universal approval this hypothesis had throughout the worldwide 
system: “Markets know best and never fail: this was the conventional wisdom in Washington, 
London, and elsewhere in the English-speaking world. Alan Greenspan, perhaps the most visible 
advocate of letting the financial system regulate itself, claimed that markets would sort things 
out, warning in 1997 that when it came to financial innovation, ‘we should be quite cautious in 
enacting legislation or creating regulations that unnecessarily fetter market development.”256 
Ackerman and Nadal note that general equilibrium approaches within neoclassical economics 
obey “the common practice, in applied economic analyses, of referring to all taxes and tariffs as 
‘distortions’ assumes that only a hypothetical pure laissez-faire economy could be 
undistorted.”257 Recall that once “incentives” have been taken through the neoclassical wringer, 
they are simply an autonomous, objective “thing,” so certain taxation schemes “distort 
incentives,” as Samuelson writes. The upshot of this is that “distortion” is seen as self-evident, 
and self-evidently negative, and contrary to the flow of capital. 
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We come now to our final feature—the neoclassical skepticism about the scope of the 
state. Brennan and Moehler write, “Neoclassical economists…insist that government 
intervention is justified only if there is a reasonable expectation that democratic politics will do 
better in relation to the policy issue than will the market. On this view, the prospects for effective 
political intervention in the economy cannot be properly assessed without an empirically 
informed and realistic account of the workings of democratic politics in agreement with the 
analysis of markets drawn from conventional economics.”258 Recall that Becker devoted several 
of his BusinessWeek columns and a chapter of his 1972 book to the thesis that markets should 
take over the majority of state functions.259 
The “public choice” school of neoclassical thought picks up on this assumption (that 
markets function more efficiently than democracies, and therefore, produce better outcomes) and 
extends it. Crouch writes that public choice theory “presents nearly all state activity as the self-
seeking and self-aggrandizement of political figures and officials. For this school, a proposal to 
develop a public service should not be seen as having anything to do with the substance of the 
service in question, but as politicians and officials expanding their scope for patronage.”260 That 
is, because humans are assumed to be selfish and rational actors (as voters, politicians, 
bureaucrats and consumers), and because markets deliver outcomes efficiently, then politics as 
such is an unnecessary distortion unless it conforms to incentive-based approaches to social 
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policy. This feature is important for two reasons. First, the “Freakonomic” approach to social 
problems explicitly disavows the rectitude of governmental action when it is convenient to do so. 
The second is that this distrust of governmental redress for social problems arises in the 
following case study chapter, on equal pay for women. When the “incentive-driven approach” 
for analyzing human behavior is invoked in public policy debates, proponents of state-based or 
legislative solutions face significant challenges. 
The Representative Anecdote: “Humans are Incentive-Driven” 
The Freakonomists deploy the economic, incentive-driven approach much as Becker does 
(indeed, he is their only theoretical citation in their first book), but conspicuously without the 
aggressive assertion of Becker’s key features. They write, “Our thinking is inspired by what is 
known as the economic approach. That doesn’t mean focusing on ‘the economy’—far from it. 
The economic approach is both broader and simpler than that. It relies on data, rather than hunch 
or ideology, to understand how the world works, to learn how incentives succeed (or fail), how 
resources get allocated, and what sorts of obstacles prevent people from getting those resources, 
whether they are concrete (like food and transportation) or more aspirational (like education and 
love).”261 This is the first demonstration of how “incentive” language smuggles in neoclassical 
concepts—while Levitt and Dubner do not need to explain that market functions allocate these 
resources, they forward the idea that a thing like “love” is a scarce resource allocated by 
individuals, that people’s resources are the result of underlying meta-preferences, and that people 
are assumed to be homogeneously gain-seeking. 
Michel Foucault diagnoses how the “Freaknonomics” approach works in his path-
breaking lectures on The Birth of Biopolitics: 
                                                
261 Levitt and Dubner, Think Like a Freak, 9. 
 153 
[Neoliberals] use the market economy and the typical analyses of the market economy to 
decipher non-market relationships and phenomena which are not strictly and specifically 
economic but what we call social phenomena… This means that analysis in terms of the 
market economy—or, in other words, of supply and demand, can function as a schema 
which is· applicable to non-economic domains. And, thanks to this analytical schema or 
grid of intelligibility, it will be possible to reveal in non-economic processes, relations, 
and behavior a number of intelligible relations which otherwise would not have appeared 
as such-a sort of economic analysis of the non-economic.262 
 
The “Freakonomic approach” is the apotheosis of this impulse that Foucault identified in 1979, 
since quite literally every social, economic, political, or cultural issue can be re-described and 
rearticulated as an “economic” problem, or more specifically, an “incentive” problem. As the 
duo writes, “We all learn to respond to incentives, negative and positive, from the outset of life. 
If you toddle over to the hot stove and touch it, you burn a finger. But if you bring home straight 
A’s from school, you get a new bike.”263 This ontological market structure is the “hidden force” 
that Levitt and Dubner promise us organizes reality. Any reference to these contexts as 
noneconomic, or conditioned by other organizing logics is deliberately suppressed in favor of 
market approaches. 
As heralds of neoclassical economics, the authors reduce the level of analysis to the 
singular individual (the “representative agent”), and claim at many times throughout their work 
that both governments (to solve economic ills) and macroeconomists (to study economies as a 
whole) are fundamentally misguided. “We hope that after reading this book, you’ll realize there 
is a whole different breed of economist out there—microeconomists—lurking in the shadows. 
They seek to understand the choices that individuals make, not just in terms of what they buy but 
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also how often they wash their hands and whether they become terrorists.”264 The neoclassical 
scope is a selection and a reduction to a manageable—and mathematizable—discrete subject. To 
further this end, I introduce Burke’s concept of the representative anecdote: The entire 
argumentative structure of Freakonomics rests on the single proposition that humans are 
“incentive-driven” animals; anecdotes follow and edify the original proposition. Later, I describe 
how the method of economic analysis lends itself to a retroactive distillation of the “incentive” as 
the difference that makes a difference, the hidden force that structures reality at the cost of 
ignoring context. 
I begin with the form of the books themselves. Burke defines form as “the creation of an 
appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite.”265 He writes, “A 
work has form in so far as one part of it leads to a reader to anticipate another part, to be gratified 
by the sequence.”266 Freakonomics embodies Burke’s “repetitive form,” for aside from a brief 
introduction that posits humans are fundamentally incentive-driven, the books simply rehearse 
anecdotes that confirm this hypothesis. No anecdote (perhaps aside from viewing the length of 
each chapter as a hierarchy of importance) appears to have priority over the other.267 Burke 
writes, “Repetitive form is the consistent maintaining of a principle under new guises… By 
varying a number of details, the reader is led more or less consciously to the principle underlying 
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them—he then requires that this principle be observed in the giving of further details.”268 Their 
consistent repetition of anecdotes (bracketed only in the first book by paragraphs from the New 
York Times Magazine article that led to the authors’ partnership, snippets which neither introduce 
the following chapter nor sum up the previous) leads to what Burke calls the “atrophy of form.” 
As he puts it, “In so far as the details in a work are offered, not for their bearing upon the 
business of molding and meeting the reader’s expectations, but because these details are 
interesting in themselves, the appeal of form retreats behind the appeal of information. Atrophy 
of form follows hypertrophy of information.”269 Sheer repetition is part of the appeal of the 
books—adopting the “Freakonomic” attitude means seeing each worldly phenomenon as part of 
a neoclassical montage. 
To wit: In just their first book, the Freakonomists write chapters on late pickup penalties 
at an Israeli daycare center, Chicago schoolteachers cheating on their students’ standardized 
exams, sumo wrestlers throwing matches, the moral economy of cheating a bagel seller, the 
takedown of the Ku Klux Klan by a single individual,270 age discrimination on The Weakest 
Link, the lies of real estate agents, the characteristics of online dating profiles, the structure of 
Chicago gangs, the force of crack in America (as related to nylon stockings), the “infamous Kitty 
Genovese murder,” the legalization of abortion and its impact on crime, whether owning a pool 
or a handgun is more dangerous for children, the “eight things that make a child do better in 
school and eight that don’t,”271 the average education level of “white”- and “Black”-named 
schoolchildren, and many more. Yet with all of this said, the authors claim that “We have 
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therefore done our best to tell stories in this book that rely on accumulated data rather than on 
individual anecdotes, glaring anomalies, personal opinions, emotional outbursts, or moral 
leanings.”272 That is to say, if you discount the entire structure of the book, the authors never 
argue by anecdote. In sum, the very structures of the books are a confirmation of the metastatic 
nature of the “incentive-driven” approach: Any question or phenomenon can answered and 
analyzed as an incentive problem. 
Freakonomics is both a selection and deflection of reality, aimed at a persuasive purpose. 
Burke explains that in this quest for an accurate chart of the world, “Men seek for vocabularies 
that will be faithful reflections of reality. To this end, they must develop vocabularies that are 
selections of reality. And any selection of reality must, in certain circumstance, function as a 
deflection of reality. Insofar as the vocabulary meets the needs of reflection, we can say that it 
has the necessary scope. In its selectivity, it is a reduction.”273 This process involves “the search 
for a ‘representative anecdote,’ to be used as a form in conformity with which the vocabulary is 
constructed… The informative anecdote, we could say, contains in nuce the terminological 
structure that is evolved in conformity with it. Such a terminology is a ‘conclusion’ that follows 
from the selection of a given anecdote. Thus the anecdote is in a sense a summation, containing 
implicitly what the system that is developed from it contains explicitly.”274 
These two concepts, “repetitive form” and the “representative anecdote,” work together 
within Freakonomics. The books’ form is nothing but repetition of anecdotes following a short 
supposition of “incentive” as motive—and for that reason, any chapter or story can be selected as 
the “representative anecdote” of Freakonomics, and by extension, the discursive formation 
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known as neoclassical economics. The phrase “humans are incentive-driven” is the motive force 
behind each anecdotal story, and the reduction of scope to any one individual example is 
perfectly consonant with neoclassical economic theory as a whole. The methodological 
individualism inherent within neoclassicism is embodied in the repetitive form of the books. This 
is an extension of Burke’s initial insight, to be sure. The representative anecdote, however, 
connotes the sense of motive embodied within any anecdote; it is for this reason I believe it 
provides some explanatory value. As Lentrecchia puts it, “From the vast and confusing historical 
panorama of human motives, one is selected as the essence (self-sufficient ground or core) of 
motivation, while all others are done away with as forces in their own right, by being relegated to 
the status of variants or departures from the essence that is single, unitary, infinitely repeatable, 
and therefore fundamentally real—in a genealogical formulation of great moment, Burke calls it 
the ancestral cause of all other motives.”275 In other words, “incentive” becomes the name of all 
human motives. 
Because macroeconomics has been superseded in academic economics departments since 
the rise of the Chicago School and the “marginalist revolution,” microeconomics fills this gap by 
positing itself as the best way to analyze any phenomenon. Neoclassical economics posits that 
only individual economic actors are knowable. As Wickens writes, “Modern macroeconomics 
seeks to explain the aggregate economy using theories based on strong microeconomic 
foundations… In modern macroeconomics the economy is portrayed as a dynamic general 
equilibrium (DGE) system that reﬂects the collective decisions of rational individuals over a 
range of variables that relate to both the present and the future. These individual decisions are 
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then coordinated through markets to produce the macroeconomy.”276 And thanks to the once-
popular principle of rational expectations, the market will reach equilibrium in advance of and 
beyond any policy enacted by a government.277 Michel Aglietta writes that the “new 
macroeconomics” hypothesis of the “representative agent” renders us indifferent to actual 
individuality—“individuals are so completely socialized that they are the same!”278 I return to 
this notion of equilibrium below, since the Freakonomic approach promises that social reality is 
continuously reaching equilibrium, but not at the visible or sensible level we expect. 
Within Freakonomics, the authors explicitly argue against the complexity of macro-level 
explanation, and rather that it is futile to expand the scope and circumference of our 
imaginations. In relation to the 2008 financial crisis, they offer, “After recent events, one might 
wonder if the macroeconomy is the domain of any economist.”279 Aune terms this the “futility 
thesis,” in that any intentional action taken to rectify an economic or social ill is simply pressed 
against the dazzling complexity of the social whole. This narrowing of scope, its circumscription 
to the individual, lurks the assumption that the world as a whole is viewable through a grain of 
sand. The authors continue: “Believe it or not, if you can understand the incentives that lead a 
schoolteacher or a sumo wrestler to cheat, you can understand how the subprime-mortgage 
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bubble came to pass.”280 From this perspective, the macroeconomy is simply aggregated 
individuals making rational choices according to exogenous preference structures. Analyzing the 
financial crisis becomes simply the assessment of “rent-seeking” individual behavior of 
investors, rather than a rigorous interrogation of the priorities of the system as a whole. This is 
especially prescient, and rhetorically savvy, considering that the financial crisis was in some 
ways the result of “perverse” incentives by both government entities like Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac as well as private entities like AIG and Countrywide. At the same time as 
“incentive” is a terminological reduction of complexity to the individual, it also contains within 
it the assumption that methodological individualism contains insight about economies and 
societies as a whole. 
In the third book by the Freakonomics authors, Think Like a Freak, the authors take this 
methodological individualism and turn it onto individual behavior. Therein, the authors largely 
give practical advice to readers to manipulate social and economic situations in their readers’ 
favor. They write, “The key is to climb inside other people’s minds to figure out what really 
matters to them.”281 In this case, “incentive” is not just produced retroactively, but is produced 
proactively, the result of which is a flattening of social and economic hierarchies into a single 
plane, an imaginary space in which advantages can be leveraged by choosing the right 
incentives. Levitt and Dubner offer a 6-point plan for how to manipulate others into a chosen 
outcome: “So while designing the right incentive scheme certainly isn’t easy, here’s a simple set 
of rules that usually point us in the right direction: 
1. Figure out what people really care about, not what they say they care about. 
2. Incentivize them on the dimensions that are valuable to them but cheap for you to 
provide. 
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3. Pay attention to how people respond; if their response surprises or frustrates you, learn 
from it and try something different. 
4. Whenever possible, create incentives that switch the frame from adversarial to 
cooperative. 
5. Never, ever think that people will do something just because it is the ‘right’ thing to do. 
6. Know that some people will do everything they can to game the system, finding ways to 
win that you never could have imagined. If only to keep yourself sane, try to applaud 
their ingenuity rather than curse their greed.”282 
 
This advice may be useful in the same way that leadership advice is doled out in self-help books. 
But just as the authors have committed themselves to methodological individualism, this advice 
is a parable for all activities under life in capitalism: This advice slips neoclassical assumptions 
into our everyday understandings, and jettisons our ability to think about hierarchy. Now that 
incentives have become globalized, any situation can be leveraged through “incentivization.” 283 
That is, in the textbook neoclassical account of market behavior, actors meet in 
marketplaces simply as utility-maximizing buyers and sellers, not as “workers” or “capital 
owners” as heterodox accounts would propose. Think Like a Freak accomplishes this task by 
placing social phenomena under this same rubric—we are all equally incentive-driven, and also 
equally capable of manipulating incentives for our own chosen purposes. This elision of 
hierarchy is an elision of complexity. “Incentive” functions here as an ideological buffer zone 
against questions regarding inequality; all motivational problems can be reduced to differences in 
incentivization or volition. Returning to the penalty kick example presented in Chapter 1, the 
Freakonomists perform a metaphorical code-switch from the “hard” economic data that presents 
an obvious best-case scenario to a narration of the action as reducible to the individual volition of 
the shooter. The data suggest that kicking the ball down the middle is the optimal strategy, yet 
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the argumentative surplus of the authors suggests that failure to follow the “rational” economic 
data indicates there is something “freaky” going on under the surface. “What is your true 
incentive? …[I]s winning the game your truest incentive?” they ask.284 Fear of shame, 
selfishness, desire for glory and approbation, these are all proffered as potential explanations for 
why players kick where they do—the effect of this is that a tremendously complex situation is 
reduced to a set of hypostatized data points.285 Overall, in this simple, and simplistic example, 
the authors invite the reader to adopt what I call below the “père-version” of events—the god’s 
eye view of social reality, to find an exploitable opening. What is missed are the sets of 
contextual and logical becomings that must be occurring for this profitable opportunity to present 
itself. This minimal difference, this gap, where “freakish” outcomes are produced, is the 
objective, external, and proper incentive. We shall return to the incentive as the mark of 
perversion at the conclusion of the chapter. 
Incentives and the Retroaction of the Signifier 
 The logic of the incentive is fundamentally a rhetorical process by which these 
economists retroactively infer the desires of their subjects. This process of retroaction also 
reduces every potential incentive onto a single plane. Even though not every interaction is 
monetary, (for instance, the social relationship that constitutes the sumo tilt, or the decision to 
have a child, or marry a partner), the authors of Freakonomics use neoclassical economic 
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analysis to discover the hidden causes that influence individual actors; these causes are then 
retroactively placed onto a single plane called “incentive.” Money is but one “incentive” among 
others; incentives can be “economic, social and moral,” they write.286 Yet in one example, the 
authors give an example of pickup penalties at an Israeli daycare center that commensurates 
money with guilt, and places them on a single plane: Instead of morally cajoling parents to pick 
up their children on time, this daycare center began to charge parents late payments their 
children. Yet instead of fixing the problem, the daycare center saw an increase in late pickups. 
The lesson, according to Freakonomics, is that parents traded their abstract, non-quantifiable 
guilt for a monetary payment they could reasonably afford—their “incentive” was revealed 
through this structure.287 
This version of economic analysis obeys the same logic as the psychological theory of 
behaviorism, for it illuminates “the terministic relationship between the circumscription and the 
circumscribed”288 in terms of methodological individualism. Burke writes: 
We cherish the behaviorist experiment precisely because it illustrates the relations 
between the circumference and the circumscribed in mechanistic terms; and because the 
sharpest instance of the way in which the altering of the scenic scope affects the 
interpretation of the act is to be found in the shift from teleological to mechanistic 
philosophies…The narrowing of the circumference thus encouraged a shift from the 
stress upon a ‘final cause’ to the stress upon ‘efficient cause,’ the kind of cause that 
would reside not in a ‘prime mover,’ but in a ‘last mover’…We are here in the orbit of 
the vis a tergo kind of cause, prominent in all theories of motivation that stress ‘instincts,’ 
‘drives,’ or other sheerly compulsive properties.289 
 
“Incentive” functions rhetorically because nearly anything can be called an incentive, and the 
economic analyst always names the incentive retroactively. 
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The Freakonomists simply assume that the incentive is reducible to the individual psyche 
of the person—whether the “incentive” is rational, individual, selfish or altruistic. But if the 
principle of “incentive” is universal, only produced retroactively, as a result of an economic 
analysis, then we must avow the essential rhetoricity of “incentive” over and above the 
Freakonomists’ assumption that they substantially exist in reality. In other words, economists 
create incentives—they do not discover them. This contention gives us a more complex account 
of how incentives-as-motives are articulated, particularly because the authors tend to impute 
motives upon their subjects, as demonstrated above. In order to do so, the authors follow 
standard economics in drawing a distinction between “revealed” and “declared” preferences.290 
As they write, “Figure out what people really care about, not what they say they care about.”291 
This distinction posits that the actor’s signifiers, their declared preference, is inadequate to its 
referent and that economic analysis better captures the “meaning” of the revealed preference. 
 Ultimately, “incentive-as-motive” functions to ground all activity and is assumed to be 
immanent to the situation. If someone has a low wage, or if someone is discriminated against, it 
is because they are incentivized something other than a high wage or respectful treatment—the 
following chapter takes this up in much greater detail. The interesting question that comes next is 
whether this explains anything at all—whether a ground for motive that contains literally 
everything does anything than re-describe, in economic terms, human behavior writ large. The 
beauty of this formulation is that practically anything can be called an incentive provided that the 
“incentive” is retroactively and symbolically constituted. We find out what motivates people by 
retroactively distill their incentive through economic analysis and then posit the efficient cause, 
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as Burke, following Aristotle, writes. How do we know our symbolic analysis is adequate to the 
revealed incentive? This is the million-dollar question, to borrow another economic metaphor. 
 Lacan points out that in any given speaking situation, the synchronic component of 
discourse is what determines the “sense” of any individual utterance.292 The period, or point, is 
what retroactively confers meaning, and in Freakonomics, that sense is conferred after the fact to 
make a stable explanation for behavior. Recall the penalty kick example from Think Like a 
Freak: The “true incentive” is not immanent to the situation at hand, but it is retroactively 
constituted through economic analysis—the player who kicks high and to the right is acting 
“selfishly,” in this framework. The retroaction also occurs in Freakonomics: The authors devote 
the entire final chapter of this book to the question of nominative determinism, or what happens 
when parents name their progeny stereotypically “white” or “Black” names. The upshot is, 
unsurprisingly, that names do not determine one’s success (so naming your child “Shithead” 
does not condemn them to a life of destitution).293 However, the more critical point is that 
nothing other than class determines whether a name is “white” or “Black,” and so we only 
associate Alexandra, Lauren and Katherine as “high status” names after viewing the income of 
their parents after the fact.294  
 Another way of putting this challenge is that “All humans respond to incentives” is 
equivalent to contending that “humans are inherently violent” or “economic outcomes are caused 
by humans being carbon-based life-forms.” If “incentive” is the ground of every act, then it 
explains very little, because it explains everything. Basu explains, “Some may argue that what I 
am describing as cases of foregoing some individual advantage is not really that because those 
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individuals have different preferences, and so it is in their utility-maximizing interest to forego 
those things. But this is purely a semantic point, with which I have no disagreement except to 
note that this kind of a definition of utility is tautological and devoid of content.”295 The 
difficulty here is that while “incentives” may purport to be an empty container, a form rather 
than a content, it does contain a content—that of neoclassical economics’ assumptions about 
market and individual behavior. Although it may be tautological, this tautology “works,” in part 
because of the form of the books, and in part because the re-articulation of social phenomena as 
economic provides a stable figuration of a chaotic, complex and contradictory reality. 
On Perversion(s) 
 There are two competing concepts of perversion operative within the Freakonomics 
universe. The first is the concept of the “perverse incentive,” which the authors describe as a 
poorly designed incentive structure, one that produces the opposite effect intended, or one that 
produces a suboptimal outcome from the perspective of the writers. The second is the 
psychoanalytic concept of perversion, in which the agent of enjoyment is reversed, from the 
subject to the Other. The first contains a moral code that once again forecloses alternative 
possibilities for addressing social problems; the second I believe accounts for the astonishing 
success of the series’ popularity in this current conjuncture. 
First, Freakonomics stacks the deck against state intervention in social phenomena for the 
same standard theoretical reasons as neoclassical economics writ large. The authors write, 
“Governments, for instance, often enact legislation meant to protect their most vulnerable 
charges but that instead ends up hurting them.”296 The authors remind readers of the apparently 
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immutable “law of unintended consequences” for progressive social politics.297 And elsewhere 
they write, “Governments aren’t exactly famous for cheap or simple solutions; they tend to 
prefer the costly-and-cumbersome route. Note that none of the earlier examples in this chapter 
were the brainchild of a government official. Even the polio vaccine was primarily developed by 
a private group, the National Foundation for Infant Paralysis. President Roosevelt personally 
provided the seed money—it’s interesting that even a sitting president chose the private sector 
for such a task.”298 This distrust of government stems from the idea that social phenomena have 
already approached stable equilibria on their own, and thus any intervention will produce 
perverse or suboptimal behavioral incentives.299 
There is a crucial rhetorical elision at work in the Freakonomists’ dismissal of state 
action. First, because the Freakonomics project relies on equilibrium models of markets and 
market actors, humans are inherently reactive to market (price) signals, not ontologically or 
sovereignly free. In other words, “incentives” are never self-generated, but rather are generated 
from others, and agents act in accordance with them. They write, “most incentives don’t come 
about organically. Someone—an economist or a politician or a parent—has to invent them.”300 
While on the surface, this is uncontroversial: Governments provide incentives to marry, 
procreate, make home repairs, invest in small businesses, own stock, among many other things. 
And in converse, the monopoly of punishment that the state controls incentivizes people to 
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refrain from breaking the law. For the Freakonomists, it is not that governments do not produce 
incentives, but rather, it is that they produce the wrong ones. 
This suspicion about the state takes on a strictly moral or political, not theoretical 
valence. That is, arguing that states only go for “costly and cumbersome” routes to solve social 
problems enables the authors to ignore how state actions, at multiple levels, function as a rich 
context in relation to other social phenomena. Recall how “public choice” theory posits that all 
actors (organizations, individuals, states, etc.) all behave “selfishly,” so the very idea of a 
government as a site of struggle is impossible to consider. Instead, laws and regulations are 
simply data points or constraints that condition economic action, usually for the worse. 
Resentment about the scope and nature of the state is an incredibly powerful communicative 
resource especially today, and it buttresses other identification strategies for readers throughout 
the book series. The state functions as a scapegoat for when perverse incentives in market or 
social phenomena occur. For example, the authors argue, “The Endangered Species Act created a 
similarly perverse incentive. When landowners fear their property is an attractive habitat for an 
endangered animal…they rush to cut down trees to make it less attractive. Some environmental 
economists have argued that ‘the Endangered Species Act is actually endangering, rather than 
protecting, species.’”301 By assuming markets will reach equilibrium in a way that counteracts 
the intended policy to such a degree that things are worse after action is taken is, definitionally, 
Aune’s “perversity thesis.” Aune points out that rhetorics of free markets frequently invoke “the 
perversity thesis,” the idea that, following Hirschman, “the attempt to push society in a certain 
direction will result in its moving all right, but in the opposite direction.”302 Aune’s properly 
dialectical notion, the notion of unintended consequences, disables any alternative modes of 
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thinking since the “economic” approach demonstrates amply how futile any exercise in 
amelioration can be. 
And because people are assumed to be rational in the face of competing contexts, this 
opens the door for easily dispensed antipathy for social welfare programs.303 This thesis finds 
corroboration in the 2014 book, Think Like a Freak. The duo reminds readers: “To think like a 
Freak means to think small, not big. …There isn’t a single big problem we’ve come close to 
solving; we just nibble around the margins.”304 Yet the first chapter of this book involves the duo 
being summoned to 10 Downing Street to meet the Conservative Prime Minister of Great 
Britain, David Cameron. During this meeting, the authors attempt to convince Cameron to cut 
and privatize the National Health Service, something even he expressed reticence about in that 
very meeting. “When people don’t pay the true cost of something, they tend to consume it 
inefficiently,” they write.305 That is, one can only think “big” if you wish the market to do more, 
but to think “big” and advocate for interventionist, redistributive, or regulatory policy, it is not 
just impossible, but forbidden. 
Finally we must contend with what exactly makes Freakonomics so “freaky.” To answer 
this question, I turn instead to the psychoanalytic concept of perversion. Economic outcomes, 
according to the Freakonomists, are “freaky” insofar as they are unexpected, irrational and 
astonishing according to “common sense,” but crucially, not according to the mechanisms of the 
market economy. It is here that we must distinguish between a precise definition of perversion 
and what they call “freaky.” Certainly, it is “common sense” to say that Chicago public school 
teachers cheating on their students’ exams, women engaging in prostitution only on holidays, or 
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doctors recommending chemotherapy despite its inefficiencies are all “perverted” behaviors, 
since they violate our typical understandings of morality, profit and the ideologies of the various 
social fields therein. Yet this is precisely the lure of Freakonomics: There is a mathematizable 
substrate of economic and noneconomic activities that cuts across “received wisdom” and 
individual intention. No matter how far afield one believes one is from mathematizable motives 
(evading the gaze of the big Other, so to speak), the rules of the neoclassical game envelop them. 
But the Freakonomic pervert is not that who enjoys outside of this gaze, rather the pervert is the 
one who assumes the burden of the Other’s desire. In other words, what is “freaky” about 
Freakonomics is not that actors do not obey neoclassical economic principles, but that they do. 
The concept of perversion helps explain this communicative process, and that the pleasure 
involved in the reading of these books is to take on the role of the pervert—to enjoy as if the 
market enjoys through us. Lacanian psychoanalysis is not the first to mark the relationship 
between economics and perversion. Deirdre McCloskey delights in pointing out what she calls 
the “ironies in social engineering” that follows any attempt to improve the world legislatively.306 
What is unique to the psychoanalytic tradition is not the pathologizing of perversion, as some 
sort of moral judgment the way that economists judge incentive structures with which they 
politically disagree.307 Rather, perversion involves a particular relationship to signifying 
regimes—a passage (or reversal) of the position of enjoyment. 
On a cursory read, we assume that certain events are “freaky” (sumo wrestlers throwing 
bouts, parents refusing to pick their kids up on time from daycare or naming their child “Loser”) 
because they do not obey typical assumptions about rational behavior. Yet the authors’ point is 
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the reverse: Human behavior is always calculating, rational and “incentive-driven,” so what we 
perceive to be “freaky” is underwritten by a meta-rationality of the market. As mentioned above, 
this approach retroactively and symbolically reduces complexity of behaviors to a single alibi, 
and smuggles in concepts from neoclassical economics to justify behavior: Recall Becker’s 
insistence on “[t]he combined assumptions of maximizing behavior, market equilibrium, and 
stable preferences” that organize all social behavior. This symbolic stitching-up of human 
behavior involves perverse reading strategies: If we begin to identify with the 
economic/Freakonomic approach, then we begin to identify with the functioning of our actions 
as the unconscious expression of market mechanisms. As Becker wrote, “When an apparently 
profitable opportunity to a firm, worker, or household, is not exploited, the economic approach 
does not take refuge in assertions about irrationality, contentment with wealth already acquired, 
or convenient ad hoc shifts in values (i.e., preferences). Rather it postulates the existence of 
costs, monetary or psychic, of taking advantage of these opportunities that eliminate their 
profitability—costs that may not be easily ‘seen’ by outside observers.”308 
Lacan’s concept of the “fundamental fantasy,” $◊a, describes typical human behavior: 
The subject barred by language ($) is set in motion by, and acts on (◊), the objet a—the object 
that is the cause of desire. He writes, “The fantasy is thus both that which enables the subject to 
sustain his desire…and ‘that by which the subject sustains himself at the level of his vanishing 
desire.’”309 The structural formula for perversion is instead the inverse of the fundamental 
fantasy: the objet a (the object-cause of desire) is in the position of the agent and it relates to the 
barred subject instead of the other way round: a◊$. As Slavoj Žižek points out, “The sadist 
pervert inverts this structure, which gives a◊$: by means of occupying himself the place of the 
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object—of making himself the agent-executor of the Other’s Will—he avoids the division 
constitutive of the subject and transposes his division upon his other.”310 Fink describes the 
phenomenon thusly: “perversion involves the attempt to prop up the law so that limits can be set 
to jouissance (to what Lacan calls ‘the will to jouissance’). Whereas we see an utter and 
complete absence of the law in psychosis, and a definitive instatement of the law in neurosis 
(overcome only in fantasy), in perversion the subject struggles to bring the law into being—in a 
word, to make the Other exist.”311 The law of the Other is a critical part of perversion: The 
pervert acts in such a way to be the instrument of the Other’s enjoyment. 
This is accomplished textually by enjoining readers and listeners to consider themselves 
as these instruments of enjoyment. Note how different this formulation is from Foucault’s 
judgment of economic thought, wherein there is no God (or god-function), only self-conscious 
market actors. He writes, “Economics is an atheistic discipline; economics is a discipline without 
God; economics is a discipline without totality; economics is a discipline that begins to 
demonstrate not only the pointlessness, but also the impossibility of a sovereign point over the 
totality of the state that he has to govern.”312 In Foucault’s formulation, it is structurally 
impossible to represent all economic activity in something other than a price system—in other 
words, there is no big Other of the market. Macroeconomic policy is misguided because it lacks 
the ability to represent the capitalist market economy as a whole.313 
However, Freakonomics raises the level of accounting to that of all social reality—even 
the price system is inadequate to symbolizing reality because markets of all kinds organize life at 
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equilibrium. Freaknomics addresses what Lacan calls a big Other—the figure of the market that 
functions as a neutral register of all symbolic activity, a discourse without remainder or room for 
an outside.314  In other words, Foucault misses the mark when he says there is no god-function in 
neoliberal thought, because the god-function is “the market.” As Lacan says, “The reason why 
there is human desire, that the field can exist, depends on the assumption that everything real that 
happens may be accounted for somewhere. Kant managed to reduce the essence of the moral 
field to something pure; nevertheless, there remains at its center the need for a space where 
accounts are kept. On the far edge of guilt, insofar as it occupies the field of desire, there are the 
bonds of a permanent bookkeeping, and this is so independently of any particular articulation 
that may be given of it.”315 For Freakonomics, we are asked to identify not with ourselves as 
idiosyncratic, individual subjects, but rather, perversely to ourselves as always calculating, 
rational ones. We are always-already incentive-driven—there is nothing prior and nothing 
outside—so we must come to occupy the place where our motives have been. This is the position 
of the pervert, in which we become the objects of (simultaneously) our “economic” selves and of 
market mechanisms. In SuperFreakonomics, the authors write that while it may be romantic to 
think of oneself as special, unique and “different” from one another—it is more useful to use a 
“coldly mathematical approach” to understanding that we are, in many ways, “typical” and 
“average.”316 For Lacan, “the perverse subject, whilst remaining oblivious to the way this 
functions, offers himself loyally to the Other’s jouissance.”317 The “enjoyment of the market” is 
another name for the enjoyment of the self—the line between these two things is blurred because 
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in Freakonomics, anyone’s individual enjoyment simply expresses a deep market mechanism. It 
is for this reason, Lacan puns on the term “perversion” by calling it the “père-version” of events. 
Žižek, following Lacan, claims that today’s superegoic injunction is not to save, practice 
responsibility, and think about the future—rather, it is to “Enjoy!” But because of the dictum 
from outside, this paradoxically produces a lack of enjoyment, or an inability to fully enjoy 
without the neurotic question, “Am I enjoying enough, or in the proper way?” Freakonomics 
dismisses this concern outright by offering “You have always been enjoying, even in ways not 
conscious to yourself.” Mladen Dolar remarks that the status of enjoyment is central to the 
division between perversion and neurosis.318 For the neurotic, there is no enjoyment, only infinite 
deferral, ritual and circumscription. For the pervert, there is nothing but enjoyment, because 
every choice they make is calibrated to the underlying fundamentals of stable preferences, utility 
maximization, and market structures. That is, Freakonomics marks the passage from the neurotic 
to the pervert in culture. 
The “economic approach to human behavior” posits that all human activity is already, 
constantly, organizing itself like a market at equilibrium: Any attempt to upset this fragile 
balance is “perverted”—hence the glib dismissals of equal pay legislation and other state action 
to attenuate pressing social problems, like polio, pollution or helping the disabled. Establishing 
this limit is absolutely vital for Freakonomics—there is a definite prohibition on thinking 
exterior to this law of unintended consequences, of the discipline of the market: 
If we know something now about the pervert, it is that what appears from the outside to 
be an unbounded satisfaction is actually a defence and an implementation of a law 
inasmuch as it curbs, suspends, and halts the subject on the path to jouissance. For the 
perverts, the will to jouissance is, as for anyone else, a will that fails, that encounters its 
own limit, its own reining-in, in the very exercise of desire as has been very well 
underlined by one of the people who took the floor earlier at my behest, the pervert 
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doesn’t know what jouissance he is serving in exercising his activity. It is not, in any 
case, in the service of his own jouissance.”319 
 
Lacan precisely diagnoses why perversion is a defense mechanism—identifying with the Other 
of the market, making one’s actions the instrument of the Other’s enjoyment—these are merely 
other ways of saying that the discourse of the incentive prohibits non-market solutions by 
positing the ubiquity of “the market” in every and all contexts. 
The vocabulary of “incentives” works, in part, to attenuate anxieties about the desires of 
the Other—but to be clear, this other is split between concrete others and the Other of “the 
market.” Yet they are sutured together because if we assume that people everywhere and always 
are “incentive-driven,” we need not make any other assumptions about them, they act 
volitionally within market contexts just as we do. Deferral to the register of “incentives” is a way 
to domesticate the desire of others analytically. And simultaneously, the big Other, this fiction 
we call “the market” is simply the theoretical repetition of that selfsame proposition: “the 
market” is nothing but others acting in and on an ontological market structure. Foucault correctly 
identifies the problem-space that neoliberalism articulates, but just misses the insight that the 
“God-function” is the trope of the market itself. And following Fink, Freakonomics elicits 
pleasure in readers by instantiating this big Other as the registrar of all human activity. In this 
account, the market is the only mechanism to articulate demands and desires, but it is a 
universality based on an exception: In a market economy the only thing one cannot profess a 
preference for is a non-market economy. That is why in the final analysis, the Other, or the 
market, is not neutral or natural, but a Law based on that singular prohibition from which all 
other decisions stem.  
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Conclusion 
In sum, Freakonomics makes an argument through repetitive form, a representative 
anecdote and a retroactive reduction of all human activity to “incentive.” Through this, the 
authors make a case that individuals are the sole horizon for economic analysis, thus buttressing 
the original suppositions of neoclassical economic theory: individuals are autonomous, rational 
(even in noneconomic terms), utility-maximizing and discrete. Freakonomics itself becomes the 
“representative anecdote” for neoclassical economics, and becomes a total ground for activity 
under capitalism. Throughout the book series, but especially the final one, the authors argue that 
the manipulation of incentives is the primary mode for “freaks” to act. This presupposes, and 
indeed performs, the idea that rational agents meet in predetermined market spaces, and are 
equally capable of leveraging one another’s incentive structures. Finally, Freakonomics is an 
admonition for “better” economic behavior as it simultaneously is presumed to be an accurate 
depiction of how the economy functions. Because of this, the authors elicit a “perverted” 
approach to identification. The authors ask us to identify with the meta(-economic)-rationality 
behind “freaky” economic outcomes (of once-a-year hookers, of Indian television watchers, and 
of selfish penalty shot-takers). We are better off identifying with market mechanisms 
themselves—and especially neoclassical assumptions about our own rationality—in order to 
better act and think in the world. Freakonomics does not make us freaks; it makes us perverts, in 
order to preempt any grievances about fairness in market economies. 
Freakonomics, then, is a “whole” discourse. It avows no outside, through the grounding 
of all activity in “incentive,” and can potentially mathematize and incorporate all behaviors, be 
they economic or noneconomic. Much like the rules of the game of capitalism are structurally 
unequal, so are the rules of Freaknomics: All behavior is incentive-driven; all things can be 
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retroactively reduced to incentives; any attempt to change the status quo is perverted. Yet 
precisely for this reason, we must find terministic ways of evading it, despite the pleasure it 
elicits from its audience and its coherent explanations for all human activity. By substituting the 
“incentive-driven” animal with the “symbol-using” one, and expanding our “economic” 
descriptions of the world to a more robust and contextual ones, we can give an account of social 
change aside from supply and demand. 
To conclude, the vocabulary of “incentives” positivizes a deadlock in social, political and 
economic thinking. In the absence of cultural agreement about the benefits of market behaviors, 
and a unified theory of cultural/individual valuation, Freakonomics “hides the ball” in an attempt 
to provide a singular explanation for all of human behavior, in both the individual and the 
aggregate. My final case study chapter deals with the consequences of when incentive logics are 
brought to bear on an issue of pressing social importance, that of equal pay for women. The 
habituated invocation of “incentives” has consequences for public decision-making precisely 
because this vocabulary can retroactively infer the rectitude of discrimination and inequality.  
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Chapter 5: Approaching Gen(d)eral Equilibrium—Equal Pay Legislation and the Logic of 
Incentives 
 
“Rather than interpreting women’s lower wages as a failure, perhaps it should be seen as a sign 
that a higher wage simply isn’t as meaningful an incentive for women as it is for men. Could it 
be that men have a weakness for money just as women have a weakness for children?”—Levitt & 
Dubner, SuperFreakonomics320 
 
This chapter explores arguments surrounding two pieces of equal pay legislation for 
women, the Lilly Ledbetter Act of 2009, signed into law by President Barack Obama, and the 
failed Paycheck Fairness Act of 2014. This chapter investigates the institutional, political effects 
of when incentive logics are globalized into new realms—and ones of public import. 
Contemporary opposition to equal pay legislation is largely organized around the trope of 
“women’s incentives,” while support for equal pay legislation is organized more loosely around 
notions of fairness, justice and liberal-democratic civil rights. This bifurcation should appear 
uncontroversial: Much of the testimony in favor of the Lilly Ledbetter Act centered specifically 
on Ledbetter herself enduring harassment and poor treatment at work, but generally about the 
challenges women face in the workforce. Meanwhile, those opposed to the equal pay bills defer 
to the “economic” logic of labor market forces, self-interested trial lawyers, and most 
importantly, the different incentive structures that lead to gendered work and gender pay gaps. 
Supporters of the Paycheck Fairness Act in particular faced significant, nigh-insurmountable 
difficulties in overcoming the logic of the “incentive” as deployed by the bill’s opponents. 
I perform an in-depth appraisal of the testimonial arguments surrounding the Lilly 
Ledbetter Act of 2009 (hereafter written as LLA) and the failed Paycheck Fairness Act of 2014 
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(hereafter written as PFA). I chose these bills for practical reasons, namely that they were the 
two major pieces of equal pay legislation in the current presidential administration, and that 
hearings held on the bills were largely concurrent in 2007-2009. Most importantly, this case 
study allows us to see what happens when the vocabulary of incentives metastasizes onto a 
specific public policy debate, and what are the tremendous consequences thereafter. I shall 
evaluate the arguments of both pro- and anti-equal pay legislation with an eye on how each side 
constructs their arguments, not necessarily the veracity or virtues thereof.321 I aim to demonstrate 
how this issue appears intractable because of a structural divergence in argument strategies for 
both sides, rooted in the logics of incentives. There is no “neutral ground” upon which to stand 
and evaluate the merits of the bills, or even determine the existence of unequal pay, the source 
thereof, and the possible remedies. Hence I invoke the notion of the Lacanian Real, as a hitch or 
anamorphic stain on “reality”—this snag is deeply tied to the notion of how we inscribe 
biological sex onto reality, onto bodies.322 
Ultimately, this issue concerns two overlapping gaps. First, the gender pay gap, 
calculated by the National Women’s Law Center as a 23% difference between women’s and 
men’s earnings; and second, the rhetorical work that covers over, diminishes, or explains away 
pay gaps under the guise of “incentives.” As Gérard Genette describes, a rhetorical figure names 
a gap: “We see that here, between the letter and the meaning…there is a gap, a space, and like all 
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space, it possesses a form. This form is called a figure, and there will be as many figures as one 
can find forms in the space that is created on each occasion between the line of the 
signifier…and that of the signified.”323 Displacements in language are at work to explain (away) 
the gender gap, and the purpose of this chapter is to discover how “incentive” fills in the 
remaining 23% in pay. 
To preview my conclusions: Neoclassical economic theories (of equilibrium, of efficient 
markets, of exogenous preferences, and especially of “women’s incentives”) circumscribe 
debates about economic policy in such a way that renders heterodox interpretations of economic 
data or alternative explanations of social life moot. The metastasis of incentive logics prefigures 
any robust debate about fairness in compensation, and indeed about difference writ large. As I 
show, opposition to equal pay legislation in the current decade sublimates moral arguments about 
gender roles into the language of economic incentives. These arguments defer to the logic of 
“women’s incentives,” their human capital investments, and their individual rational action to 
explain why women take home smaller paychecks than men, so it becomes futile to combat such 
pay inequities with policy. Opponents to equal pay legislation defer to the logic of incentives 
because the language is a domesticated and digestible way to infer people’s choices, beliefs and 
behaviors. 
Among others, the figures of “education, experience and training” are deployed as 
displacements of genuine gender inequality. In this view, women first lack the education and 
training to gainfully succeed in their chosen professions, and second, women’s choices to have 
and raise children set them back in earning seniority. I explain below that those opposed to equal 
pay legislation see each of these circumstances as either “gender neutral” or the result of 
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women’s preexisting incentives and preferences.324 Opposition to the bills posits, and discovers, 
a woman’s calculable jouissance outside of wage structures. Just as Becker posits a Newtonian 
economic universe (complete with a conservation of mass), economists, politicians, and media 
figures use “women’s choices” to fill in the gap to prove that women are paid at the rate they 
deserve. Most importantly, economists and politicians attribute jouissance to women—by 
refiguring their constrained, contextual choices as the result of their unique substance as 
“woman.” 
The mobile, metastatic vocabulary of incentives accounts for how opponents of equal pay 
successfully combated the PFA, but other discursive strategies worked in their favor. Opponents 
to this Act develop a case against the closing of a loophole in the original Equal Pay Act of 1963 
and force businesses to name a “bona fide factor,” such as experience, training or education, as a 
reason to pay a man more than a woman. Previously, employers simply had to name a “factor 
other than sex” that could account for difference in compensation, and courts allowed employers 
to be as literal as possible, so height and weight requirements were presented as gender-neutral 
“factors other than sex” to discriminate against women. Yet paradoxically, “sex” becomes the 
forbidden keyword in this discursive economy—closing the loophole shuts off the available 
alibis for discriminatory pay.325 I use Freud’s concept of negation (Verneinung) to explain how 
employers are able to use everything but sex to authorize unequal pay. 
Opponents of the legislation also effectively repelled the PFA’s provision to gather and 
dispense salary data so women could improve their bargaining positions in negotiations. 
Opponents argued that women (and well-meaning politicians, lawyers and judges) would misuse 
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this data to deliver unduly high wages to female workers, thus throwing off the labor market’s 
equilibrium. The argument goes: Women are already incentivized by raising children (and leave 
the labor market to do so); to pay them a wage equal to men would be a disproportionate double 
reward, or a dreaded “perverse incentive.” Mary Poovey’s insights from A History of the Modern 
Fact assist me here to note the vicissitudes of using “big data” by both sides of this issue. Hidden 
within Congressional debates about the PFA is an open question about the importance that we 
afford to “big data”-type arguments for rendering prudential judgment; the paradox here is that 
supporters of “market-based” solutions largely opposed the “big data” databases that would 
objectively demonstrate unequal pay. 
On the other side, those who favor equal pay legislation deploy several different 
rhetorical strategies for the bills. First, some testifiers straightforwardly adopt the language of 
morality to argue for fair treatment and fair pay, but not everyone relied on a straightforward 
argument for morality or equity. Second, pro-equal pay legislators and testifiers also invoke 
specifically “economic” language to plead their case, including the language of “incentives.” 
This objectively demonstrates the metastasis of “incentive-driven” thinking across the political 
spectrum, but this deployment comes at a price. By relying on claims of economic efficiency and 
incentives for companies to remain legally compliant, equal pay advocates risk engaging with the 
idea that gendered inequality is the result of gender-neutral economic logics. Testifiers instead 
invoked the “hysteric’s question,” in which they ask the free market to reconcile the division 
between economic and non-economic incentives that motivate people’s behavior. Fink writes 
that the “hysteric” in psychoanalysis is the one who calls the “master” into question, demanding 
figurative wholeness from a given discursive formation: “In addressing the master, the hysteric 
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demands that he or she produce knowledge and then goes on to disprove his or her theories.”326 
This is another form of “stitching up” an inconsistent reality by pointing to the gender pay gap 
and asking why we ought to interpret it as being filled by the preexisting incentives of women. 
The LLA succeeded not just because of the political party that held the houses of 
Congress, but because supporters were able to suture together sets of discursive investments into 
a coherent narrative: Pay discrimination is not just an issue of economic efficiency and a better 
distribution of human capital within the body politic, but an issue of liberal civil rights, very 
broadly conceived, as President Obama explained while he signed it into law. That is, Lilly 
Ledbetter’s struggle intersected with basic principles of dignity, the idea that fair pay should 
accompany the day’s work she put in alongside male coworkers, but also her ability to submit a 
claim within a courtroom for back pay and damages. I conjecture that because the LLA concerns 
a subject’s right to sue (to participate in the judicial process), one might not even need to support 
a woman’s right to be paid equally to a man, but strictly that an aggrieved party should be able to 
have a day in court. Once again, it is reductive to simply argue that Republicans, regardless of 
gender, oppose equal pay legislation, or that Democrats generally support it. This is evident. I am 
more interested in what types of discursive investments organize the political field.327 
Finally, this chapter has substantial theoretical value: Our intractable public debates about 
equal pay legislation are a way to illuminate the status of the Lacanian Real—and how we 
manage, or cover over, it. We know we are speaking about the Real when the gender pay gap 
appears to be anamorphic: On the one hand, no one seriously disputes that the gender pay gap 
exists. Yet those who oppose equal pay legislation claim that the gap has perfectly good reasons 
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327 One could easily make a set of arguments from a neoclassical or an Austrian perspective that equal pay is a 
positive social good; indeed, the president of the American Economics Association attempts to argue that the 
government need not intervene to ensure equal pay, since markets can and should do it on their own. 
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for existing—which then implies that there is no “gap” at all, only a coherent social reality that 
abides different returns for different genders.328 According to this view, women are paid less not 
because of discriminatory practices, but because they (are free to) choose things other than high 
wages, including child-rearing and affective labor. As Alenka Zupančič puts it, “the 
psychoanalytic discoveries regarding the nature of sexuality (and of its accomplice, the 
unconscious) have led to the discovery and conceptualization of a singularly curved topological 
space, which it named the Real. The something produced by the signifier, in addition to what it 
produces as its field, curves or magnetizes this field in a certain way. It is responsible for the fact 
that the symbolic field, or the field of the Other, is never neutral (or structured by pure 
differentiality), but conflictual, asymmetrical, ‘not all,’ ridden by a fundamental antagonism.”329 
We argue out of a necessity to cover this gap, to manage or discipline it—any attempt to speak it 
out of (or indeed into) existence is impossible. 
As Žižek and others have posited, Lacan’s concept of the Real is not some inaccessible, 
non-figural, Kantian ding-an-sich, but a gap that opens up within the Symbolic order itself. “The 
Real is first there as the anamorphic stain, the anamorphic distortion of the direct image of 
reality—as a distorted image, a pure semblance that ‘subjectivizes’ objective reality.”330 When it 
comes to equal pay, there is no neutral ground upon which to stand to discover whether or not 
there is discrimination, or what to do about it.331 When Lacan claims that “sexual difference is 
                                                
328 Opponents engage in the logic of the “borrowed kettle”: Women are not underpaid, but women are underpaid 
because they find their rewards elsewhere. 
 
329 Alenka Zupančič, “Sexual Difference and Ontology,” E-Flux 32 (2) 2012. 
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331 Another example of the Real rearing its ugly head is in debates about human-made climate change. The logic of 
mutual exclusion prevents action on three levels: First, people can claim that climate change does not exist for 
whatever reason. Next, those invested in denial can claim that while climate change may exist, human beings are not 
responsible for it. And finally, people can admit, “Well, climate change does exist, and humans may or may not be 
 184 
Real,” he means that it is Real not just in the sense that there are definable traits of the female 
and male sex (that these differences ex-sist), but in the sense that between the male and female 
sexual organs, there is no “neutral” or objective ground that organizes them. Rather, the sexes are 
defined as pure difference from one another. “There is, according to Lacan, no direct 
relationship between men and women insofar as they are men and women. In other words, they 
do not ‘interact’ with each other as man to woman and woman to man. Something gets in the 
way of their having any such relationship; something skews their interactions.”332 
Žižek claims that “sexual difference” is, paradoxically, what prevents the 
“complementarity of the sexes” so longed for by traditionalists: “One could say that sexual 
difference is the paradox of the particular that is more universal than universality itself—a 
contingent difference, an indivisible remainder of the “pathological” sphere (in the Kantian sense 
of the term), that always somehow derails or destabilizes normative ideality itself. Far from 
being normative, sexual difference is thus pathological in the most radical sense of the term: a 
contingent stain that all symbolic fictions of symmetrical kinship positions try in vain to 
obliterate.”333 In other words, if there were a natural complementarity of the sexes, wage gaps 
would not need to be legislated at all, since social arrangements would actually comport to the 
biological and cultural attributes of men and women. Sex is a hitch that prevents the “objective” 
data of qualifications, education, and experience from being interpreted “objectively”—sex is the 
                                                                                                                                                       
the cause of it, but we cannot adopt policies that would endanger our economic futures in the present for a hope of 
an eventual payoff in a livable planet.” For example, former Sen. Rick Santorum’s position on climate change is all 
three of these simultaneously. The Real here is not simply some inert, unknowable quantity outside of our capacities 
for representation and action, but an active logic (or dare I say, a drive) that resists symbolization. 
 
332 Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1995), 104 
 
333 Slavoj Žižek, “The Real of Sexual Difference,” 72. 
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difference that makes a difference. I return to this point when discussing the endemic problem of 
sexist discrimination in both sorting and hiring within occupations. 
Finally, the Lacanian Real is not an objective “reality” which rhetors and social actors 
can invoke to win arguments—it is the hitch, or stain, that prevents a subjective position on the 
whole. It is a way to describe that each position—for and against equal pay legislation—is 
mutually exclusive from one another. In contrast to the invocation of a neutral “reality” in public 
arguments, the Lacanian Real does exist as a rhetorical resource, in a precise sense. It arrives 
when those who testify against equal pay legislation reveal that no one really supports 
discrimination, but that even if it exists, the available legislative remedies would be ineffectual 
and/or counter-productive. That is, the inability to adequately symbolize all of social reality is 
incorporated into our calculations (because some substance always exceeds it). This is a 
synthesis of both Aune’s “futility thesis” and “jeopardy thesis” in Selling the Free Market: not 
only will nothing change human nature/the perfection of markets/take your pick, if you try to 
change things, the consequences will be dire.  
Overview of Laws: Lilly Ledbetter and Paycheck Fairness Act 
I turn now to the texts of the two bills in question, starting with the Lilly Ledbetter Fair 
Pay Act of 2009, the first law that President Barack Obama signed into law. The bill: 
[a]mends the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to declare that an unlawful employment practice 
occurs when: (1) a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted; (2) 
an individual becomes subject to the decision or practice; or (3) an individual is affected 
by application of the decision or practice, including each time wages, benefits, or other 
compensation is paid. Allows liability to accrue, and allows an aggrieved person to obtain 
relief, including recovery of back pay, for up to two years preceding the filing of the 
charge, where the unlawful employment practices that have occurred during the charge 
filing period are similar or related to practices that occurred outside the time for filing a 
charge.334 
 
                                                
334 “S. 181—Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act,” 111th Cong., 2nd sess. January 8, 2009. 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/senate-bill/181, accessed June 10, 2014. 
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This type of wage discrimination is prevalent in many industries: Wal-Mart, Merrill Lynch and 
other major American corporations have had class-action lawsuits brought against them for their 
discriminatory wage practices, with varying results for plaintiffs.335 This law came about after a 
2007 Supreme Court ruling against the namesake of the law, Lilly Ledbetter, who had, in a lower 
court, successfully sued for back pay and damages from her time at a Goodyear tire plant in 
Alabama. According to the National Women’s Law Center, “The Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit reversed the jury verdict, holding that her case was filed too late—even though 
Ms. Ledbetter continued to receive discriminatory pay—because the company’s original decision 
on her pay had been made years earlier. In a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Samuel Alito, the 
Supreme Court upheld the Eleventh Circuit decision and ruled that employees cannot challenge 
ongoing pay discrimination if the employer’s original discriminatory pay decision occurred more 
than 180 days earlier, even when the employee continues to receive paychecks that have been 
discriminatorily reduced.”336 In summary: The Supreme Court ruled that a worker who believes 
she is discriminatorily compensated has only 180 days from her first unfair paycheck to 
challenge it.337 The new law as written only allows for two years of back pay to be reinstated, but 
the statute of limitations for filing a claim resets after each paycheck. 
Next, the Paycheck Fairness Act was a bill designed to supplement the existing Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938 (otherwise known as the Equal Pay Act). It was first ratified in the 
US House in 2009, but failed to pass with a filibuster-proof majority in the US Senate. Sen. 
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it should be noted, is what happened to Ledbetter. 
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Barbara Mikulski most recently introduced the bill in April 2014, but it once again failed in 
September of the same year for the same reason.338 The bill has three major provisions.339 First, 
it tightens up the language in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938: Whereas the current law 
allows for differences in pay based on seniority, merit, quantity and quality of goods produced 
and “a differential based on any other factor other than sex,” the bill specifies “a bona fide factor 
other than sex, such as education, training, or experience” as the heretofore unnamed “any factor 
other than sex.”340 Next, it “[p]rohibits retaliation for inquiring about, discussing, or disclosing 
the wages of the employee or another employee in response to a complaint or charge, or in 
furtherance of a sex discrimination investigation, proceeding, hearing, or action, or an 
investigation conducted by the employer.”341 Finally, the bill would compel the federal 
government to gather data on gender pay gaps. After passage, the EEOC would “complete a 
survey of the data that is currently available to the Federal Government relating to employee pay 
information for use in the enforcement of Federal laws prohibiting pay discrimination and, in 
consultation with other relevant Federal agencies, identify additional data collections that will 
enhance the enforcement of such laws; and… provide for the collection of pay information data 
from employers as described by the sex, race, and national origin of employees.”342 
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The Lilly Ledbetter Act of 2009 
 The following analysis draws upon the House and Senate hearings about the bill in 2007, 
2008 and 2009.343 The bill failed initially in 2007, under a Republican Party Congress, but after 
its reintroduction in 2009 under a majority Democratic Party Congress, it was passed with newly 
inaugurated President Barack Obama’s support.344 As mentioned, the main threads in favor of 
the bill rely upon tropes of “fairness” and “justice,” along with the struggles of working in a 
discriminatory environment as a woman. However, there is a significant strand of thought in 
favor of legislation that deploys the language of “incentives,” namely that businesses and 
individuals rely on incentives generated by the legal system. Those opposed to the bill also 
deploy the vocabulary of “women’s incentives” and insist that self-interested trial lawyers, not 
women, will be the main beneficiaries of this bill.345 
Testimony in Favor of Lilly Ledbetter: Fairness, Justice and…Incentives 
In his five-minute opening statement in favor of the Fair Pay Restoration Act, Sen. 
Edward Kennedy uses the term “civil rights” five times, explicitly linking the issue of fair pay to 
American civil rights: “Equal pay for equal work is a fundamental civil right in our society.”346 
He mentions the terms “fair” or “fairness” seven times, both in reference to the proposed law 
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being fair to workers and employers, and also the social bond implied in a contract for work 
(“She endured the frequent scorn of her male co-workers, but she persevered and constantly gave 
the company a fair day’s work for what she thought was a fair day’s pay”).347 Sen. Patty Murray, 
in her brief opening salvo, mentions the notions of “justice” and “injustice” thrice, and needing 
to remedy paycheck “unfairness” twice.348 Sen. Barbara Mikulski, in her brief statement, 
gestures in two directions. First, she links the health of the nation’s economy to the power of 
women to earn equal pay: “if you want to get the economy going, let us start paying women what 
they are worth.”349 Second, Mikulski emphasizes that women struggle with genuine 
discrimination at work. She quotes Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: “the court does not comprehend 
or is indifferent to the insidious way in which women can be victims of pay discrimination.”350 
This rhetorical strategy—paying heed to the realities of gender-based workplace 
discrimination—is embodied by the testimony of Lilly Ledbetter herself. 
Ledbetter’s testimony weaves together three aspects: her own feelings of everyday 
workplace discrimination with soft “economic” arguments about her ability to provide for her 
family, and a generalizable argument that renders fair pay a civil right. 
What happened to me is not only an insult to my dignity; it also had real consequences 
for my ability to care for my family. While every paycheck I received I got less than what 
I was entitled to under the law, the U.S. Supreme Court said this didn’t count as illegal 
discrimination. But it sure feels like discrimination when you are on the receiving end of 
that smaller paycheck and trying to support your family on less money than what the men 
are getting for the same job. It doesn’t feel like any less like discrimination because it 
started a long time ago. Quite the opposite, in fact. But according to the court, if you 
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don’t figure things out right away, the company can treat you like a second-class citizen 
for the rest of your career, and that is not right.351 
 
Ledbetter immediately articulates the blind spots in the Supreme Court’s decision, and the 
incentive-driven account writ large: The Supreme Court ruled that because Ledbetter did not take 
action over her discriminatory treatment within six months, she had, in effect, locked herself into 
a legally discriminatory paycheck. That is entirely consonant with the logic of the incentive 
developed in Chapter 1 as “responsibility oriented;” she is not only assumed to have freely 
chosen to take the wages, but in putting her head down and accepting unequal pay, she then 
conferred legitimacy upon it, binding her to the legal outcome. 
Later, during the question-and-answer session, Ledbetter tells the story of her experiences 
with sexual harassment at work, including when a supervisor “continually discussed [her] 
underwear, whether or not [she] had worn a bra to work that day.”352 Her daily indignity, as we 
shall see, remains uncounted and uncountable within the neoclassical account, since while it 
cannot appear on a balance sheet, her decision to remain employed at Goodyear can be taken as 
evidence that she rationally weighed her dignity against her paycheck and chose the latter. 
Finally, and in reference to the final point, Ledbetter renounces her own self-interest (partly out 
of necessity, because the Supreme Court did rescind her back pay and damages) and offers that 
the beneficiaries of the bill will be other women: “Goodyear may never have to pay me what it 
cheated me out of, but if this bill passes, I will have an even richer reward because I will know 
that our daughters, our granddaughters, and all workers will get a better deal. That’s what makes 
this fight worth fighting and it’s what makes this fight one we have to win.”353 In contrast, 
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witness the strategies of a testifier who invokes “incentives” as a positive case for equal pay 
justice. 
Margot Dorfman, CEO of the U.S. Women’s Chamber of Commerce, exemplifies the 
“incentive-driven” approach in favor of equal pay legislation. Dorfman indicates that because the 
Supreme Court decided to only allow 180 days for women to make a claim about a 
discriminatory paycheck, businesses now have a financial incentive to wait out potential 
challenges, and workers will in turn be incentivized to bring hasty litigation. 
The 180-day time limit also creates incentives for business practices that will be 
detrimental to both business owners and workers. Rather than take the time necessary to 
evaluate their situation and confirm they have been subject to discrimination before filing 
a claim, the new deadline puts pressure on employees to file complaints as quickly as 
possible… And while the previous system promoted voluntary employer compliance, this 
new interpretation provides an entirely different incentive… Under this decision, 
employers instead have a reason to be less vigilant about pay discrimination, knowing 
that after 180 days, they will be insulated from future challenges.”354 
 
She extends this line of argument to how it will affect businesses owned by women. By closing 
off avenues for redress after six months, the Supreme Court inadvertently distorts the playing 
field against businesses that voluntarily comply with the law.355 Women-owned businesses 
“frequently provide stronger employee benefits than their male counterparts,” the Court’s 
interpretation doubly discriminates against women—both workers in male-dominated industries 
and female business owners in an equilibrium-determined economy.356 
This a case in which the legal system and the market combine to produce a new incentive 
structure: If a business is legally capable of prohibiting its workers from discussing pay, thereby 
preventing a worker from discovering discriminatory pay for six months, the company now has a 
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“get out of jail free” card in perpetuity. An argument from an equilibrium standpoint turns out to 
be a useful critique of pay discrimination: Every market that intersects, however obliquely, with 
underpaid women is potentially inefficient—in effect, businesses that discriminate are gathering 
rents from other sectors. Dorfman’s perceptive analysis is an example of how an “incentive-
driven” approach in market economies can be helpful in advocating for different and socially 
beneficial outcomes. Because she endorses the government’s legitimate ability to produce 
incentives, laws that enforce equal pay for equal work will properly incentivize both businesses 
and individuals within this framework.357 Overall, many of those testifying in favor of the bill 
argue that fair pay is connected to civil rights, and that women struggle with real discrimination 
at work. But for some, fair pay is connected to the logic of incentives and other modes of 
“economic” thinking. The discursive differences are stark, but they become starker when the 
PFA comes about. Now I turn to the Ledbetter bill’s opposition. 
Opposition to Lilly Ledbetter: Trial Lawyers Benefit, and Discriminators Die? 
Those opposed to the bill develop a few major points: First, the bill would engender 
frivolous lawsuits; the bill’s allegedly open-ended liability incentivizes aggrieved workers like 
Ledbetter to delay their accusations for years in order to reap the most monetary benefit. Second, 
the bill would create undue hardships for businesses forced to keep paycheck records in 
perpetuity. Sen. Johnny Isakson, argues against the merits of the bill’s 180-day reset of each 
discriminatory paycheck, and argues that the only result will be more lawsuits against 
companies. In the sixth sentence of his opening statement, Isakson explicitly condemns the law 
for going “overboard in favor of trial lawyers;” his penultimate claim is that “the bill is ripe for 
                                                
357 Recall the discussion of “perverse incentives”: The stock answer for opponents of progressive legislation is that 
states can only produce “perverse incentives” because they, by definition, distort the free market. 
 
 193 
abuse and amounts to nothing more than a gift to trial lawyers eager for a frivolous lawsuit.”358 
According to Isakson’s interpretation of the bill’s provisions, an employee has an incentive to 
wait until the person in charge of her or his paycheck leaves the company or dies; it becomes 
harder for a corporation to defend itself against the accusations of an aggrieved party if the 
discriminator cannot provide exculpatory information. 
Eric Dreiband, former general counsel for the EEOC, and opponent of the bill, asserts, 
“By eviscerating the charge-filing period, the Fair Pay Restoration Act would require the EEOC 
to conduct investigations into events that happened decades before anyone filed a charge despite 
the absence of records. Witnesses’ memories will be faded. Some witnesses will be missing. 
Others, as in the Ledbetter case, may be dead.”359 The US Chamber of Commerce’s statement 
similarly argued, “An employer’s ability to tell its story dissipates sharply as time passes. 
Memories fade; managers quit, retire, or die, business units are reorganized, disassembled or 
sold; tasks are centralized, dispersed, or abandoned altogether.”360 Although the Ledbetter Act 
does reset the ability to file after each discriminatory paycheck, it only provides for two years of 
back pay and only up to $300,000 in damages. Samuel R. Bagenstos, a witness in favor of the 
law, deploys the language of incentivization to rebut this point. In his prepared statement, 
Bagenstos writes, “Under the bill, victims of pay discrimination would have no incentive to sleep 
on their rights. Because a plaintiff can recover back pay for only the two years…an employee 
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who waits to file more than 2 years after the initial discrimination charge will lose the chance to 
obtain full compensation.”361 
The opposition’s “infinite liability”/”incentive to delay” accusation is repeated by people 
who testify against the bill with such regularity that it cannot be attributable to a simple 
misreading. Says Dreiband: “The bill likewise contains no time limit for back pay and liquidated 
damages that may be recovered under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. If enacted, 
then the Fair Pay Restoration Act would subject state and local governments, unions, employers, 
and others to potentially unlimited compensatory and punitive damages, back pay, and liquidated 
damages.”362 Either Dreiband had not read the bill, or assumed the gathered Senate committee 
had not.363 Even Ledbetter’s $3 million in damages was greatly reduced; as the federal appeals 
court noted, “The district court denied Goodyear’s motion for judgment as a matter of law but 
remitted the entire award to $360,000, including the statutory maximum of $300,000 in 
compensatory and punitive damages and $60,000 in backpay.”364 To be fair, $300,000 in 
damages may be expensive for some businesses, but opponents of the bill refer to potential 
damages as “lottery-style” winnings (implying that the damages would be in the multiple 
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millions), not to this legal maximum. This rhetorical strategy obfuscates the fact that the LLA 
does not alter this maximum damages statute. 
 So how can we go about explaining this habituated rhetorical strategy arguing that the 
bill would lead to unlimited damages, if the text of the bill so clearly defines their limits? On the 
one hand, this could be a classic example of mauvais foi by these actors—an unconscious signal 
that infinite liability would be the proper response to discrimination. Or perhaps it is the slippery 
slope fallacy, that even one political act of redress over and against the laws of supply and 
demand would result in the dissolution of the system altogether. These both contain some kernel 
of truth, for I believe it to be connected to the logic of monetary “incentives” writ large: That is, 
the “incentive” to benefit from discriminatory pay and harassment is a massive payoff, so any 
self-interested actor would quietly, and rationally, absorb such indignities. This is a profoundly 
paranoiac strategy: by presupposing that all aggrieved parties are simply self-interested, the 
complex reasons why people remain in demeaning jobs are transformed into evidence for why 
they might eventually submit a lawsuit and win “lottery-style” payments from a judge. Here, I 
am reminded of Žižek’s remarks about the signifying order: “Language, in its very notion, 
involves a minimal distance towards its literal meaning—not in the sense of a some irreducible 
ambiguity or multiple dispersion of meanings, but in the more precise sense of ‘he said X, but 
what if he really meant the opposite.”365 So remaining in a demeaning job proves the paranoiac’s 
point, that truly “incentive-driven” people are just biding their time to unleash hell on business 
owners. 
 Also paramount in the fears of the anti-LLA camp is that a corporation would be unable 
to defend itself since it would be unable or unwilling to keep records that detail payroll decision-
                                                
365 Žižek, For They Know Not What They Do, xiii. 
 
 196 
making.366 Dreiband redefines the word “dreadful” to argue this point: “The Fair Pay Restoration 
Act would also require anyone accused of discrimination to make a dreadful choice—preserve 
records in perpetuity or lose the ability to mount a defense to a charge that challenges decades-
old employment decisions. The cost of perpetual recordkeeping would be enormous and, in the 
cause of public employers, would add to the taxpayers’ burden.”367 This is undoubtedly a strange 
defense, for three reasons. First, the bill’s provisions, like many statutes regarding allegations of 
discrimination, place the burden of proof on the accuser to demonstrate bias—not on the 
company to prove its innocence, and summary dismissals would be potentially allowed if a 
plaintiff did not file a claim in a timely manner. Secondly (and pedantically), this bill was 
introduced in 2007. Digital copies of prior records, and the production of new ones are entirely 
feasible. Third, and most importantly, this defense against the law personalizes the decision to 
pay a woman less than a counterpart—hence the opponents’ insistence that memories will fade, 
or that the people who make decisions might die. 
On this view, paycheck decision-making is not an institutional decision, but rather one 
that can be explained, defended and mitigated through an individual’s testimony. Here, a 
company is not a single legal entity, liable for wrongdoing (and similarly protected against other 
forms of penalties). Instead, a company is a mere aggregation of individuals, some of whom may 
have discriminatory foibles. Opponents of the bill create an exploitable epistemological opening 
here, one that comes into greater focus during debates over the PFA: unequal pay is the result of 
sets of individual choices (both by employers and employees), and it is unfair to compare 
                                                
366 This is undeniably a strange defense: If a corporation should not be held liable for discriminatory pay because a 
single individual is responsible for a discriminatory paycheck, then it is not clear what any corporation could be held 
liable for, ever. 
 
367 Eric S. Dreiband, “The Fair Pay Restoration Act,” 24. 
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someone’s wages with another, and certainly improvident to question what kinds of good reasons 
someone has for paying a worker less than another.368 
On the other hand, equal pay proponents argue the reverse: If a woman is objectively paid 
less than a man, the individual who makes such a decision is secondary to the institutional or 
objective discrimination. Ledbetter’s case is exemplary here: She never alleged that Goodyear’s 
supervisors acted with discriminatory intent, just that they would have been larger prior to her 
accusation.369 Sen. Tom Harkin begins to advance this point in his endorsement of the Fair Pay 
Act during this hearing (which contains language similar to the PFA): “In addition to requiring 
that employer provide equal pay for equivalent jobs, my bill also requires disclosure of pay 
scales and rates for all job categories at a given company without disclosing individual pay 
levels. This will give women the information they need to identify discriminatory pay practices 
negotiate better for themselves—which, in the end, could reduce the need for costly litigation in 
the first place.”370 
In the end, Congress passed the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, and the newly inaugurated 
president, Barack Obama, signed it into law on January 29, 2009. In his remarks, Obama 
synthesizes several of the strands of argument generated by its proponents: 
So signing this bill today is to send a clear message: that making our economy work 
means making sure it works for everybody; that there are no second-class citizens in our 
workplaces; and that it's not just unfair and illegal, it's bad for business to pay somebody 
less because of their gender or their age or their race or their ethnicity, religion or 
disability… Ultimately, equal pay isn't just an economic issue for millions of Americans 
and their families, it's a question of who we are—and whether we're truly living up to our 
fundamental ideals; whether we'll do our part, as generations before us, to ensure those 
                                                
368 In the Paycheck Fairness Act discussion below, note how some political actors oppose a study of how the money 
commodity (a generalized, embodied form of value) is distributed across genders. That is, the one thing that does 
allow for equivalence between jobs (the money commodity itself) and ordinal comparison (one’s salary in dollars) 
must be kept safe from actual comparison by the state. 
369 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S.Ct. 2167. 
 
370 Sen. Tom Harkin, “The Fair Pay Restoration Act,” 43. 
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words put on paper some 200 years ago really mean something—to breathe new life into 
them with a more enlightened understanding that is appropriate for our time.371 
 
The President’s remarks suture equal pay to civil rights, moral character, and good business 
practices together—a fairly broad bit of symbolic coverage. Supporters argued that equal pay is a 
moral issue and an issue of the unfinished project of civil rights; the surplus is that equal pay 
makes markets function more efficiently. While it is not extant in testimony for the bill, I also 
hypothesize that a broadly conceived civil right, namely the right to participate in the judicial 
system, was instrumental in its passage. Had the Supreme Court’s ruling remained in effect, 
anyone with a job for over six months would be legally barred from bringing a pay 
discrimination lawsuit against their employer; the consequences would have been dire, since as 
mentioned, this would have produced a “get out of jail free” card for businesses who could 
effectively disguise any discriminatory payment practices for 180 days. In other words, this bill 
may have succeeded because of the gender neutrality of the liberal subject of rights, not because 
it provided a coherent moral story about the rectitude of fair treatment. 
Following from that, no opponents to the bill ever resorted to exhorting the “traditional 
role of women” to oppose equal pay: Mistreated women were figured simply as incentive-driven, 
self-interested litigants. The PFA, which I discuss below, did not have the same legislative 
success, and some opponents adopted some of this morally traditionalist language under the 
rubric of “incentives” to argue against it. 
Paycheck Fairness Act 
As mentioned, the PFA stalled in Congress in 2014, and despite the introduction of a 
similar bill in nearly every congressional session since 1997, it does not appear to be a legislative 
                                                
371 Barack Obama, quoted in Rachel Weiner, “Lilly Ledbetter Act: Obama Signs His First Bill,” Huffington Post, 
February 27, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01/27/lily-ledbetter-act-the-fi_n_161423.html, accessed 
March 3, 2015. 
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priority at present. Democratic Sen. Barbara Mikulski, who has introduced the bill most recently, 
will not be running for reelection in 2016, and the Republican Party currently controls both 
houses of Congress.372 In this section, I evaluate the arguments made for and against the bill, and 
bring forward several concepts from the prior section. There are three major points to be made 
about this bill that might explain its legislative failure, each of which interlock in interesting 
ways. First, even more than in debates about Lilly Ledbetter, opponents deploy the language of 
incentives to explain away the gendered wage gap. “Women” have different incentive structures, 
and because markets adequately and efficiently distribute social resources according to 
individuals’ incentive-driven behavior, state action to remedy pay gaps neglects the underlying 
calculative behavior by all rational actors. 
Second, specific language within the PFA aimed at closing the available discursive 
openings to pay women unequally, namely, a “bona fide factor other than sex, such as training, 
experience or education,” runs up against powerful investments in existing nondiscrimination 
law. Previously, “any factor other than sex” was interpreted quite literally by courts, “sex” 
became the key word that, while it unquestionably operated to depress pay, could not be uttered 
by employers. I use the Freudian concept of negation to contend that when policymakers attempt 
to close this discursive gap, they bring this intentionally repressed word into consideration. The 
edifice of “incentives” becomes more tenuous when the key word of “sex” must be accounted for 
mathematically. 
Finally, the PFA contains a provision to allow the federal government to aggregate data 
about salaries across fields and geographic regions to determine if women are systematically 
underpaid and give women bargaining power to demand equal salaries to men in the same field. 
                                                
372 Eight members of the Republican Party voted for the Lilly Ledbetter Act, but not a single Republican voted for 
the Paycheck Fairness Act in the last two times it was introduced. See “S. 2199 (113th): Paycheck Fairness Act,” 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s2199. Accessed March 5, 2015. 
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On the face of it, this provision does not appear to be radical, or even controversial. Yet 
opponents of the law condemn this bill as inimical to the free enterprise system.373 I hypothesize 
that, following Poovey’s A History of the Modern Fact, there is considerable persuasive power in 
the epistemological units generated by “big data.” Whereas Poovey describes the generation of 
such epistemological units in the service of nascent free market capitalism, the gender-based 
salary data works to momentarily disturb this easy connection. 
Overall, the bill’s failure can be interpreted as the confluence of these factors. From a 
practical, partisan standpoint, equal-pay opponents in the Republican Party controlled both 
houses of Congress, so despite 53 “aye” votes in September 2014, the bill could not overcome 
the threat of a filibuster. But opposition stems from not just a simple issue of party allegiance, 
but rather through investments in the above ideas: The vocabulary of “incentives” cloaks 
traditionalist beliefs about women’s desires in the language of neoclassical economic inferences; 
if passed, the bill would bring to light implicit discrimination against women, and make it harder 
for business owners to hire whom they choose. 
Testimony for PFA: Metaphysics and Hysteria 
As with the LLA, supporters of the PFA argue in terms of fairness and justice, and rely 
on “economic” reasoning to make a case for the bill, but also open up a “metaphysical” avenue 
for interrogating gender inequality, as Sen. Tom Harkin puts it. Many of the arguments in favor 
                                                
373 There is a remarkable similarity here between equal pay and gun control legislation. Because of influence by the 
National Rifle Association, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has legally barred from researching 
gun violence as a public health problem since 1996. (According to the Washington Post, President Barack Obama 
ordered the CDC to study the causes of gun violence in 2013 after the Sandy Hook child massacre, but Congress has 
refused to fund the research, so no progress has been made. See Todd C. Frankel, “Why the CDC Still Isn’t 
Researching Gun Violence, Despite the Ban Being Lifted Two Years Ago,” Washington Post, January 14, 2015, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/wp/2015/01/14/why-the-cdc-still-isnt-researching-gun-violence-
despite-the-ban-being-lifted-two-years-ago/, accessed March 6, 2015.) The identical fear shared by both issues is 
about the persuasive power of “big data”: If enough salary data are collected to verify that women are objectively 
underpaid in comparison to men, or that gun ownership directly correlates with higher rates of death and violence, 
then there are fewer available rhetorical resources for opposition to equal pay and gun control. 
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of this bill mirror the arguments in favor of Lilly Ledbetter—this is largely because the bills were 
first argued concurrently in 2007, and because many of the same members of Congress staffed 
the committee meetings for them. For this reason, I shall only note the major, and intellectually 
interesting, differences in arguments here. Progressive economists draw upon a repertoire of 
economic studies that argue unequal pay and gendered labor is an inefficient use of social 
resources, and the PFA’s preamble deploys explicitly “economic” reasoning in much of its 
justification for the remedy:  
The existence of such pay disparities— 
(A) depresses the wages of working families who rely on the wages of all members of the 
family to make ends meet; 
(B) undermines women's retirement security, which is often based on earnings while in 
the workforce; 
(C) prevents the optimum utilization of available labor resources; 
(D) has been spread and perpetuated, through commerce and the channels and 
instrumentalities of commerce, among the workers of the several States; 
(E) burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; 
(F) constitutes an unfair method of competition in commerce; 
(G) leads to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of 
goods in commerce; 
(H) interferes with the orderly and fair marketing of goods in commerce; and 
(I) in many instances, may deprive workers of equal protection on the basis of sex in 
violation of the 5th and 14th Amendments.374 
 
Straight away, we see how a constitutional argumentation strategy partakes in a reinforcement of 
the neoclassical concept of equilibrium—by pointing to moments of apparent disequilibrium, the 
bill can take concrete steps to restore efficiency to labor and commodity markets. Sexist wage 
discrimination simply prevents women from earning as much as the equivalent amount and 
quality of work by a man, and thus violates the equal protection clause within the US 
Constitution. 
                                                
374 “S. 2199—Paycheck Fairness Act.” 113th Cong., 2nd sess, April 2, 2014, 
https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/s2199/BILLS-113s2199pcs.xml, accessed June 3, 2015. 
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There is experimental and empirical evidence to suggest this happens many places. A 
study done at Yale University in 2012 claims that outright sexist discrimination is endemic to the 
natural sciences: The researchers performed a randomized double-blind sample study for 
professionals in the field about who to hire as a laboratory manager. Applications were identical, 
save for the name of the applicant—the participants were handed applications with either a name 
gendered typically female or typically male. “Faculty participants rated the male applicant as 
significantly more competent and hireable [sic] than the (identical) female applicant. These 
participants also selected a higher starting salary and offered more career mentoring to the male 
applicant. The gender of the faculty participants did not affect responses, such that female and 
male faculty were equally likely to exhibit bias against the female student. Mediation analyses 
indicated that the female student was less likely to be hired because she was viewed as less 
competent.”375 For the fictional female applicants, the exact same employment information as 
men was turned against them—there was not a plethora of information tested in this experiment. 
The signifier “woman” reversed the valence from “hirable” to “not hirable.” 
Overall, the Act’s preamble also synthesizes the micro and macro levels of economic 
reasoning, for not only does discrimination hinder the prospects of individuals (and families), it 
also hinders the proper flow of commodities, thereby throwing commodity markets into 
disequilibrium.376 That is, when company owners can hire people at a discriminatory wage rate, 
                                                
375 Corinne A. Moss-Racusin, John F. Dovidio, Victoria L. Brescoll, Mark J. Graham, and Jo Handelsman, “Science 
faculty’s subtle gender biases favor male students,” Psychological and Cognitive Sciences 109(41), 2012, 16474. 
 
376 As I hope to have made clear in previous chapters, “equilibrium” is a profoundly dialectical notion, because the 
bill’s logic can be easily disputed using the selfsame terms of equilibrium/disequilibrium. To dispute the notion of 
disequilibrium, all one must do is posit that cultural, social and economic resources are allocated efficiently; the 
collection of “raw” economic data misses the point entirely. Women are not only incentivized by child rearing 
(thereby accounting for cultural and biological influences), but also, their time out of the workforce accounts for 
their lower wages (thus providing an elegant economic justification for their inequality). Equilibrium-style 
arguments from both sides rely on an objective, neutral standpoint from which to argue—the ideal point of the 
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they are able to either sell the wares at a lower price, or more likely, sell commodities at the 
going rate and pocket the difference in wage. Therefore, sexist discrimination has the potential to 
throw off any market in which women are paid less than men.377 
  Jocelyn Samuels and Sen. Tom Harkin also open up a “metaphysical” question contained 
within the debates about equal pay. The Iowa senator begins with an inquiry about how gendered 
occupations with demonstrable pay gaps actively discourage men taking traditionally “women’s” 
jobs: “I throw this out for your consideration. You might get more men willing to take those jobs 
that have been previously considered women’s jobs. Certainly there is a nurse’s aid paid the 
same as a truck driver. Hey, I might not like getting beat around that truck cab all the time. I 
might want to be a nurse’s aid if I had the same equal pay and benefits and retirement benefits 
and that type of thing. It might be a more appealing job but if there is this huge wage gap, well 
then, I’d gravitate to something else.”378 He is correct about the “gendering” of jobs in America: 
Men overwhelmingly make up the truck-driving workforce (the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
estimates that only 5.8 percent of truck drivers in America are women379), while women 
overwhelmingly comprise the nursing industry. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 
2013, 90.4 percent of nurses in the United States were women.380 Here, Harkin demonstrates that 
                                                                                                                                                       
absolutely free market in which all resources are efficiently allocated. Its absence, impossibility, inexistence, or 
withdrawal (depending on your politics) is the spur for signification to fill in this gap. 
 
377 Of course, if women’s unequally paid work is evenly distributed throughout the entire capitalist economy, then it 
could be mathematically possible for there to be zero arbitrage opportunities for company owners who distribute 
discriminatory wages. 
378 Sen. Tom Harkin, Subcommittee Hearing on Workforce Protections, Committee on Education and Labor, The 
Paycheck Fairness Act (H.R. 1338). 110th Cong., 1st Sess. July 11, 2007, “Closing the Gap: Equal Pay for Women 
Workers,” 47. 
 
379 Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Household Data, Annual Averages: Employed Persons by Detailed Occupation, Sex, 
Race, and Hispanic or Latino Ethnicity,” 10. http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat11.pdf. 
 
380 Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Men in Nursing Report,” February 2013, 
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one’s stable workplace preferences could be stunted by the “gendering” thereof—men are guided 
to “masculine” jobs just as women are sorted into “feminine” jobs, albeit for different reasons.381 
Harkin is asking, in effect, a hysteric’s question; by asking, “all things being equal,” what would 
happen to the labor market if people could follow their preferences rather than their pocketbooks. 
Aune points out that “all things being equal” is the mantra of neoclassical rhetorics, which allows 
economists to avoid precisely the kinds of complexities when we start with an unequal world. 
Fink writes, “The hysteric pushes the master—incarnated in a partner, teacher, or 
whomever—to the point where he or she can find the master’s knowledge lacking. Either the 
master does not have an explanation for everything, or his or her reasoning does not hold water. 
In addressing the master, the hysteric demands that he or she produce knowledge and then goes 
on to disprove his or her theories.” 382 His question signals a fracture in the stolid neoclassical 
account by acting as a “perspective by incongruity,” a vantage point from which to ask how 
gender pay inequality affects men as well. Harkin asks “the market” to give a coherent account 
of itself—either it is aimed at facilitating the freedom of actors to pursue what they choose (the 
jouissance of the individual) or it is aimed at the maximization of profit (the jouissance of the 
market), since men (too) have to make this tradeoff thanks to gendered pay inequality. 
According to Evans, Lacanian psychoanalytic theory typically poses the hysteric’s 
question as “What is a woman?”383 The hysteric asks what she/he is for the other, or what 
position in relation to the signifier she or he holds; as I demonstrate below, the question of 
“Woman” is not reducible to the female sex. Harkin’s question, it seems to me, is similarly less 
                                                
381 The “incentive-driven”/Becker riposte is as follows: Even if men are incentivized by care work, they value a 
higher wage over that preference. In essence, they are making their choices “economically” in the narrow sense of 
maximizing earnings, rather than the broader conception of “the economic approach to human behavior” involving 
the maximization of preferences, however defined. 
382 Fink, The Lacanian Subject, 134. 
 
383 Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, 78. 
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about a specific gender—men of course are affected by sexist structures, even if they may 
monetarily benefit from it. Rather, he is asking more pointedly how both men and women are 
affected by the system of difference that organizes them as such, and so he asks, “What is a 
woman?” in different terms. In so doing, he demands that defenders of the status quo provide a 
“whole” account for an inconsistent reality; he, like the hysteric, finds it lacking. For 
psychoanalytic theory, the hysteric’s question ultimately serves to reconstitute the relation 
between the hysteric subject and their Other—by calling into question the Other’s knowledge, 
the hysteric finds a place for her/his desire therein to make up this gap. Harkin’s only difference 
is that he strategically uses the question, and provides no final rejoinder—this question hangs in 
the air because it cannot be answered by those gathered to testify. 
Next, in an exchange between Samuels and Harkin, we uncover the most pointed 
criticism of the logic that offers a safe, sealed, and circular explanation for women’s unequal 
pay. Samuels explains that because of the history of systematic inequality in the United States, 
one cannot reasonably expect market forces to do any amelioration on its own: “there is 
unfortunately pervasive and systemic sex discrimination as well as discrimination on the basis of 
race and national origin and disability that still persists in the workforce… [T]he problem that 
these bills are intended to address is that the market forces themselves, not only cannot alone 
solve these inequities but, in fact, are based on the kinds of prior barriers and discrimination that 
have prevented people like women, like minorities, like people with disabilities from reaching 
the same level playing fields that men have occupied.”384 What follows is the exchange between 
the two: 
Sen. Harkin: So your point being, how can you expect a system to adjust itself to change 
the basis when the system itself is set up on that basis? You’re right. Interesting point. 
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Ms. Samuels: It’s metaphysical.  
 
Senator Harkin: Yeah, it’s getting metaphysical here, you’re right.385 
 
“Metaphysical” is not the term I would use here, but it does signal that the neoclassical account’s 
stability is the “universality based on an exception” introduced at the end of Chapter 4. Since 
market structures are the only available registrars of preferences and power, one cannot express a 
preference for a higher paying job without the power to obtain one. This strategy is also what 
allowed Becker, in Chapter 3, to argue that all positive changes in women’s employment were 
the result of “market forces,” since markets are the only mechanism available to register cultural, 
political and social changes. Below, I introduce the line of argument by opponents of the PFA 
that women’s incentives, generated from their stable preferences, fill in the pay gap; I pick up 
Samuels’ and Harkin’s critique in the conclusion of the chapter. 
Opposition to PFA 1: Incentives Fill the Gap 
Today, opposition to the PFA in this decade sublimates traditionalist arguments about 
women’s enjoyment into the language of economic incentives. Gender inequality is natural (and 
expressly unfixable with public policy) because women voluntarily choose options other than 
high-earning jobs, including raising children, doing domestic work, and doing “care work” with 
children or the elderly.386 These arguments defer to the logic of “women’s” incentives, their 
                                                
385 Quoted in “Closing the Gap: Equal Pay for Women Workers,” 51. 
386 In this view, the low-paying jobs that are typically gendered “feminine” carry with them their own “incentives” 
of caretaking that resonate with the “essential” feminine qualities of women. The consequence is that the average 
wage of these jobs is at the legal minimum because so many women take these types of jobs (which admittedly 
involve lower training thresholds than many other professions) after leaving the workforce to have children of their 
own. However, careful attention to this argument reveals that the logic of “incentives” works retroactively to justify 
their choices as the result of their innate preferences for care. That is, as Becker and other economists aver, these 
two phenomena do not happen simultaneously, and it is less likely that the preference for care happens first. Rather, 
women leaving the workforce precedes, and leads to, the lack of professional/specialized training. To claim that 
women follow their preferences is simply a retroactive symbolization of this straightforwardly supply-and-demand 
problem. 
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“human capital” investments, and their individual rational action to explain why women take 
home smaller paychecks than men. As Becker says, women are incentivized by child-rearing 
instead of high earnings, and therefore do not invest in “education and training that improve[s] 
earnings and job skills.”387 As List and Gneezy put it, “Scholars have long theorized about the 
reasons why women haven’t made faster progress in breaking through the glass ceiling. 
Personally, we think that much of it boils down to this: men and women have different 
preferences for competitiveness, and at least part of the wage gaps we see are a result of men and 
women responding differently to incentives.”388 That is, because women do not receive higher 
wages, clearly women are not incentivized by higher wages. 
Even someone who believes the wage gap exists is opposed to legislative fixes thereto. 
Claudia Goldin, president of the American Economic Association, holds that the wage gap is just 
a numerical problem: Occupations like lawyers, doctors and pharmacists have high wages 
because they are rewarded for long hours, or recompensed more greatly for unusual hours. 
Employees who pick up children from school, care for young ones, and perform domestic labor 
in the evenings will inevitably earn less—hence, a gender gap in pay. Goldin writes, “The gender 
gap in pay would be considerably reduced and might even vanish if firms did not have an 
incentive to disproportionately reward individuals who worked long hours and who worked 
particular hours.”389 Crucially, Goldin does not explicate how, or why, firms would alter their 
incentive structures to aid women; she simply offers an elegant implementation of incentive-
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based vocabulary, and a faith in the self-correcting nature of markets as a private, 
nongovernmental solution to the problem of sexism.390 
Camille Olson, representing the United States Chamber of Commerce, argues: 
The proponents of the Act have not cited any evidence establishing that the existing wage 
gap is actually caused by employer discrimination. They essentially propose acceptance 
of the existence of the gap as definitive proof of employer discrimination. However, this 
unsubstantiated and faulty syllogism does not withstand scrutiny, or common sense. As 
labor economists and feminist scholars, alike, have proven and observed, the existing 
wage gap between men and women is attributable to a number of factors bearing no 
relationship whatsoever to alleged employer discrimination… Logically, these factors 
include personal choice; women’s disproportionate responsibilities as caregivers and 
other family obligations; education; self-selection for promotions and the attendant status 
and monetary awards; and other “human capital” factors.391 
 
Olson’s statement is symptomatic of nearly the entire “incentive-driven” argument strategy of 
the PFA’s opposition. First, and perhaps most importantly, her testimony demonstrates that the 
two opposing sides of this bill are ships passing in the night on even the stasis of the problem. 
Proponents argue that structural wage inequality cannot be fixed through market mechanisms 
because women are still subject to discriminatory wages, even after controlling for education, 
training and experience. The bill aims to remedy this impersonal-yet-operative structure; 
intentional discrimination is not an issue for this bill, specifically. 
That is why, on its face, Olson’s complaint that “[t]he proponents of the Act have not 
cited any evidence establishing that the existing wage gap is actually caused by employer 
discrimination…[t]hey essentially propose acceptance of the existence of the gap as definitive 
proof of employer discrimination,” is true only in a very narrow sense. Proponents argue the 
opposite: the existence of the gap is proof of a structural, impersonal inequality that is irreducible 
                                                
390 Of course, the market has already reached an equilibrium with a distribution of wage-earning and domestic work, 
so unless there were a financial reason to pay women more, it is not clear why a firm would take an economist’s 
advice (even if it is the president of the AEA) to alter their compensation schemes. It seems to me that the only 
outcome from a purely market-based solution standpoint would be to pay men disproportionately to their hours 
worked—in effect, lowering their wages. The legislative solution, fraught as it may be, at least ensures that no one 
can be paid less as the result of implementing fair pay laws. 
391 Olson, “Paycheck Fairness Act,” 22. 
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to a single market actor undervaluing a female worker. (Even a progressive, interventionist 
politician might be willing to concede that the market could discipline a single discriminatory 
employer in a competitive labor market.) It is also important that Olson reveals her opposition as 
syllogistic. She contends that PFA supporters simply engage in faulty reasoning: The premise 
that there is a wage gap (which Olson does not deny exists) joins with the premise (faulty, in her 
eyes) that employers are intentionally discriminating against women, to support the conclusion 
that legislation should fill this gap. 
Next, she points out that “logically,” the wage gap is attributable to the following factors: 
“personal choice; women’s disproportionate responsibilities as caregivers and other family 
obligations; education; self-selection for promotions and the attendant status and monetary 
awards; and other ‘human capital’ factors.” However, PFA supporters point out that the 
explanations for pay inequality are not alibis for said inequality. Precisely the opposite: Whereas 
opponents point to these to end the debate for a political solution to inequality, supporters point 
them out as contextual and malleable sites of struggle. Cohen points out, somewhat clumsily, 
that women make choices that change due to circumstances sometimes beyond their control: 
“Women do make choices that have negative effects on their long-term earnings but the choices 
they make are highly constrained and a lot of the times, those choices are constrained by factors 
at their places of work. So that you may be comparing women and men in different positions at 
the same workplace who have responded to opportunities at that workplace. It is very important 
to consider the factors in hiring and promotion and wage setting that work through people’s 
careers, even within the workplace that they’re in.”392 
                                                
392 Philip Cohen, “Closing the Gap: Equal Pay for Women Workers,” Hearing of the Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor and Pensions,” April 12, 2007, 43. Accessed March 20, 2015. 
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That is, women may lack the desire to work 60-hour weeks, or they never received the 
education that would generate a top-earning job, but that only implicates the prior availability or 
desirability of those choices in the past. As Sabrina Schaeffer from the Independent Women’s 
Forum (a right-wing think tank) writes, “The differences in pay between men and women come 
down to choices. Choices women—and men—make have costs. More women than men choose 
to take time off to raise a family, but that's a far cry from discrimination. And costs are the result 
of a woman's freedom, not an injustice imposed on her by society.”393 Incentives, as noted in 
Chapter 1, are almost always “responsibility-oriented,” meaning that because they are assumed 
to be voluntary, they are solely the responsibility of the incentive-driven actor—they dwell in the 
realm of freedom. And because they are inferred retroactively as the result of stable preferences, 
we can only conclude that such women previously followed their existing incentive structures. 
With an incentive-driven vocabulary, it is always too late to talk about change. 
As also explored in the introductory chapter, “incentives” function as both a trope of 
condensation and of displacement. Primarily, it condenses existing investments in neoclassical 
economic explanations for human life into a single term; because of this, it hypostasizes these 
competing explanations (recall, Gary Becker throws all of history, anthropology and psychology 
under the bus to claim that “the economic approach” explains each of them in turn) and pushes 
them further from the levers of cultural and political effectivity. Solving social problems is no 
longer the work of interrogating multiple, interacting, and complex layers of human society; 
since everything is reducible to incentive structures, human life is reduced to a series of 
techniques. And because the vocabulary functions both proactively (we solve problems by 
altering incentive structures) and retroactively (everyone is always assumed to have been 
                                                
393 Sabrina L. Schaeffer, “Paycheck Fairness Act Will Hurt Women,” US News & World Report, 
http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-the-senate-pass-the-paycheck-fairness-act/paycheck-fairness-act-will-
hurt-women, May 4, 2012, accessed March 22, 2015. 
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incentivized by their pre-given preferences, as evidenced by their behavior), the vocabulary 
stunts any critical interrogation of social life. In this case, each of the factors Olson brings up—
education, experience, even motivation—are all contextual factors in and of themselves, and 
sites of struggle. Whereas in pro-legislation positions these are avenues for change and redress, 
anti-legislation actors use them as ways to stop debates on the merits of the bills. These identical 
terms have opposite functions in the two positions: one metaphoric and one metonymic. 
Those opposed to the PFA see these factors functioning metaphorically, as concrete 
expressions of the “stable preferences” so venerated by neoclassical analysis. First, economists 
(and others who make these claims) attribute women’s choices to their preference structures; that 
is, women’s labor force behavior is attributable to their innate desires, their affective investments 
condensed in their calculable behavior. But beyond that, the semiotic closure foregrounded by 
economists is condensed affective investment on their part, as well. That is, uncovering the 
hidden forces that govern women’s wages is also a discursive act of affective investment by 
economists and other cultural actors. Defenders of the status quo have demonstrable investments 
in this act of attribution, so the metaphoric condensation works by attributing affective 
investment to the actions of others.394 For example, Jennifer Colosi, who runs an executive 
search firm, contends that Silicon Valley firms wish to hire women, but women turn them down 
because of family commitments: “They say ‘no thanks’ because they are unable to travel or 
commit the hours for the job that would move their careers further upward.”395 She concludes 
                                                
394 This outcome is potentially pernicious because economists perform the attribution of investment onto women 
regardless of whether it actually intersects with their thought processes or preferences. The affective investment to 
give a stable account of inequality is on the side of the economist. 
 
395 Quoted in Stephen J. Dubner, “One Woman’s View of the Female Wage Gap,” Freakonomics.com, 
http://freakonomics.com/2012/04/17/one-womans-view-of-the-female-wage-gap/, accessed May 10, 2015. 
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that “Women and men are different…and it should stay that way!”396 For Colosi, this attributive 
act is where our considerations, and especially our attempts to rectify through public policy, 
should end. 
On the other hand, equal pay supporters see these aforementioned incentives (of 
“women’s choices,” “disproportionate housework responsibilities,” or “raising children”) 
operating metonymically, as tropes of displacement. Supporters interpret these incentives as 
contextual factors, as potentially malleable social forces, not as explanations that stand on their 
own.397 Therefore, when such alibis are invoked, these serve only to highlight a more 
fundamental antagonism that slips away when equal pay opponents order them in the metonymic 
chain: Incentiveà Women’s choicesà Housework/Raising Children. “Women were more likely 
than men to leave the workforce with intentions to sacrifice their paychecks for the sake of 
caring for their families,” writes Penny Nance, of Concerned Women for America.398 For 
opponents such as Nance, invoking the “choice” tropes is intended to stop debate. Meanwhile for 
supporters, these are signals that we are missing something—an opportunity for action or 
redress—in this type of analysis. Both sides are caught on the rails of desire, to paraphrase 
Lacan, in the quest to symbolize an inconsistent reality; opponents of equal pay condense 
meaning in stable and demonstrable phenomena, while supporters thereof simply insist that 
meaning is elsewhere, and symbolizing it as a concrete expression of preferences misses the 
mark entirely. 
                                                
396 Quoted in Dubner, “One Woman’s View of the Female Wage Gap,” Freakonomics.com. 
397 That is, as concrete expressions of innate desires and the stable preferences posited by neoclassical economics. 
 
398 Penny Nance, “Act Undercuts Protection, Choices Women Have in Job Market,” US News & World Report, 
http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-the-senate-pass-the-paycheck-fairness-act/act-undercuts-protection-
choices-women-have-in-job-market, May 4, 2012, accessed March 22, 2015. 
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The Italian feminist autonomist Silvia Federici takes the assumption of “women’s 
incentives” head on. She argues that the sexual division of labor is a powerful ideological tool 
for the capitalist mode of production—it is not the result of innate preferences. In an essay about 
the political importance of waged housework, she writes: 
The wage gives the impression of a fair deal: you work and you get paid, hence you and 
your boss each get what’s owed; while in reality the wage, rather than paying for the 
work you do, hides all the unpaid work that goes into profit. But the wage at least 
recognizes that you are a worker, and you can bargain and struggle… The difference with 
housework lies in the fact that not only has it been imposed on women, but it has been 
transformed into a natural attribute of our female physique and personality, an internal 
need, an aspiration, supposedly coming from the depth of our female character… Capital 
had to convince us that it is a natural, unavoidable, and even fulfilling activity to make us 
accept working without a wage.399 
 
Federici’s analysis dovetails neatly with the themes developed here: A woman’s prescribed (and 
proscribed) social role is posited as the result of her innate preferences—her feminine qualities 
combined with her human capital investments. My contribution is that this process is a 
retroactive symbolization of the observed behavior of women—economists infer, or pundits 
extrapolate, that women must have been incentivized by their culturally agreed-upon role 
because they have performed it.400 
Of course, the neoclassical point rejoinder is that the capitalist mode of production is not 
innately sexist—it just so happens that men develop better wage-earning potential, and women 
just happen to invest their human capital more heavily in domestic chores and raising children. 
(This is, in not so many words, Becker’s entire position on differences among the sexes.) But this 
effectively “hides the ball” of the historical and cultural arrangements that organized the sexes 
                                                
399 Silvia Federici, Revolution at Point Zero: Housework, Reproduction, and Feminist Struggle (Oakland: PM Press, 
2012), 16. 
 
400 Or without a geography for that matter: Sweden, the 4th-most egalitarian country in the world, according to the 
World Economic Forum, has robust anti-discrimination laws to protect new parents who take leave—this is 
precisely where the gender pay gap begins to flower. See “Gender Equality in Sweden,” 
https://sweden.se/society/gender-equality-in-sweden/. Accessed May 4, 2015. 
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into these roles; for economic theory, capitalism is a process without a history. This purportedly 
agnostic position also confers human capital investments onto economic actors who may not 
have volunteered for such investments: Gendered wardrobes and toys for young children, 
cultural texts that treat sort boys and girls into defined roles, and socialization by peers at puberty 
are all prior to when people are assumed to be legally responsible for their actions. 
Jean-Paul Sartre saw this inattention to childhood development as a strategic failure of 
Marxism, and sought to supplement Marxist thought with psychoanalysis: 
Today psychoanalysis alone enables us to study the process by which a child, groping in 
the dark, is going to attempt to play, without understanding it, the social role which adults 
impose upon him. Only psychoanalysis will show us whether he stifles in his role, 
whether he seeks to escape it, or is entirely assimilated into it. Psychoanalysis alone 
allows us to discover the whole man in the adult; that is, not only his present 
determinations but also the weight of his history… In fact, it is a method which is 
primarily concerned with establishing the way in which the child lives his family 
relations inside a given society.401 
 
Neoclassical economics shares this failure, but effectively obfuscates it in a twofold manner: 
First, economic actors need not be of age to be considered rational economic actors, and second, 
children are considered to be the durable good of their parents, so the investments that parents 
make in their children cannot necessarily be condemned. As I discuss in the conclusion, women 
are somehow held responsible for this historical accretion and these concrete practices that 
contour their lives qua gender, and here is no exception: Their available menu of choices cannot 
reasonably said to be unencumbered by context.402  
                                                
401 Jean-Paul Sartre, Search for a Method, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), 60. 
 
402 Basu also condemns the assumption of voluntarism in neoclassical choice models. In a personal anecdote, he 
retells the story of a mugging, in which he was given a choice: “Your watch, or your life.” Of course, Basu hands 
over his watch, but while he purportedly had a choice in the matter, it was nevertheless a forced one. He writes, “I 
chose to keep my life. In fact, it was a bargain since mine was a cheap, unreliable watch. So having a choice cannot 
be equated with noncoercion. It is depriving me of my right—namely, the right to both my watch and life—that 
made it a case of coercion” (Beyond the Invisible Hand, 139.) Lacan also has his own version of this “your money or 
your life!” forced choice—his is at the level of the subject’s entry into the Symbolic order. One is not able to keep 
one’s “self” without castration, without a piece of flesh sacrificed to symbolic inclusion. This initial decision—the 
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Overall, opponents to equal pay legislation defer to the logic of incentives because the 
language is ostensibly an impartial way to infer people’s choices, beliefs and behaviors—all 
from the perspective of the “economic approach” to behavior. The metonymic connection of 
“women’s preferences” are made into a governing metaphor for the gendered division of labor, 
and such a metaphor represses the contextual, accidental and, yes, ideological functions of such 
metonymic connections. Each of these circumstances is then retroactively assumed to be either 
“gender neutral” or the result of women’s preexisting incentives and preferences.403 As Olson’s 
testimony demonstrates, that women are expected to perform the majority of domestic labor, or 
that their personalities might disincentivize them to demand a promotion, are “human capital” 
outlays—gender-neutral and the result of individual volition. This allegedly gender-neutral 
language still carries, however consciously or unconsciously, the assumption of a certain 
substance of femininity or womanhood. In sum, those opposed to equal pay legislation today do 
not rely on outwardly sexist arguments about a woman’s place, but rather, use the positive 
version of a form of essentialism to argue against legislative fixes.404 
Opposition to PFA 2: Closing the “Any Factor other than Sex” Loophole 
The gap within the language of the original Equal Pay Act just happened to be broad 
enough to allow employers to justify pay disparities without acknowledging the historical role 
that gender plays in determining pay. Four affirmative defenses against accusations of sex 
                                                                                                                                                       
inclusion of the actor into the capitalist mode of production, is obviated in economic theory. (Or it is assumed to 
have been freely chosen.) 
403 And equally important that the Paycheck Fairness Act does not significantly alter these excuses for inequality, 
but that it calls attention to gendered inequalities and offers redress for discrimination. 
 
404 Additionally, opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment did invoke some mild apocalyptical language— a 
radical form of equality would imperil the edifice of the family, and the nation. Those opposed to the Paycheck 
Fairness Act invoke the threat that if the federal government is empowered to set wages, the free market would be 
hamstrung by excessive regulation, and everyone would suffer. 
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discrimination are proffered within the Equal Pay Act: seniority, merit, quantity/quality of 
produced goods, and “any factor other than sex.” Greenberg testifies: 
Court interpretations of the last of the affirmative defenses, however—the defense that a 
pay differential between equal jobs is based on a “factor other than sex”—have in some 
instances opened the door to a perpetuation of the very sex discrimination the Equal Pay 
Act was designed to outlaw… Some courts have, for example, authorized employers to 
pay male employees more than similarly situated female employees based on the higher 
prior salaries enjoyed by those male workers. In a case decided in March of this year, for 
example, one federal district court accepted the argument that higher pay for the male 
comparator was necessary to “lure him away from his prior employer.” According to the 
court, “salary matching and experience-based compensation are reasonable, gender-
neutral business tactics, and therefore qualify as ‘a factor other than sex.’”405 
  
“Sex” functions as the one thing that cannot be named as a reason for wage discrimination, but as 
advocates are keen to point out, much of what constitutes sexist wage discrimination is not 
because of a conscious sexist belief, but because wage determination relies on the privileges that 
men are privy to in the first place. 
Aune points out that free market rhetorics rely upon “the law of unintended 
consequences,” by which I interpret as the ability to imagine, via a slippery slope or reductio ad 
absurdum, how anyone could potentially exploit a public policy aimed at remedying a social 
evil. Within debates about equal pay legislation, the specter of the “trial lawyer” and “frivolous 
lawsuit” is consistently invoked (so much so that it warrants its own study, since it makes an 
appearance in so many criticisms of public policy406). The gap within the language of the Equal 
Pay Act is large, excruciatingly so: Greenberg testifies that “[i]n fact, at least two circuits have 
accepted the argument that ‘any’ factor other than sex should be interpreted literally and that 
employers need not show that those factors are in any way related to a legitimate business 
                                                
405 Greenberger, “The Paycheck Fairness Act (H.R. 1338),” July 11, 2007, accessed February 22, 2015, 16. 
406 Especially because the “trial lawyer” trope is an example of social life organized like a market: Since individuals 
pursue their own selfish ends, and there is a market for lawyers to exploit tragedies and inequalities for their own 
personal gain, then their existence has not become obsolete. For a set of thinkers that wish for, or believe that, 
everything is organized like a market, consternation qua the “trial lawyer” functions as an exception to how a fully 
marketized system would operate. 
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purpose.”407 That is, literally anything can be invoked as a way to affirmatively defend pay 
discrimination. 
In a 1925 paper, Freud relates the strategy of verbal negation to the divergent 
psychological acts of judgment and repression. He uses the anecdote of a patient who says, 
during analysis, “You ask who this person in the dream can be. It’s not my mother.”408 Freud 
contends that “Negation is a way of taking cognizance of what is repressed; indeed, it is already 
a lifting of the repression, though not, of course, an acceptance of what is repressed… The 
outcome of this is a kind of intellectual acceptance of the repressed, while at the same time what 
is essential to the repression persists.”409 I use this concept to describe how the “factor other than 
sex” in the original Equal Pay Act is deployed to the detriment of women’s wage discrimination 
lawsuits because the discursive hole was large enough to be filled with any other factor. Evans 
notes, “Whereas negation concerns what Freud called ‘the judgement of existence,’ Bejahung 
denotes something more fundamental, namely the primordial act of symbolisation itself, the 
inclusion of something in the symbolic universe. Only after a thing has been symbolised (at the 
level of Bejahung) can the value of existence be attributed to it or not (negation).”410 “Negation” 
in the psychoanalytic sense is a term that plays between logical negation and a stronger form of 
“disavowal” (in German, this would be translated as “verleugnen”). 
Laplanche and Pontalis claim that “When we turn to the specifically Freudian usage, 
there seems to be a justification for distinguishing between ‘verneinen’ [negation proper] and 
‘verleugnen’ [denial, disavowal],” and that Freud reserved “disavowal” for when a patient denies 
                                                
407 Greenberger, “The Paycheck Fairness Act (H.R. 1338),” July 11, 2007, accessed February 22, 2015, 17. 
 
408 Sigmund Freud, “Negation,” in The Freud Reader, ed. Peter Gay (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995), 667. 
409 Freud, “Negation,” 667. 
 
410 Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, 17. 
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an external fact.411 I endorse the use of the term precisely because of the un-decidable zone 
between “logical” negation and “rejection” in wage discrimination cases. That is, because 
discriminatory employers have recourse to some external facts that justify unequal pay, these 
attributes (height requirements, equivalent positions’ pay, etc.) become rhetorical resources, even 
if they serve as displacements for a more fundamental fact—that of sex. Numerous experiments, 
surveys and lawsuits have demonstrated that women are systematically paid less after controlling 
for these “factors other than sex,” hence I claim that “sex” is the one piece of the discursive 
economy that must remain unsaid.412 
Olson argues that companies will be unduly burdened by the need to justify a pay 
inequality via one of these factors. She states, “It would be nearly impossible for an employer to 
defend against a claim that a wage differential existed by explaining that the differential was 
based on a factor other than sex… Employers would be required to prove, in order to counter the 
presumption of wage discrimination, that the factor responsible for a wage differential not only is 
something other than sex, but also meets a higher standard of ‘job relatedness’ or ‘legitimate 
business purpose.’”413 To paraphrase Freud’s analysis from before, with the current law as 
written, employers may say in court, “I do not know why I paid this woman less (or did not hire 
her in the first place)—all I know is that it was not because she is a woman!” Rather than Betty 
                                                
411 Jean Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (New York: 
Routledge, 1973), 262. 
412 There is an interesting case that paradoxically relates to the “factor other than sex,” which stems from the notion 
that a woman’s childbearing ability is what disqualifies her from certain types of work (and thus certain types of 
higher pay on a shop floor). In a case brought against Johnson Controls by eight female employees (and backed by 
the UAW), Johnson Controls had barred women from working in conditions that exposed them to lead because it 
could potentially harm an “unborn child.” While ultimately, the plaintiffs were successful (the Supreme Court ruled 
that this policy violated Title VII’s provision against sex discrimination in workplaces), it is useful to keep in mind 
that a woman’s mere biological potential can be, and was, used against her employability. Carrie Crenshaw argues 
that “By assuming the likelihood of accidental pregnancy… courts treated all women capable of bearing children as 
‘potential mothers’ although neither court cited any quantifiable evidence.” See Carrie Crenshaw. “The Normality of 
Man and Female Otherness: (Re)Producing Patriarchal Lines of Argument in the Law.” Argumentation & Advocacy 
32, no. 4 (1996): 170. Communication & Mass Media Complete. 
 
413 Camille Olson, “The Paycheck Fairness Act,” 28-9. 
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Friedan’s “problem that has no name,” the problem of unequal pay does have a name—it simply 
cannot be uttered by employers. Put differently, the gender pay gap appears through its 
symbolization—and then is negated just as quickly. Yet for our purposes, and for the purposes of 
those fighting for gender pay inequality, this negation is registered as a wage gap, and what is 
repressed in the symbolic of the legal realm returns in the “real” of big data.  
Opposition to PFA 3: “Big Data” Creates an Epistemological Quandary 
Finally, those opposed to the PFA object to the creation of federal surveys and databases 
of salaries across occupations and geographical regions. The idea, concomitant with the Act’s 
prohibition on retaliating against workers who share salary information at work, is that more 
information will aid female workers in negotiating for salaries. Prior to the PFA, Iowa Sen. Tom 
Harkin wrote in a similar provision in his own Fair Pay Act, which eventually ended up in the 
PFA: “In addition to requiring that employer provide equal pay for equivalent jobs, my bill also 
requires disclosure of pay scales and rates for all job categories at a given company without 
disclosing individual pay levels. This will give women the information they need to identify 
discriminatory pay practices negotiate better for themselves—which, in the end, could reduce the 
need for costly litigation in the first place.”414 That is, because opponents to all workplace 
nondiscrimination legislation invoke the threat of lawyers, not aggrieved workers, benefiting, 
this provision was inserted as a way to directly avoid the court system altogether.415 Women can 
refuse to apply to jobs below their pay expectations, and/or negotiate for equivalent salaries to 
men once they have earned the job. 
                                                
414 Sen. Tom Harkin, “The Fair Pay Restoration Act,” 43. 
 
415 The Lilly Ledbetter Act faced a similar set of counterarguments—those opposed did not take issue with 
Ledbetter’s experiences with outright sexist harassment and discrimination, only that lawyers would benefit more if 
a greater number of discrimination cases could be brought to trial. 
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The main argument developed by the bill’s opponents is that data could be misused by 
plaintiffs. For instance, some testifiers fear that a worker in Iowa could use the salary of a worker 
in an equivalent position in New York City to demand a higher wage. Barbara Brown, testifying 
against the bill, relates this: “First, the law has always said that employees need to be similarly 
situated in order to be fairly compared for purposes of pay. This law will eliminate two key 
concepts. One, the notion that employees must be in the same establishment to be working at 
equal work and that seems to me, fundamental. If you’re talking—whether it’s Wyoming, Iowa 
or New York City, you’ve got to look at that market, not only that geographic market but that 
employment market in terms of what skills are in demand there and what drives pay in that 
place.”416 Sen. Mike Enzi of Wyoming argues that “[t]hose who would go beyond the vigorous 
enforcement of gender discrimination laws and the efficient operation of open markets often 
make highly selective use of statistical data reported by the Department of Labor’s Bureau of 
Labor Statistics to support their position.”417 Furchtgott-Roth complains, “The Paycheck Fairness 
Act would require practically all employers to give the government information on workers' pay, 
by race and sex, with the goal of equalizing wages of men and women in different job 
classifications. This would represent a substantial intrusion of government into wage-setting and 
would discourage hiring.”418 Even the act of collecting data is an intrusion into the free market. 
 In order to explore what the value of this critique is for anti-equal pay opposition, I turn 
to the work of Mary Poovey, who, in A History of the Modern Fact, defines how thinkers of the 
Scottish Enlightenment created epistemological units of classical political economy in order to 
                                                
416 Barbara Brown, “Closing the Gap: Equal Pay for Women Workers,” April 12, 2007, 14. Accessed March 20, 
2015. 
 
417 Sen. Michael Enzi, “Closing the Gap: Equal Pay for Women Workers,” 6. 
 
418 Diana Furchtgott-Roth, “Paycheck Fairness Act Is Based on a Misapplied Statistic,” US News & World Report, 
http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/should-the-senate-pass-the-paycheck-fairness-act/paycheck-fairness-act-is-
based-on-a-misapplied-statistic, May 4, 2012, accessed March 22, 2015. 
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influence policy—numerical, as opposed to metaphorical, data was a form of “value-free 
persuasion.” She writes: 
The ensemble of knowledge practices that dominated the ancient world was reordered in 
such a way as to separate numerical representation from figurative language and, 
gradually, to elevate practices associated with numbers over those associated with 
metaphorical language… [T]he emergence of the modern fact coincided with this 
reordering—indeed, was instrumental to it—and that effacing this epistemological unit’s 
characteristic peculiarity was central to creating, then sustaining, the illusion that 
numbers are somehow epistemologically different from figurative language, that the 
former are somehow value-free whereas the excesses of the latter disqualify it from all 
but the most recreational or idealist knowledge-producing projects.419 
 
As a result of this shift, laissez-faire capitalist policies and practices were able to colonize the 
mindset of the modern world. 
By setting ‘descriptive’ in opposition to ‘rhetorical’…he [Adam Smith] created an 
epistemological space for an apparently nonsuasive mode of representation (whose form 
could be numerical but did not have to be), whose credibility came from its internal 
coherence as much as from its truth to nature… Thus the idea of a market system, which 
was generated by the systematic science of political economy, also helped address the 
problem of induction in protopsychological terms, for it brought what had not yet been 
observed (or counted) into relation with what the theorist could imagine, and it signaled 
that it had done so by conferring satisfaction where there had once been doubt.420 
 
Poovey is arguing, in fact, that classical political economy introduced the power of numerical 
thinking into public policy; yet this was crucially not empirically numerical thinking, since she 
argues Smith’s mathematical arguments were largely imaginary. Instead, these “epistemological 
units” bear a closer resemblance to “big data” in our contemporary conjuncture; in most cases, 
“big data” reveal hidden (equilibrium) forces, “hidden patterns, correlations and other insights” 
through regression analysis.421 
                                                
419 Mary Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact, 6. 
 
420 Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact, 216. 
 
421 “Big Data Analytics: What It Is and Why It Matters,” SAS, SAS.com, n.d., 
http://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/analytics/big-data-analytics.html, Accessed Feb. 22, 2016. 
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However, the harnessing of “big data” today for equal pay is a considerable challenge to 
this form of argument, for two reasons. First, if such databases would be able to demonstrate a 
gender pay gap even after controlling for purchasing power, cost of living, training, experience, 
and so on, those who rely strictly on the market would have nowhere to hide, as it were. The 
recourse to women’s incentives would be considerably more difficult, as would the assertion that 
markets are efficiently distributing the social resources of labor irrespective of sex or gender. 
After all, the Government Accountability Office already concluded that, even after controlling 
for marital status, race, children, income, and experience, women still earn 20 percent less than 
men do.422 The only rhetorical resource would be to argue that each of these contextual (not 
innate) factors explains gender inequality better than any form of discrimination, which is 
essentially the argument that opponents proffer. Poovey further indicates that Smith’s argument 
style invites the reader to imagine a world in which a potential outcome could be, but is not yet: 
The adoption of free trade policies (back then) would produce epistemological satisfaction in 
aligning free-market actions with the supposedly free-market inclinations of Nature itself. With a 
demonstrable gender pay gap, interested publics could imagine the diminution, and hopefully, 
the elimination of this gap, and could take concrete actions to participate therein. 
The neoclassical argument against this position follows: If “hard” economic data is itself 
persuasive—which Poovey insists rests at the heart of the classic economic project—then the 
capture and dispersal of “hard economic data” that says women are paid less than men would 
inevitably lead to redistributive public policies toward women. “Perverse incentives” would then 
infect the market, either revising wages for both genders downward, or “unjustly” raising wages 
                                                
422 U.S. General Accounting Office, Women’s Earnings: Work Patterns Partially Explain Difference between Men’s 
and Women’s Earnings 2, GAO–04–35 (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO–04–35. 
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for women with no regard to their marginal productivity.423 In the latter case, so the argument 
goes, labor markets would function inefficiently, as surplus value would become the property of 
working women and not the companies that employ them.424 Nance invokes Aune’s perversity 
thesis here by arguing, “Rather than helping women, the Paycheck Fairness Act would actually 
hurt them by abolishing jobs. It eliminates the flexibility between a woman and her employer… 
This will encourage frivolous lawsuits against companies, which will hurt business. Any time 
you hurt business, you hurt women… If you really want the economy to soar, then nix excessive 
government regulations and taxation for the sake of both working women and men.”425 
Furthermore, according to this view, the published wage information cannot adequately 
represent women’s incentives—theirs are embodied in the durable good of children, or in her 
prior human capital investments expressed by a tidy home. Poovey’s insight, I believe, 
momentarily de-familiarizes our assumptions that the epistemological units are uniformly tilted 
toward market-based solutions, but only in the sense that the valuation system can work once 
more informational sunshine is poured onto the labor market—which is, in itself, a component of 
market-based principles.426 After all, the bill’s sponsors claim that the publicized information 
                                                
423 Philip Mirowski’s Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste is one of many works to note how fearful neoliberals 
are of representative democracy. Democracy’s radical egalitarianism in the distribution of political power is inimical 
to the capitalist system of determining values of all types. 
 
424 Here is an opening for speaking about the question of remuneration for domestic labor. If “women’s work” were 
adequately and monetarily valued by the capitalist mode of production, one would assume that these inequalities 
would be attenuated, and indeed, individuals of all genders could make choices better in line with their incentive 
structures. If there were no difference in payment between waged work inside and outside the home, then any 
household arrangements could reasonably be called “efficient.” Becker’s aforementioned mathematical sexism 
would become gender-neutral, since the data would not privilege one gender’s human capital investments over the 
other. There is an open political question about whether people should demand that the market assign a price to 
biopolitical reproduction, discussed in the next footnote. 
 
425 Nance, “Act Undercuts Protection, Choices Women Have in Job Market.” 
 
426 In Commonwealth, authors Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri contend that the 2008 financial crisis was a crisis of 
biopolitical reproduction. Because financial capital harnesses the immanent power of the multitude’s 
biopolitical/immaterial labor and withers it away for its own purposes (Commonwealth 300), the worldwide 
meltdown was a crisis not of commensuration, or of realization, but of subjectivity. This produced what the duo 
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will allow women and employers to avoid lawsuits and legislation. The market will solve the 
problem of inequality because women will better bargain for wages and take jobs that accurately 
reflect their value. What is astonishing about this strategy is the idea that we ought to cast 
aspersions on empirical evidence, since the explicitly non-empirical accounting of women’s 
preferences as evidenced by children, domestic labor, and the like, is proffered as a more holistic 
way of viewing the assets of women. Here is the subversive upshot of Poovey: This type of 
argument is explicitly non-empirical while still partaking in a “numerical form.” We cannot trust 
hard economic data because it cannot account for everything, while we ought to trust equilibrium 
approaches that promise us there is no gap at all. (Even contemporary “big data” analytics rely 
on equilibrium models of analysis to argue that, as mentioned in Chapter 3, social reality is 
organized like a market already—“big data” simply registers these hidden forces unseen by say, 
pricing mechanisms.) 
In sum, there are essentially three overlapping arguments working against the PFA: The 
invocation of/deferral to “women’s incentives,” negation that covers over the particularity of 
inequality as a “factor other than sex” despite demonstrable evidence to the contrary, and hand-
wringing about the potentially distorting effects that gathering empirical information would have 
on women’s ability to bargain for higher pay. These all, in different ways occlude our attention 
to both structure and contingency. Contextual decisions that make up a woman’s pay are 
explained away as the result of the metaphor of “women’s preferences,” structural inequality is 
negated (in the psychoanalytic sense), barred from our consideration. As a whole, these argument 
                                                                                                                                                       
termed “blockages of subjectivity” (to others, it might reasonably be described as a “credit crunch,” or 
“unemployment,” or “a cascading foreclosure nightmare”). Following Federici, the duo in effect argue that crises 
could be avoided if the capitalist mode of production better valued the immaterial biopolitical connections among 
people that make up the multitude. I am unenthusiastic about this strategy. 
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strategies render it difficult, if not impossible, to gain a vantage point from whence to argue 
against gender pay inequality—the difference then becomes Real. 
Conclusion: What Does Woman Want? 
As argued in Chapter 1, one facet of incentive logic is that it is “responsibility oriented,” 
meaning that people who make a choice are assumed to have done so from an available, non-
coerced menu of choices, and thus are responsibility for choosing X over Y. (And following the 
choice=utility axiom, the chooser is assumed to value, or be incentivized by, X over Y.) In this 
particular case, the strict incentive-based logic does not inhere. Women are judged to be 
responsible for four simultaneous and occasionally contradictory phenomena—their own 
choices, the choices of other women, the cultural expectation of motherhood and the biological 
necessity of species propagation. On an individual level, women are rendered responsible for 
their own choices—should they choose to leave the labor force to raise children, they must 
expect to individually forego earning opportunities available to people who do not. Next, women 
are paid less than men even in equivalent circumstances, even if they have not raised children. 
The mere potential of the woman’s body to become pregnant, and the expectation that they will 
is enough of an alibi to underpay one gender, as Moss-Racusin et al. demonstrate. That is, the 
concrete choices of women who wish to become mothers and the cultural expectation that they 
eventually will do so is confirmation that women are held to the standards of other people’s 
incentive structures.427 The only way the logic inheres here is to admit that the incentive 
structures of other actors determine those of others. In this case, employers have incentives to 
hire women at lower wages, and resist legislative or judicial redress by engaging in the political 
process through lobbying and donations to agreeable lawmakers. 
                                                
427 To say nothing of the cultural expectation that women should perform the bulk of domestic work. 
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Finally, this vocabulary closes in on itself, and around alternative ways of being, when 
the issue of species propagation arises. Opponents of equal pay legislation aver that women’s 
unequal pay arises because they leave the workforce to have and raise children—so 
hypothetically, if all women refused the order to propagate in favor of equivalent pay, the 
outcome is naturally the dissolution of the human species.428 Child-rearing is an indispensable 
“externality” of the system; the capitalist mode of production reaches its partnering equilibrium 
when women find the mate with wage-earning human capital outlays that best matches their 
human capital outlays of domestic work (see Becker’s The Economic Approach to Human 
Behavior, 1972). And as Federici emphasizes, naturalizing the privatization and gendering of 
domestic work is one of the greatest ideological victories of the capitalist mode of production 
over alternative modes of being. 
In Lacan’s 20th seminar, Encore, the psychoanalyst asks, as his subtitle conveys, what (if 
any) relationship love and knowledge have, and what is the essence of “feminine sexuality.” He 
engages with Freud’s unanswerable question “What does a woman want?” Lacan, in high 
Lacanese emblematic of his latter-day seminars, contends that:  
Analytic discourse demonstrates to me…that, to one of these beings qua sexed, to man 
insofar as he is endowed with the organ said to be phallic…the corporal sex (sexe 
corporel) or sexual organ (sexe) of woman—I said, ‘of woman,’ whereas in fact woman 
does not exist, woman is not whole (pas toute)—woman’s sexual organ is of no interest 
(ne lui dit rien) except via the body’s jouissance… Phallic jouissance is the obstacle 
owing to which man does not come (n’arrive pas), I would say, to enjoy woman’s body, 
precisely because what he enjoys is the jouissance of the organ.429 
 
In concordance with the definition of masculine knowledge noted above, men (that is, those 
organized as “man” by the symbolic order) only cognize the “woman” insofar as she is reducible 
                                                
428 Again, this is a hypothetical thought exercise—a tracing of the consequences of what equal pay opponents 
actually proffer as explanations for gender inequality. 
429 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX: On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and 
Knowledge, 1972-1973, trans. Bruce Fink, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999), 7. 
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to the object of enjoyment, the objet petit a. What he enjoys is phallic enjoyment, not the woman 
in and of herself. In this interpretation, “woman” is “not-whole (pas-toute) because it lacks the 
“thing” that men possess—the phallus.430 
Butler extends this position, writing, “Women are the ‘sex’ which is not ‘one.’ Within a 
language pervasively masculinist, a phallogocentric language, women constitute the 
unrepresentable… [T]he feminine ‘sex’ is a point of linguistic absence, the impossibility of a 
grammatically denoted substance, and, hence, the point of view that exposes that substance as an 
abiding and foundational illusion of a masculinist discourse.”431 Lacan’s point in defining 
masculine knowledge thusly is that, as Lundberg puts it, “the ‘male’ position represents the 
reduction of the Other to an object.”432 This reduction is endemic to the debates about equal pay 
legislation—opponents are able to stably objectify the activities of women as epistemologically 
commensurable with objects at other levels of reality. However, the movement is more complex 
than the reduction of “woman” to an object, calculable and domesticated. The sophisticated 
criticisms of the PFA and Lilly Ledbetter posit something like “woman’s jouissance,” something 
inaccessible to male legislators, except as this enigma—they can only gesture to it. The Real of 
the woman’s incentive is a rhetorical resource: The gap of intelligibility, of being able to 
definitively account for all of human interactions, is precisely how opponents of equal pay can 
posit something like “women’s incentives” exist, and that they are calculable and able to be 
registered at the same ontological level as wage-earning. 
                                                
430 Elsewhere, Lacan speculates that while men “have” the phallus (and therefore are separated from it at the level of 
being), woman “is” the phallus, the fantasy object that men wish to possess. 
431 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 2007), 10. 
 
432 Christian Lundberg, Lacan in Public, 200-1. 
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Lacan’s concept of feminine jouissance is helpful here—rather than being strictly 
reducible to an object, Lacan claims that “there is always something in her that escapes 
discourse.”433 Later, he contends, “when I say that woman is not-whole and that is why I cannot 
say Woman, it is precisely because I raise the question of a jouissance that, with respect to 
everything that can be used in the function ϕx, is in the realm of the infinite.”434 In other words, 
while the feminist criticism of reducing woman to object (a) helps us understand how anti-equal 
pay rhetors, legislators and economists essentialize “women” as caregivers and childbearing 
vessels, these same actors’ arguments are effective precisely because they attribute this 
inaccessible, infinite jouissance to women. Women’s jouissance is inaccessible to legislators, 
barred precisely because of the masculinist reduction of “other” to “object”—hence 
paradoxically producing this remainder of jouissance. It is an act of figuration, of attribution, that 
occurs here, not one of substance—far from it. In my view, it is instead the masculine jouissance 
of the economist, the politician, and the testifier that is circulated in these debates. The pleasure 
is the attribution of jouissance to an other, through the metaphorical reduction of that other to an 
objet a. 
What makes this particular rhetorical strategy pernicious is that this purported 
agnosticism about “woman” is in fact an alibi for the persistence of the tropes that surround all 
women. In other words, women are held responsible for the (male) fantasies that surround 
them—“woman” is not reducible to biological sex, although that is occasionally an alibi for 
mistreatment. Instead, “woman” is a fantasy structure within a signifying economy that reduces 
concrete others to objects of control. The conceptualization of woman, much like the wage gap 
itself, is both/and, not either/or: Women have both the non-monetary incentives inaccessible to 
                                                
433 Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX, 33. 
 
434 Ibid., 103. 
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capitalism as well as their stable figuration that guarantees their unequal treatment thereby. That 
is, if we attribute the predictable essentialist predicates to “woman,” she does have a substance; 
women are caregivers, they raise children, they deeply desire to do housework. And because one 
is able to posit this enjoyment as calculable in the very deepest sense—calculated 
instantaneously by all actors, resulting from their preference structures, woman’s work (in both 
senses!) must not be valued monetarily as highly by the work done by men. As Federici puts it, 
“Wages for housework, then, is a revolutionary demand not because by itself it destroys capital, 
but because it forces capital to restructure social relations in terms more favorable to us and 
consequently more favorable to the unity of the class.”435 Federici’s demand is that the capitalist 
mode of production should have no recourse to invoking non-monetary incentives, since it can 
theoretically put a price on everything. (“Women’s work” is “work.”) 
Yet the same logic works in reverse: As long as a woman is not “woman,” she can 
achieve anything she wants in the capitalist mode of production. In the end, it is not that women 
cannot “have it all,” it is that the capitalist mode of production cannot have “it all,” a universality 
without remainder. Here we have the alliance between Lacan’s concept of masculine knowledge 
and Marx’s conceptualization of the capitalist mode of production. Lacan’s masculine 
knowledge is a universality grounded in an exception, the exception/remainder is what generates 
the dynamism of the universal. Marx, in turn, defines the capitalist mode of production in the 
same way—a system that generates its own unstable excesses even as it continually reabsorbs 
them. The dialectical tension in reproducing the worker (for the autonomist school) or for the 
discovery of equilibrium (for the neoclassical) is a relation of labor-power to its supplement, the 
“woman”—the part that is generated precisely to not be calculated with the wage relation. Once 
again, we are in the realm of the Real—the hitch or stain that prevents the whole from relating to 
                                                
435 Federici, Revolution at Point Zero, 19. 
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itself as such, but the hitch that generates our anamorphic reality. When legislators attack equal 
pay legislation as improper, they are pointing to this supplementary enjoyment, contending that 
both women and firms already calculate it. The term “incentive” is the signal of this enjoyment, 
and its alibi for non-remuneration. Ultimately, the capitalist mode of production would be 
imperiled if this enjoyment were doubly registered—if women close the wage gap legislatively, 
it means they would be enjoying their housework (non-monetary incentive) and their wages 
(monetary incentive) too. Neoclassical economics, then, provides the model of the obsessional 
neurotic, contending with the fear that someone, somewhere, is enjoying (inefficiently).436  
                                                
436 Philip Mirowski, in Machine Dreams writes that “inefficiency [is] a sign that someone, somewhere, was not 
optimizing.” See Machine Dreams: Economics Becomes a Cyborg Science, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 21. Opponents denigrate equal pay legislation by claiming it would produce inefficiencies in the 
market, causing unemployment, higher prices, or unjustly higher wages for women. Hence, one must root out these 
inefficiencies by positing the types of enjoyment that need not be remunerated. 
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Chapter 6: The Frontiers of Incentive-Driven Politics 
 
“Unrealistic optimism is a pervasive feature of human life; it characterizes most people in most 
social categories. When they overestimate their personal immunity from harm, people may fail to 
take sensible preventative steps. If people are running risks because of unrealistic optimism, they 
might be able to benefit from a nudge.”— Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge437 
 
In September 2015, President Barack Obama released an executive order calling for the 
creation of a team to advise federal agencies to use insights from behavioral economics in 
policymaking, since a “growing body of evidence demonstrates that behavioral science 
insights…can be used to design government policies to better serve the American people.”438 In 
so doing, President Obama continued his own trend of relying on behavioral economists to 
influence government policy. Cass R. Sunstein, an author of the popular 2008 book Nudge: 
Improving Decisions in Health, Wealth, and Happiness served in the Obama administration from 
2009 to 2012 at the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, and economist Peter R. Orszag 
headed the Office of Management and Budget from 2009 to 2010. Bloomberg News credited 
Orszag with implementing incentive-based schemes within the Affordable Care Act and the 
Dodd-Frank financial reforms, and noted that his team’s “handiwork can be seen in proposed 
rules ranging from mine safety to retirement savings, tire durability, and food labels.”439 In 2010, 
Bloomberg heralded this trend in the Obama administration as a return of the “regulatory state,” 
which was, in their words, “poised for a dramatic comeback following decades of 
                                                
437 Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 33. 
 
438 Barack Obama, “Executive Order: Using Behavioral Science Insights to Better Serve the American People,” The 
White House, September 15, 2015, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/15/executive-order-using-
behavioral-science-insights-better-serve-american, accessed February 20, 2016. 
 
439 Mike Dorning, “Obama Adopts Behavioral Economics,” Bloomberg News, June 24, 2010, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/magazine/content/10_27/b4185019573214.htm, accessed February 20, 2016. 
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retrenchment.”440 But was this the case? Or more importantly, if the Obama administration’s 
“regulatory state” instead entailed incentive-based policies rather than classically regulatory 
ones, in what precise sense would this remain true? 
In the preceding chapter, we saw that the metastasis of “incentive-driven” vocabularies 
onto a bill regarding equal pay for women had a calamitous effect on its legislative success. The 
attribution of “incentives” onto the choices of women rendered a site of contextual, conflictual 
and culturally bound circumstances as the voluntary result of their preexisting preferences. The 
case study functions as a paradigm for how incentives function in the current conjuncture: 
Incentives are assumed to be voluntarily chosen from an available menu of options, and they 
condition (or control) people’s behavior. (In this case, women had human capital factors and 
“innate preferences” that motivated them to take low-paying or “care work” jobs.) Thus, 
incentive logics are responsibility oriented, in that people are held responsible for their choices—
they are assumed to be ready to “pay the price” of whatever behavior they take. The logic of the 
incentive retroactively renders coherent these contextual factors, and acts as a figure that covers 
over a gap in our available matrix of explanation. The result is that we infer people’s preferences 
as the result of their behavior and posit an underlying “incentive” therein. And finally, 
neoclassical economics is fundamentally underwritten by the presumption that market 
mechanisms already structure all social relationships: Only three simplifying assumptions need 
to be made to argue any social phenomenon as an “economic” one—the principles of utility 
maximization, stable preferences and market mechanisms. 
In sum, this model of analysis smuggles in fairly standard neoclassical assumptions about 
human behavior in order to treat all social phenomena as market phenomena, and what results is 
an attenuation of non-economic vocabularies and the reduction of potential solutions to “market-
                                                
440 Dorning, “Obama Adopts Behavioral Economics.” 
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based” ones. For many social phenomena, this simply implies that the status quo is at 
equilibrium, and no changes ought to be made thereto: Witness Becker’s claim that the 
“marriage market” exists at equilibrium, or Levitt and Dubner’s glib remarks that women are 
simply not incentivized by higher wages. That is, these “market-based” solutions rely on the 
notion of equilibrium to retroactively authorize opposition to any ameliorative action. 
Yet in other ways, “incentive-driven” rubrics authorize the prescription or application of 
what Foucault calls “the economic grid” onto “non-market relationships and phenomena.”441 
Here, the retroactive account is presented as a prescriptive model for behavior. When faced with 
an intractable social problem, an economic policymaker makes the simplifying assumption that 
people are improperly incentivized as a way to authorize the imposition of market structures onto 
social existence.442 Becker’s BusinessWeek columns advocating for the auctioning off of 
immigration slots to the highest bidder falls under this rubric, since that would properly signal 
who most highly values residency in the United States, as do his academic works advocating two 
justice systems for the rich and poor. (In his view, stiffer jail sentences for the poor and monetary 
fines for the rich would better incentivize each group of people into more “rational” criminal 
acts, thus making the criminal justice “market” more “efficient” at deterring and punishing 
crime.) 
This final chapter introduces the consequences of the executive branch, especially when 
occupied by the Democratic Party, adopting incentives as a governing metaphor to contour social 
                                                
441 Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 240. 
 
442 The great irony of this position is that it depends on a disavowal of the efficacy of incentives as a global 
explanatory mechanism. That is, to assume that humans are always-already incentive-driven means that their current 
behavior is already driven by unacknowledged incentives. The implementation of incentive schemes into non-
economic social phenomena means only that policymakers, economists or judges aim to alter those already existing 
incentives. Thus, incentives are a partial explanatory matrix in the guise of a universal one. 
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policy.443 I use this as a way to conclude and examine the limits of incentive logics overall. Here, 
I introduce the psychoanalytic distinction between the “goal” and the “aim” of a subject to 
explain what makes incentive-based social policies so attractive to the liberals of all parties, and 
the consequences of its metastasis. As of this writing in 2016, the Democratic Party is poised to 
occupy the White House for a third consecutive term, and by 2020, will have occupied the 
executive branch for 20 of 28 years. The party has enthusiastically embraced the logic of the 
incentive in social policy over and above that of redistributive and regulatory politics as part of 
the uptake of “public choice”-based policies writ large. Barnett, writing in the context of the 
United Kingdom over the same time period, writes that the public choice model, “leads therefore 
to a search for incentive structures that will encourage agents to align their own self-interests 
with forms of action which will also be of benefit to their clients. It also recasts the role of 
elected officials as champions of the interests of public service users, seeking to rein in and 
discipline indifferent and inflexible ‘producer’ interests in bureaucracies and expert 
professions.”444 While the Republican Party has deregulated and defunded industries outright, 
preferring the “real thing” of commodity markets, the Democratic Party has instead sublated the 
logic of the market into policymaking towards its chosen ends. 
Overall, should governments metastasize the social logic of the incentive onto social 
policy writ large, we may witness the abandonment of the state’s traditional role of mediating 
                                                
443 At least at the federal circuit court level, the “economic approach” has been enormously influential due to the 
gargantuan influence of Judge Richard Posner. Indeed, the entire subfield of “law and economics” is one that he 
largely inaugurated. See Ranney’s “The Things We Say: The Speculations of Legal Science” in Ethics and Legal 
Rhetoric. Richard Coase, another highly influential economist, won a Bank of Sweden prize in economic sciences 
for work in this vein. According to Landes, Lessig and Solimine, Posnder is the single most cited federal appeals 
judge, followed in third place by his ideological fellow traveler and colleague in at the 7th Circuit, Judge Frank 
Easterbrook. See William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig, and Michael E. Solimine, “Judicial Influence: A Citation 
Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges,” Chicago Working Paper in Law & Economics (Second Series) 1998, 
23. 
 
444 Clive Barnett, “Publics and Markets: What’s Wrong with Neoliberalism?” in The Handbook of Social 
Geography, eds. Susan Smith, Sallie Marston, Rachel Pain, and John Paul Jones III (London: Sage, 2009), 23. 
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social conflicts through the taxation and redistribution of social surplus. Instead, states will 
govern by incentivizing “good” behaviors for those formerly the beneficiaries of social welfare 
programs, and rewarding businesses that facilitate or enact good behavior for those in need of 
help. This presents a robust challenge to the social democratic tradition: The introduction of 
incentive schemes may entail a foreclosure of alternative solutions to social ills regarding both 
wealth redistribution and economic regulation: To fulfill social priorities, the state may no longer 
tax social welfare at a progressively higher rate, but instead, incentivize businesses through tax 
cuts to produce socially beneficial outcomes. The narrowing of the scope of social policy may in 
fact determine its content.445 This does not mean that the state shall cease to mediate conflicts—
far from it! Instead, such conflicts will be transposed onto a different register, a stasis upon 
which the axioms of neoclassical economics reside most comfortably. 
In the standard view of governmental activity, the state collects tax revenues 
progressively based on wealth as well as on certain activities (like investment, or wage-earning), 
then redistributes that surplus toward programs, agencies and individuals. In addition, state 
agencies enforce regulations for businesses and individuals, such as environmental protections, 
food safety standards, or building codes. These actions are the complex expressions of social 
priorities, legislative compromise, interest group power, and political will, among many other 
factors. For instance, between 1879 and 1906, “nearly 100 bills had been introduced in Congress 
to regulate food and drugs,” according to the Food and Drug Administration, each one of them 
failing.446 The publication of Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle, first in serial form in Appeal to 
                                                
445 In the case of equal pay, advocates for the Paycheck Fairness Act either imitated the rhetorical logic of the 
incentive, which presumes incentive logics fully characterize the entirety of the issue, or rejected it outright, after 
which opponents could produce a coherent explanation of why equal pay is acceptable. 
 
446 John P. Swann, “FDA’s Origin,” http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm054819.htm. 
Accessed June 22, 2016. 
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Reason, and later on its own as a novel, galvanized public support for safety standards, and 
contributed to President Roosevelt signing the Food and Drugs Act in 1906. This law instituted a 
set of regulatory agencies and regimes for insuring food safety through inspections and 
standards, and represents one of the high points of the Progressive Era in the United States. 
Criticism of the standard position occurs in two ways: The first, following Samuelson, 
comes by retroactively re-articulating all governmental action as an unconscious production of 
“perverted” or “distorted” incentives. The second builds off the first: Pace Becker, policymakers 
metastasize the form of “the incentive” to encompass any and all behavior, and what results is a 
set of calculable levers or techniques to contour the behaviors of citizens and subjects toward 
chosen social or political ends. These two positions collapse in on one another. The first relies on 
the “law of unintended consequences,” in which any progressive policy (taxation, regulation, 
redistribution) is thwarted by the iron laws of supply and demand, and returns social reality to 
equilibrium. The second position fails by not taking this intellectual challenge seriously enough. 
By presuming market mechanisms organize all behaviors, one does not avoid the problem of 
mediation by producing new incentive schemes—desire is only displaced onto a different 
register. In other words, the Carter, Clinton, and Obama administrations simply rephrase the 
question “What do you want?” without taking seriously the tremendous challenge that market-
based approaches bring to social problems. It is here Lacan can make a decisive intervention: His 
schematization of desire helps us understand how incentive logics founder at their frontiers. 
First, the notion of taxation-as-incentive long precedes the recent uptake of incentive 
logics in politics and society. Recall that Samuelson’s claim that taxation is primarily a form of 
behavioral modification: By incentivizing and disincentivizing certain behaviors (such as taxing 
risk-taking entrepreneurial behavior), governments produce suboptimal outcomes. Samuelson’s 
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concern was that taxation “distorts” incentives, by which he means distorts markets from 
unilaterally determining the behaviors of individuals. (And long before that, Bentham argued that 
states cannot create appetites, only articulate them toward productive ends.) When the term 
“incentive” becomes an objective feature of markets, and there is agreement that it is sutured to 
“financial motivation,” then any potential inhibition can be characterized as a “distortion” of 
incentives. “Incentive” becomes a rhetorical resource to guard against any taxation scheme that 
does not connect the taxed behavior to the desired outcome. In the terms of psychoanalysis, 
redistributive state policies produce an unconscious signification: They do not realize they are 
producing incentives that, due to the iron (dialectical) laws of supply and demand, produce 
suboptimal effects. The solution is for the state to voluntarily remove itself from issuing top-
down regulations, and instead to “incentivize” socially beneficial behaviors. 
This (neoclassical) position is not that governments intentionally set out to morph the 
behaviors of its constituents, but because governments are ignorant of the profound 
consequences of their taxation, regulatory, and incentive schemes, they unconsciously produce 
suboptimal social outcomes. It relies on the immutable “law of unintended consequences” to 
point out what McCloskey calls the “ironies of social engineering.”447 As pointed out by 
Foucault, “economics is an atheistic discipline” because it “demonstrate[s] not only the 
pointlessness, but also the impossibility of a sovereign point of view over the totality of the state 
that he has to govern.”448 The problem with Foucault’s account, as posited in Chapter 3, is that 
the “god-function” is that of “the market” itself, the purportedly neutral registrar of all human 
activity through prices. What “incentives” do, then, is transfer the position of knowledge from 
                                                
447 Deirdre McCloskey, If You’re So Smart, 15. McCloskey argues that this “pointing out” function is the aim of the 
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the state to that of the individual (and by extension, the market, since that is the only place where 
individuals can act). Foucault arrives at the insight that neoliberalism instantiates a necessary—
and useful—stupidity at the heart of the state. It begins from the proposition that since no state 
could adequately represent all desires, motives and activities better than the price system, no 
state ought to be allowed to do so. McCloskey’s point is that when a well-meaning politician or 
bureaucrat mistakes the “aim” of a social policy for its “goal,” they produce perverse incentives, 
thereby nullifying, or worse, producing the exact opposite intended outcome. Incentive-based 
arguments are predicated on the idea that one cannot ever aim directly at a desired outcome and 
achieve it. (Or if we do, we produce unexpected perverse outcomes. For instance, solving the 
problem of homelessness cannot, in this view, involve giving all people housing, since that 
would depress housing prices, drive down property values, and so on.) Instead, the best social 
policy is to aim at a mediating object and indirectly produce the desired outcome.449 We shall 
return below to interrogate the structural necessity of this indirection. 
The second position, represented by Sunstein and Thaler, relies on the metastasis of 
“incentives” to incorporate all behaviors, not just monetarily influenced ones. The duo was 
explicitly cited in the Obama administration’s 2015 executive order, and their work functions as 
an exemplar of this “incentive-based” approach to social policy. To them, individuals act in 
accordance with their own selfish preferences and they respond to the “prices” of behaviors, 
financial or otherwise. Therefore, the best social policy is not to prohibit any behaviors, but 
rather, to raise the cost of behaviors and appeal to people’s rationalities. (In this world, 
everything is permitted, as long as you are willing to pay.) The implicit coercion of regulation 
                                                
449 Adam Smith’s concept of “self-interest, rightly understood” is another way of articulating this point. Only when 
we appeal to the baker’s self-interest do we get a loaf of bread—money functions as the mediating object that 
motivates someone to provide a service for another. The metastasis of “incentive” merely means that we assign 
nonmonetary, social and political rewards to the same selfish calculus that money formerly occupied on its own. 
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makes way for a softer, positive entreaty toward better behavior. The duo intensifies the logic of 
the incentive and metastasizes it to include every single action, not just to taxation. In Nudge, the 
authors aver they are actively aiming to direct or contour the behaviors of their subjects. They 
write, “choice architects must think about incentives when they design a system. Sensible 
architects will put the right incentives on the right people. One way to start to think about 
incentives is to ask four questions about a particular choice architecture: Who uses? Who 
chooses? Who pays? Who profits?”450 So committed to the incentive-driven approach are the 
authors that they place it first in their mnemonic device for “nudges,” by creatively fudging the 
device’s arrangement. Choice architects, they argue, should be concerned with the following 
checklist: 
iNcentives 
Understand mappings 
Defaults 
Give feedback 
Expect error 
Structure complex choices451 
 
To be fair to the, every other item on Sunstein and Thaler’s checklist does represent an 
acknowledgement of complexity and context in the production of outcomes. 
Anchoring points, for instance, represent “one of the most common human biases. As an 
example…write down your phone number and add two hundred. Now answer when you think 
the Hun sacked Europe? In surveys, people’s answers differ by a few hundred years depending 
on whether they have a low or a high anchor.”452 That is, people can feel totally different about 
identical outcomes if their “anchoring points” are manipulated: Being told you are receiving a 
                                                
450 Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, 97. 
 
451 Ibid., 100. 
 
452 Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, “Behavioral Economics Tips for Home Sellers: How to Price a House,” 
Nudges.org, May 14, 2008, accessed June 20, 2016. 
 240 
“free serving” of a differently packaged but identically sized item changes your likelihood of 
purchasing it. But ultimately the vision of “libertarian paternalism” reinforces the centrality of 
neoclassical economic approaches in social analysis because any divergences are cosmetic, since 
Sunstein and Thaler explicitly aim to produce new equilibria from already existing ones. In other 
words, this is a formal difference rather than a content-based one, since the organizing metaphor 
of the universal market remains in place. White writes that behavioral economics “successfully 
parodies the traditional model’s implicit assumption that no matter how complex a choice 
situation, people can instantly perform all the mental calculations of benefit and costs, or 
‘pleasures and pains,’ to arrive at the utility-maximizing choice.”453 The accent, for the Nudge 
authors, is on the ability for a state to adequately represent the socially or economically “correct” 
choice for a given individual, and contour the available choices to be what someone would have 
wanted all along.454 
 Yet the duo’s divergence from the traditional function of the state is also explicit. They 
write, “Typically regulators have chosen some kind of command-and-control regulation, by 
which they reject free choices and markets entirely and allow people little flexibility in 
promoting environmental goals. Command-and-control regulation is sometimes embodied in 
technological mandates, through which government effectively requires the environmentally 
                                                
453 Mark D. White, The Manipulation of Choice: Ethics and Libertarian Paternalism (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan 2013), 25. 
 
454 White, in an explicitly libertarian manner, bristles at the notion that governments can know better than 
individuals what the “utility” of their choices are. He writes, “The only way a policymaker can judge another 
person’s choice is by the policymaker’s own standards and interests, not the standards and interests of the person 
whose choices are being judged. And regardless of whether a particular choice is judged as good or bad by the 
person who made it, policymakers are not justified in ‘nudging’ that person to make a different choice which suits 
the interests imposed by the policymakers.” White, The Manipulation of Choice, xii. The Lacanian riposte, of 
course, is that nothing authorizes the presumption that an individual knows full well the utility of their choices, only 
that the individual retroactively authorizes that decision through a Nietzschean “thus I willed it.” The tricky issue is 
that Thaler and Sunstein are right when they remind us that “nudges” happen everywhere, whether we like it or not, 
so there is no moral case against them in a highly complex world. Because there is no pure space of decision, 
whether individual or social, all we have are competing accounts of our acceptance or rejection thereof. 
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friendly technologies that it prefers; catalytic converters for cars are one example.”455 The 
authors liken this to “Soviet-style five-year plans,” and instead advocate for incentive-based 
plans for problems as large as global climate change: “And if the problem of climate change is to 
be seriously addressed, the ultimate strategy will be based on incentives, not on command-and-
control.”456 Such is the dominant disposition of the present presidential administration, but was 
also nothing new for the Democratic Party twenty years before. 
Philip Cooper, in The War Against Regulation, argues that the Jimmy Carter and Bill 
Clinton administrations frequently used “incentive-driven” policies in their regulatory directives. 
Cooper notes that the Clinton administration was outwardly enthusiastic about the role of 
government in regulatory issues, but when their guidelines arrived in 1993, the “public” nature of 
government regulation was absent or severely attenuated. He writes: “Notwithstanding the 
rhetoric about concern for the good people in government, it was clear that many Clintonites held 
little trust or confidence in the public service to make the changes they sought. That lack of 
confidence—and for some a very real suspicion—was manifest in part by a focus on policy that 
emphasized the creation of policies that relied as much as possible on incentives and other 
market dynamics and not primarily on implementation and administration by public 
administrators.”457 The Obama administration’s disposition mirrors Clinton’s in this respect, 
which makes the Bloomberg prediction that the “regulatory state” was due for a resurgence 
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sound so strange. That is, the content of the Obama administration’s regulatory structures are not 
demonstrably different from Clinton’s, which makes the term “regulatory state” oxymoronic.458 
Take Clinton’s September 1993 Executive Order #12866: “Each agency shall identify 
and assess available alternatives to direct regulation, including providing economic incentives to 
encourage the desired behavior, such as user fees or marketable permits, or providing 
information upon which choices can be made by the public.”459 Vice President Al Gore partook 
in this strategy as a policy endeavor. In an overview of the entire American government in a 
commissioned “National Performance Review,” two of the Vice President’s suggestions to 
“invent a government that puts people first” are “Replace regulations with incentives” and 
“Search for market, not administrative solutions.”460 It should be lost on no one that the language 
of the “performance review” is explicitly borrowed from corporate management—Gore simply 
applied this logic of a “performance review” to the ferociously complex, trillion-dollar social 
organization known as the federal government. 
Perhaps the turning point for the Democratic Party’s embrace of this new way of thinking 
comes with debates over “welfare reform” in the mid-1990s. As then-First Lady Hillary Clinton 
wrote of President Bill Clinton’s welfare reform bill, “Bill promised to ‘end welfare as we know 
it’ and to make the program pro-work and pro-family… Bill and I, along with members of 
Congress who wanted productive reform, believed that people able to work should work. But we 
recognize that assistance and incentives were necessary to help people move permanently from 
                                                
458 A charitable interpretation of this point is that Republican administrations have both aggressively implemented 
“incentive-based” approaches as well as deregulating entire industries through a variety of other nefarious strategies 
that Cooper details. Essentially, Cooper’s thesis is that the last six presidents, starting with Carter and moving 
forward into the present have had their own strategies for deregulating industries and governmental agencies, but 
have used different tactics to accomplish a singular goal. 
 
459 Quoted in Cooper, The War Against Regulation, 78. 
 
460 Al Gore, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government that Works Better and Costs Less, Report of the 
National Performance Review (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), 7. 
 243 
welfare to employment.”461 Foucault identified this as a neoliberal strategy, to get as many 
people as possible to play the “economic game” as possible, and for the state to facilitate and 
officiate.462 By giving poor people the “ends” of a social welfare system—housing, food, money, 
governments blunt the poor’s incentive to work. Instead, a mediating object—an incentive—
must intercede, and in this case, that incentive is privation. The Congressional Research Service 
notes that the bill “imposed a 5-year limit on basic ongoing aid paid with federal funds. It 
required states to engage recipients in state-defined ‘work’ after 24 months of aid, achieve 
minimum participation rates in federally recognized work activities, and spend on needy families 
from their own funds at least 75% of the sum they spent in FY1994 on programs replaced by 
TANF [Temporary Assistance to Needy Families]—maintenance-of-effort (MOE) rule.”463 
The results of this bill for many have been catastrophic—although the poverty rate fell 
prior to the 2000 recession, the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities notes that “TANF plays 
much less of a role in reducing poverty than AFDC [the welfare law replaced by TANF] did—
and the provision of less cash assistance has contributed to an increase in deep or extreme 
poverty. Although a key focus of welfare reform was on increasing employment among cash 
assistance recipients, states spend little of their TANF funds to help improve recipients’ 
employability.”464 The globalization of the “incentive-based” approach to social problems entails 
a code-switch from a structural to an individual one because it demands we ask what 
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463 Vee Burke, “The 1996 Welfare Reform Law,” Congressional Research Service, 
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retroactively accounted for an unexpected outcome: By what are people in extreme poverty 
incentivized, if not by payments? 
So although the “incentive-based” approach is nothing new for the Democratic Party, 
what do we make of the Obama administration’s explicit endorsement of behavioral economics 
specifically? Behavioral economics accepts the precepts of neoclassical economics, only making 
cosmetic changes to individual utility functions to retain the force of equilibrium approaches 
overall. As Rabin puts it, behavioral economics “is not based on a proposed paradigm shift in the 
basic approach of our field, but rather is a natural broadening of the field of economics…[it is] 
built on the premise that not only mainstream methods are great, but so too are mainstream 
economic assumptions.”465 Loewenstein and Ubel, in a piece for the New York Times, similarly 
argue, “Behavioral economics should complement, not substitute for, more substantive economic 
interventions [of] traditional economics.”466 Tellingly, the title of this editorial is “Economists 
Behaving Badly,” but this is not a rebuke of orthodox economists for having an inadequate 
theory of the subject, or for failing to predict the worldwide financial catastrophe in 2008. 
Rather, their argument is a perverted, self-faced (and self-effacing) argument about the 
conduct of behavioral economists—their complaint is that behavioral economics strays too far 
from the assumptions of neoclassical economics, and thus draws non-generalizable conclusions. 
Not to put too fine a Freudian point on this, but the “bad boys” of behavioral economics posit 
themselves as such because of the enjoyment they gather from the fetishistic disavowal of the 
power of the big Other of market discipline in the field of academic economics. Behavioral 
economists “know full well” that markets rationally coordinate behavior, and that individuals 
                                                
465 Matthew Rabin, “A Perspective on Psychology and Economics,” Institute of Business and Economic Research 
Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley (2002), 659. 
 
466 George Loewenstein and Peter Ubel, “Economics Behaving Badly,” New York Times, July 14, 2010, 
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maximize their utility function, yet they momentarily disobey to advertise (and enjoy) the 
seemingly “irrational” behaviors of individuals. Behavioral economists instantiate the enjoyment 
of the Other—the Freakonomists are not the only perverts in “economic culture.” 
Thaler and Sunstein also arbitrage this split in the discourse of economics by positing that 
there are two types of “people” in the world: “To keep our Latin usage to a minimum we will 
hereafter refer to these imaginary and real species as Econs and Humans.”467 Ariely, another 
prominent behavioral economist, admonishes traditional economics for privileging rationality 
over context, anchoring points, and irrationality.468 Despite these nods to such contexts, both 
projects tend to reaffirm rather than rebuke traditional neoclassical economic dicta. John B. 
Davis makes a similar point, since “individual psychology” is not a rigorously interrogated 
phenomenon in behavioral economics, only the presumption that people act quasi-irrationally in 
context, “psychological” insights do not matter in behavioral economics.469 Mirowski also raises 
this point: Theories of the individual, of development, or of groups from the discipline of 
psychology are never introduced as explanatory heuristics for interpreting available data in 
behavioral economic studies. Instead, the word “psychology” simply acts as a shibboleth for 
access to cultural privilege.470 
Overall, I contend that the “incentive-based” criticism of traditional governmental policy 
fails as a result of its own success, and here I re-introduce Lacan’s distinction between the “aim” 
and the “goal” of a subject. The Lacanian position begins with a general agreement with 
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neoclassical economics: The nature of desire is such that aiming at an object and attaining it is 
impossible—it must go through some swerve or clinamen in order to achieve satisfaction. Such 
is the nature of the objet a: It is never the object of satisfaction, but rather, the signifier that 
resides within the object—satisfaction itself. To arrive at one’s object of desire is to destroy it; 
desire is sustained by “missing” that which is aimed at, only to circle back thereto. Laurent 
writes, “you have to aim at the object between the lines, using the subject’s chain of signifiers 
and equivocation… [I]n psychoanalysis you cannot grab hold of an object. You can, however, 
aim at it. Using signifiers, you have to target that point. You cannot hit it directly.”471 
Lacan posits that desire is sustained by saying “That’s not it!” when confronted with the 
supposed object thereof. This has everything to do with the signifier: Lacan emphasizes that the 
presence of the signifier is what swerves desire from its aim, which then becomes the point of 
investment itself. He illustrates this point by referring to archery, and playing off two senses of 
the term “but” in French, translatable as both “aim” and “goal.” He writes, “In archery, the goal 
is not the but either, it is not the bird you shoot, it is having scored a hit and thereby attained your 
but. If the drive may be satisfied without attaining what, from the point of view of a biological 
totalization of function, would be the satisfaction of its end of reproduction, it is because it is a 
partial drive, and its aim is simply this return into circuit.”472 In archery, there is no way to aim at 
“the score” directly, one must aim at “the bird” and achieve satisfaction thereby. Paradoxically, 
Lacan’s point is the satisfaction behind the object is thus not “the real thing” itself—it is not 
copulation, or bodily satisfaction (or even the bird), but the signifier, or the button tie that 
retroactively names the act of achievement. 
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Thus, it may be completely valid that governments set up “perverse incentives” for 
people to ruthlessly or unconsciously exploit to the detriment of society. Lacan’s intervention is 
to point out that shifting the stasis from one incentive scheme to another does not evade the form 
presupposed by any sign system. As long as there is a mediating principle (be it money, 
satisfaction, reward), there is an inevitable swerve around satisfaction of “the thing itself,” and 
the incentivized action becomes the object of desire itself. As argued in Chapter 4, perversion 
may very well be built into every incentive system. One example suffices from an alteration that 
the Clinton administration made to the income tax code: American corporations regularly exploit 
a tax loophole in which they can deduct only $1 million from their tax bill toward CEO 
compensation—unless the pay is designated as “incentive” or “performance” pay. According to 
Brian Hall of Harvard Business School, “The dramatic explosion in stock option grants during 
the past 15 years represents a major change in the financial incentives facing US top executives. 
CEOs of the largest US companies now receive annual stock option awards that are larger on 
average than their salaries and bonuses combined.”473 According to the Roosevelt Institute, this 
well-intentioned strategy to better tax executive pay has ended up completely inverting: it “has 
not only further driven the rise in average executive pay (while reducing tax revenues), but 
restructured it such that it has skewed economic incentives, arguably to the detriment of our 
economy.”474 That is, making pay more compatible with incentives ended in one of McCloskey’s 
“ironies of social engineering.”475 
                                                
473 Brian J. Hall, “The Pay to Performance Incentives of Executive Stock Options.” NBER Working Paper Series. 
National Bureau of Economic Research (1998), 1. 
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475 The Hillary Clinton 2016 presidential campaign also provided what in the future may be a textbook case of 
“incentive-based” policies that produce adverse consequences. The campaign unveiled an “Initiative on 
Technology” in June 2016 that, among many other provisions, proposed a “deferment incentive” on federal student 
 248 
My point is not that Lacan provides us an easy rebuke to neoclassical economics—rather, 
he points us toward the misplaced enthusiasm for “incentives” as a cure-all for social ills 
precisely because it fails to take seriously its founding proposition, that markets structure all 
behavior, even non-commodity activities. If “incentives are the cornerstone of modern life,” as 
Levitt and Dubner claim, then modern life fundamentally rests on the presumption that markets 
are the only way in which social life is registered. The structure of desire (as metonymic, as 
“impossible” to slake) does not change when incentives enter the frame—the argument is simply 
transposed, or better, metastasized, onto another register. That the discipline of economics is so 
invested in these deep ironies, and that current policymakers are invested in attempting to 
overcome them through more precise or more elaborate incentive schemes is simply a reminder 
that both are largely playing the same game by the same rules. The political challenge is that by 
not defying the fundamental precepts of market behavior, one cannot overcome the built-in 
dialectical reversals of fortunes that market theory presents to us. Without a challenge to the 
logic of private property as a whole, social policymakers do not get us out of this trap. 
A fully incentive-compatible system would entail the absolutely perfect calculation of all 
relevant incentives instantaneously—no free riders would be allowed to partake in social services 
(or sidewalks) without pay, no surplus enjoyment could be extracted from individual commodity 
purchases. A fully incentive-compatible system entails the abolition of remainders, and these 
remainders or fragments of enjoyment may be itself social bond itself. Schroeder argues that this 
fear is built into the very structure of market societies, that actual enjoyment (jouissance) is 
delayed or deferred while we circulate (among) the objects of our desires in commodity 
                                                                                                                                                       
loans repayment for people who open a “startup” company. That is, the campaign uses an explicit argument of 
“incentives” to induce entrepreneurial behavior—young people will now be incentivized to take on student loans 
and start small businesses in the hopes that those loans will be more easily paid back after 3 years of successfully 
running a business. See “Hillary Clinton’s Initiative on Technology and Innovation,” hillaryclinton.com, accessed 
June 28, 2016. 
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exchange. She writes, “Once wealth is maximized through the transfer of objects to the highest 
valuing user, all exchange will stop. Only then can market participants finally stop 
procrastinating and enjoy their objects of desire. The achievement of the perfect market would 
fulfill the end of the actual market and result in the end of the actual market.”476 Schroeder’s 
speculative judgments on the precepts of market theory should not be taken as empirical, or 
realistic. Rather, she points us to fundamentally what is embedded in the founding assumptions 
of such theories. The proper Lacanian point here is to note that the transposition of the 
organizing metaphor of market behavior onto other social behaviors entails the same result: We 
miss what we aim at because the “aim” of a given incentive scheme is inadequate to its “goal” 
for precisely the same reason that all desires are a deflection or deferral of the selfsame 
satisfaction. 
Another way of phrasing this question is as a question of mediation from the perspective 
of a government: With a global account of “incentives,” the state will still function, but will 
function mostly as a “vanishing mediator” between competing market actors, providing incentive 
structures for citizens to adopt “socially beneficial” behaviors, like eating healthy foods and 
signing up for retirement plans, as Thaler and Sunstein advocate.477 Thus the issue of 
redistributive justice can be explicitly evaded, since properly incentivized citizens will be able to 
choose proper behaviors in a market society. Instead, or in addition to the superegoic injunction 
“Enjoy!”, the dictum “Act in accordance with your own incentive!” will be offered to the 
subjects of any given state. Blurring the “aim” and the “goal” via an incentive scheme entails 
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individuals being perfectly responsible for any given outcome—a healthy polity is the result of 
individuals making healthy consumer and behavioral choices. Instead of vigorous taxation or 
regulatory regimes for businesses, governments will provide monetary incentives for proper 
actions, such as cash rewards for companies that reduce their emissions.478 Presumably, tax 
revenues will be collected from companies that pollute over the legal limit, and from 
“traditional” sources, but they do not offer a limit to this remuneration. It may seem like a 
“slippery slope” argument toward the abolition of the state, but at least within their own explicit 
comments, Thaler and Sunstein only advocate for the state to simply “incentivize” and contour 
behavior by disbursing cash payments toward its political priorities. 
This is an open challenge to the traditions of social democracy and other “progressive” 
ways of thinking about governmental action as the complex expression of social priorities. The 
“incentive-based” discursive formation by and large smuggles in explicitly neoclassical 
assumptions about individuals, society and the shape and role of the state. Any social 
phenomenon can be rearticulated as an “incentive” problem—it is indeed a metastatic vocabulary 
that functions as both a displacement of alternative explanations and a condensation of 
attachments to a strictly neoclassical view of social reality. The question is what we lose along 
the way. And the cultural prevalence of this discursive formation in political debates, in popular 
culture, in economic theory, online, in news, and in individual utterances, signals that we should 
at least be cognizant and vigilant about how and under what circumstances the term is deployed. 
This dissertation is merely the jumping off point for interrogating new sites of inquiry that use 
this term as a Trojan horse, and then a cudgel, or for market-based solutions to complex 
problems.  
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